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EDITORIAL

This is a rather larger issue than normal because there seem to be so many items that need to be covered at this time. It is very appropriate that we should include '**Appreciations**' of two notable figures in Sudan affairs. Firstly, **Professor Robert Collins** noted for his work on the history of southern Sudan. Endre Stiansen of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, is a longtime friend. Secondly, **Sir Donald Hawley** receives his from Philip Bowcock, both he and Sir Donald were members of the Sudan Political Service. Members may also be aware that **Glencairn Balfour-Paul** another former member of the SPS died in July this year. From 1952-55 he was Resident at El Geneina. I am aware that so many of the '**Appreciations**' that have appeared in *Sudan Studies* have been of Europeans or Americans. **As Editor, I would be pleased to include 'Appreciations' of important Sudanese who have passed on.**

More happily, we include a profile of **Ibrahim El-Salahi**, our newly appointed President, and are pleased to report that earlier this year the UN Environment Programme awarded its top 'Environmental Champions of the Earth' award to a Sudanese, **Balgis Osman-Elasha**, for her work on coping with climatic change with special reference to Darfur.

This issue contains a long article by **Dr Mohammed Elansari Ali** on the Sudan Peace Process. Mohammed, a Sudanese Lecturer in Humanitarian Studies, has just completed further postdoctoral work in London in Diplomatic Studies. In 2007, **Pieter Tesch** accompanied the Associated Parliamentary Group on a fact finding visit to Sudan led by David Drew (Lab., Stroud) and he provides us with a summary of their Report. Both articles stress the important need under the CPA to settle the situation over **Abyei**. There is an interesting article about this in *African Affairs* 107 (No.426, January 2008) by our Chairperson, Douglas Johnson.

The third main paper, by **John Udal**, until recently a member of the SSSUK Committee, is about the history of the Shukriya, a group with main concentration in the Butana.

Jane Hogan, in charge of the Sudan Archive at Durham University, has provided us with a list of recently published books about the Sudan which I trust members will find useful. **If you can recommend any other books published since 2004 please let me know and these can appear as a supplementary list.** There are no book reviews in this issue, so I would like to receive from **members, reviews of books about the Sudan for future publication.** Why not choose one from the book list? – and, *please do not leave this to Committee members!!*

Members may be interested to know that a **Sudan Studies Society (SSS)** has been set up **in the Sudan with Professor Yusuf Fadl Hassan as President**, based in the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, P O Box 321, Khartoum 11115.

Elsewhere in this issue you will find a reminder of our **Annual Symposium/AGM** to be held in SOAS, on **4 October 2008** (note the later date to avoid Ramadan). Further information is included with this posting. This is an annual event which you should not miss! Last minute information will be found, in due course, on the SSSUK web-site. **I shall be approaching speakers at the Symposium asking them to write up their papers for Sudan Studies!!**

Ibrahim El-Salahi

A Profile of the new SSSUK President

Ibrahim El-Salahi was born in Omdurman, Sudan in 1930. He studied at the School of Design at Gordon Memorial College and Khartoum Technical Institute (now Sudan University for Sciences and Technology), and worked as an art teacher until he was awarded a scholarship to the Slade School of Art in London. After completing his studies in Europe, El-Salahi returned to Sudan, where he taught for a number of years at the Khartoum School of Fine and Applied Art. Alongside his career as an artist, he has held various Sudanese and Qatari government posts and has served as a consultant for UNESCO. Most recently he was a Visiting Scholar at Cornell University, where he worked on the major retrospective of his work planned for 2010 in the new building of the Museum for African Art, New York.

El-Salahi has held numerous one-man shows, and has participated in group shows all over the world. His work has been acquired by a number of museums and private collections. In 2001 he became one of the laureates of the Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development, on the grounds that he *'made history as a painter and teacher in post-independence Sudan. He draws his visual vocabulary from the visual and literary heritage of Sudan and is responsible for opening the door to modernism in Sudan and the Arab world, thereby creating links with other parts of Africa and the wider world, and becoming an example to generations of African artists.'*

Robert Collins (1933-2008) An Appreciation

Professor Robert Oakley Collins died of cancer in California on April 11th 2008, aged 75. He worked almost to the end, and for many his death came as a sad surprise. Comments posted on the internet, and the special session hurriedly organized at the Sudan Studies Association's annual meeting in Florida, bore witness to a life of great personal and professional accomplishment.

Although Collins will always be remembered as the historian of the Southern Sudan, his research interests were not limited to the Nile Valley. In the course of a career of more than fifty years he published four monographs covering the history of South Sudan from the beginning of the Mahdiyya (1880s) to the end of the Condominium in 1956. His other contributions to the history of the Sudan and on the hydro-politics of the Nile (several monographs, an edited volume and numerous articles) also belong to this category. His last book, *A History of Modern Sudan*, will be released by Cambridge University Press this summer.

A second category of work is what he called 'problem books'. These were issue-oriented texts aimed at American University students with little or no previous knowledge of Africa. They gave many budding Africanists their first introduction to a rapidly evolving field. Their reprinting through the 1990s testifies to their usefulness. Collins's books on such contemporary issues as relations between Sudan, Chad, Libya and Islamism, which he wrote with J Millard Burr, introduced his work to new readers whilst *Alms for Jihad: charity and terrorism in the Islamic world* (2006) won some notoriety when Cambridge U P withdrew it under the threat of legal action from a Saudi businessman.

He earned numerous honours: perhaps the one he enjoyed most was the Jon Ben Snow Prize for the best book in British Studies



for, *Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956* (Yale 1983). He received the Order of Sciences, Arts – Gold Class from the Democratic Republic of Sudan in 1980 for his contributions to Sudanese scholarship. A long association with Durham University included the Trevelyan Fellowship. He was Visiting Fellow at Balliol, his old Oxford College, and held many appointments, foundation fellowships and research awards in North America, Europe and Africa.

Collins engaged the public sphere by writing many background papers aimed at policy makers. These addressed contemporary issues and reveal a shrewd analyst who stressed the need to look at the large picture. To the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in November 1981 he argued, *“America must avoid at all costs any efforts by friend of foe that would push the United States and the Sudan into insulting situations”*. Relations between the two countries deteriorated steadily during the years that followed. He welcomed the (second) Bush administration’s decision to move US policy towards the Sudan from isolation to constructive engagement, and he lauded the most important result of this change, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (signed on January 9th 2005). However, he was not naïve about the prospects for the ‘New Sudan’. In a short essay soon after the signing he coined the term the ‘Naivasha Enigma’: *“Are the Sudanese Islamists ready to abandon their ideology, their mission, and above all their power in return for a united, democratic Sudan or is it just more of the same tactics of give-and-take, stonewall, and prevarication that has characterized their governance [since 1989]?”*

Professor Collins spent most of his career at the University of California, Santa Barbara, which he joined in 1965 after teaching stints at Williams College and Columbia University. For ten years he served as Dean of UCSB’s Graduate Division. This was a time of rapid expansion, and he played many roles, not least in supervising numerous doctoral students. Less well-known is that

Collins wrote the report of the University of California Library Task Force that led to the system-wide electronic catalogue known as 'Melvyl'. This was to lead to the UC system becoming one of the best publicly funded universities in the world.

How should Robert Collins's many contributions to the world of learning be assessed? Undoubtedly, his books on the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium will stand for years to come. Future students will most likely associate him more with the University of Durham than with Santa Barbara because he donated his library, as well as all his research materials to Durham's Sudan Archive. The value of this gift is immeasurable because it brings together such a wide range of resources from the 19th century down to to-day and it includes his journals and personal papers. The journals are as rich on the wily world of the Northern Sudanese establishment as on the ins-and-outs of the Southern elite.

I want to end this appreciation on a personal note. For one full year (1991) I had the pleasure of studying with Professor Collins at Santa Barbara. To this day I have some doubt that I would have finished my doctorate without his gentle but determined tutelage. In subsequent years he was a model of collegiality, and to me he will always represent the very best of a tradition of scholarship that goes back to Arkell, Hill and Holt. Nor was I the only one to benefit from his generosity. He was always interested, courteous and good company. He was a true raconteur holding large audiences captive with stories from 'the quest for the sources of the Nile', or the lives of the 'bog barons'. His old yellow beetle became his trademark on campus. I hope he died content with a lifetime of achievement, as a historian, a teacher, and a man.

Endre Stiansen



**Sir Donald Hawley, KCMG, MBE, (1921-2008),
and the Sudan:**

An Appreciation.

Donald Hawley arrived in the Sudan in December, 1941 after taking a war time degree in law at Oxford. He had been selected under a rather intelligent scheme whereby men destined to work in an overseas territory after the war would do war service with the soldiers of that territory. He was commissioned as a bimbashi in the Sudan Artillery and was first posted to Kufra Oasis in Libya until the battle of El Alamein meant that the garrison could be safely removed. Later, having reached Tripoli, the capital of Libya, he was withdrawn from the Sudan Defence Force for civilian duties at the end of 1943.

His first substantive posting was as Assistant District Commissioner at Kosti on the White Nile south of Khartoum. Sixty two years later there was a pleasing postscript: when the British pensioners' party visited the impressive Kenana sugar project in January 2006 and local notables came to bring their greetings. There followed a spell in Gedaref and then a transfer to the Legal Department, first as Police Magistrate Khartoum in mid 1947 and ultimately Chief Registrar, after being called to the English Bar. His work in land registration was to be of particular significance in the Emirates and the Sudan.

*"It was a sad day for the Sudan when the Sudanisation Committee decided that British judges were proper subjects for Sudanisation", Hawley comments in **Sandtracks in the Sudan**, "This meant that Sudanese judges in the future would have a tough task in keeping the judiciary out of politics. Doubts began to grow in my mind as to whether a future Sudanese Judiciary so rooted in English Common Law and tradition could stand intact against*



pressures from politicians and lawyers trained in the very different Egyptian system – based on the Code Napoléon. Meantime preparation for withdrawal in friendship and dignity was the best service we could give. We left behind a far less strong and independent Judiciary than in many other overseas territories, - India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and Nigeria are notable examples where Judiciaries remained strong.” Writing some fourteen years later one might comment that the judiciary and the legal profession in Pakistan have had a significant influence in recent events there. Could a similar thing happen in the Sudan? It seems doubtful.

Hawley then joined the British Diplomatic Service, part of a batch from the Sudan Political Service to do so. His first overseas post was as Political Agent in Dubai. His recent memoir, ***The Emirates: Witness to a Metamorphosis***, describes the Emirates as they are in the twenty first century and then transcribes his diary of the 1960's. The contrast between the two periods is almost incredible. Then, they had hardly any facilities of a modern state such as ports, telephones, good roads, municipal services and schools. Now they are stable and prosperous with a key place in the world's communications and finances. Hawley realised that the Trucial States needed much professional expertise and he saw the Sudan as the best source. He made two journeys to Khartoum and recruited widely in education, municipal government, law, land registration and other fields. If it has not been already done there is scope for a history thesis on the contribution of Sudanese professionals to the development of the Emirates. Looking back, one can see that the demise of the Sudan Political Service was an answer to the Foreign Office's prayer. Relations with the Gulf States had been the responsibility of the Indian Political Service. It now fell to the British Diplomatic Service and who did they have to do it? Suddenly there appeared a group of experienced administrators, speaking fluent Arabic and understanding Islam and its culture.

Almost without exception they did well and eventually became Heads of Mission.

Hawley then moved up the promotion ladder, with postings to Egypt, Iraq and Nigeria. He was the first British ambassador to Oman, in a new era for British/Omani relations with a new Sultan and membership of the United Nations. His career culminated in the major appointment of High Commissioner to Malaysia.

But he was not ready for a quiet retirement, taking on business responsibilities and a number of charitable tasks. He was Chairman of the Council of Reading University, the Royal Asian Society, the Anglo-Omani society and the Sudan British Pensioners Association. In this capacity he was invaluable in keeping members in touch with events in the Sudan when little news filtered out. He received the invitation from Sayyid Ibrahim Moneim Mansour for a party to visit the Sudan on the fiftieth anniversary of independence in January 2006. He was the leader and responded graciously and with humour to the speeches of welcome.

He was a prolific and entertaining author. In addition to *The Emirates: Witness to a Metamorphosis* already mentioned, his publications include: *The Trucial States; Courtesies in the Gulf Area; Oman and its Renaissance* and his autobiography, *Desert Wind and Tropic Storm*. Specifically on the Sudan there were *Sandtracks in the Sudan* and two collections of reminiscences which he edited, *Sudan Canterbury Tales* and *Khartoum Perspectives*. He rightly believed that such writings concentrate excessively on the Administration and tend to overlook the contribution of the departmental officers. The former book is now reported to have been translated into Arabic and to be on its second printing.

Donald Hawley married Ruth in Cairo and they had three daughters and a son. Caroline was at one time seen daily on our television screens reporting from Iraq for the BBC. Donald made good and lasting friends wherever he lived, of every nationality, especially Sudanese. The huge number who crowded in to his memorial service in the crypt of St. Paul's Cathedral testified to that and many of them had to stand. In his address Lord Carrington referred to the twinkle in Donald's eye: his courtesy and humour made him the best of company which he combined with an outstanding capacity for getting things done. He could say with Leigh Hunt's Abou Ben Adhem "*Write me as one that loves his fellow-men*". Among these, the people of the Sudan were prominent.

Philip Bowcock

THE SUDAN PEACE PROCESS

Mohamed Elansari Ali

There has been an on and off civil war in the Sudan since 1955. The first phase of the conflict was brought to an end by the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement signed between the government and southern rebels led by General Joseph Lagu. Civil war re-ignited in 1983. The principal rebel protagonist since then has been the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang. It is estimated that there have been two million deaths as a result of the conflict as well as over four million refugees¹. However, there have also been two other areas of conflict in Darfur and the Red Sea.

There have been numerous attempts, both internationally and from within the Sudan itself, to bring the North-South war to an end. The longest running forum has been that sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional body consisting of Sudan and several of her neighbouring states.

This paper now looks in turn at the various attempts that have been made leading up to the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) signed in January 2005. First of all, attempts by the various parties in the Sudan to come to an agreement will be discussed, followed by attempts by various countries individually to mediate between the various parties, and lastly by the interventions of IGAD.

¹ Almahdi, M., April 2007. The Assessment by the Umma National Party of the Implementation of the CPA.



ATTEMPTS BY THE VARIOUS SUDANESE GROUPS TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT INTERNALLY

The Addis Ababa Agreement - 1990

On 30th June 1989, discomfited by the suffering of the Sudanese people and concerned at the political and economic crisis and the exploding security situation through which Sudan had been living, the SPLM/SPLA and the UMMA Party agreed on a programme of action. The SPLM/SPLA affirmed its solidarity with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and supported both the spirit and the general tenor of the Charter and Programme adopted by the NDA with the understanding that details of that Charter and Programme which were understandably worked out without its participation should be subject to the necessary alterations and fine tuning and, in this connection, the SPLM/SPLA drew attention to the policy declaration on the current Sudanese situation made by Dr. John Garang de Mabior on 14/15 August 1989. For the sake of better coordination, the two parties agreed on the urgent necessity of holding a meeting comprising all the signatories of the Charter on a date and a venue to be coordinated by the two parties. The two parties also agreed on the desirability of creating a standing coordinating organ for the NDA in which the SPLM/SPLA should participate.

The Frankfurt Agreement - 1992

In January 1992, the government negotiator, Ali el-Haj and Lam Akol of the SPLM/A-Nasir, made a joint statement on a '*special political and constitutional status*' for the south.

Nairobi Declaration - 1993

In March 1993, the NDA parties agreed that the basic human rights norms, including the *Right to Self-Determination* (RSD), be the basis of the future constitution of the Sudan.

Washington Declaration - 1993

The SPLM/A (Dr. John Garang) and SPLM/A-United (Dr. Riek Machar) agreed on the RSD for the southern Sudanese in October 1993.

Chukudum Agreement – 1994

The SPLM/A and the Umma Party also agreed to the same thing, the RSD for the people of the southern Sudan, *including Abyei*, at the Chukudum Agreement in December 1994.

The Nairobi declaration - 1994

The Sudanese National Democratic Alliance (NDA) held a historic meeting in the Kenyan Capital, Nairobi, on Saturday 17 April 1993. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA), the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Sudan Communist Party, the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), the Sudan African Congress (SAC), the Legitimate Command of the Sudanese Armed Forces and independent national figures.

The meeting was opened by the Commander Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLM/SPLA, who reiterated the firm commitment of the movement to the unity of the Sudan, emphasizing that such unity should be predicated on democracy, religious, ethnic and cultural pluralism and true commitment to social justice and respect for human rights. He said that the preferred option of the SPLM/SPLA was unity within the context of a 'New Sudan', reaffirming the Movement's commitment to the Charter, programme of action and resolutions of the NDA. Dr. Garang assured the meeting that the SPLM/SPLA would remain firm and true to the principles of this alliance even as it engaged in the forthcoming peace negotiations at Abuja, Nigeria. He appealed to the meeting to address the issues labelled for

discussion with honesty and candour, keeping in mind the critical historical period through which the country was passing and the immense human tragedy that the war had brought about: a war that had been deliberately escalated by the National Islamic Front regime, which in so doing had aroused international concern and won the condemnation of the international community.

The Asmara Agreement, 1994

The main Sudanese opposition forces of the Democratic Unionist Party, the SPLA/M, the Umma Party and the Sudanese Allied Forces met on Tuesday, 27th December 1994.

H.E. Mohammed Osman El Merqini, the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and two from the leadership of his party, Dr Garang De Mabior, the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement and Sudan Peoples Liberation Army SPLM/SPLA and two from the leadership of his movement, Dr. Omar Nur Eldayem the Secretary General, of the Umma Party and two from the party leadership and Brigadier PSC Abdel Aziz Khalid Osman, the leader of the Sudanese Allied Forces (SAF) and two from the leadership of that organization met and discussed the political development of the Sudanese problem and the consequences of the increasing suffering of the Sudanese people under the regime of the National Islamic Front. The meeting also discussed the continuing civil war and the consequences of the policies of the regime on the security and stability of the region².

² <http://www.alumma.net/07/7,07a.htm>

SUDANESE GROUPS ARE ASSISTED BY OUTSIDE AGENCIES

The Djibouti Agreement

On the 25th November 1999, in the capital of Djibouti, the Umma Leader Alsadig Almahdi and President Omer Al-Bashir met in response to an invitation from Ismail Omer Gile, President of Djibouti. They signed a declaration in principle, to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Sudan.

The Eritrean Initiatives to solve the Eastern Sudan Dilemma

The Government of Eritrea did well through the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), to resolve the Sudanese problems emanating from the historical relations between the peoples of both countries.

Often referred to as the forgotten conflict, the situation in Eastern Sudan has for several decades represented serious challenges to the population in the area, with violent confrontations between government forces and rebel movements. On the 14th of October 2006, the Sudanese government and the Eastern Front signed a peace agreement. The Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the Eastern Front (comprised of the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions) reached a peace agreement after intensive consultations. The negotiations were led by the Eritrean Government, and the peace talks were held in the Eritrean capital Asmara. The international community was not allowed to participate in these negotiations.

The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) lays down a framework for rehabilitation and development of this marginalized region, focusing on capacity building, strengthening of infrastructure, poverty eradication and a return of refugees and Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs). The agreement further requires that members of the Eastern Front

are represented in the GoNU. The ESPA also stipulates the establishment of a "Joint Implementation Committee", comprised of members from the Parties, to oversee the implementation of the agreement³.

The Sudanese Government agreed to invest 600 million dollars in the impoverished east of the country over a period of five years. Eritrea is, therefore, now more qualified to play a major role in bringing those Darfur rebels who did not sign a 2006 peace deal to the negotiating table with the Government.

The Libyan-Egyptian Initiative - 1999

In September 1999, Libya formally invited the NDA leadership Council to meet in Tripoli where it presented a specific initiative to resolve the conflicts in Sudan. The NDA unanimously accepted that initiative and signed the Tripoli Declaration in August 1999. Since then, Egypt has endorsed that initiative which became the Joint Egyptian - Libyan Initiative. The Khartoum Regime declared its acceptance of the joint initiative⁴.

On the 24th August 1999, the Sudanese Government accepted a Libyan - Egyptian plan to end the war. The parties would call a permanent cease-fire, attend a national peace conference and stop mounting media campaigns against each other. The progress of the Libyan - Egyptian negotiations was slow because both countries needed to avoid the issue of self determination. Therefore, this initiative resulted in a lack of success at every step.

On the 21st February 2000, the Libyan - Egyptian Initiative commenced with the Umma Party leader, Sadig al-Mahdi stating that plans were underway for the Egyptian Foreign Ministry to hold a four day meeting in Cairo with the Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir, the NDA leader Muhammad Osman

3 <http://www.norwaysudan.org/Norway+in+Sudan/peace+process/eastern+sudan/eastern+sudan.htm>

4 Letter from Al-Imam Alsadig Almahdi, Elected Prime Minister of Sudan, 1986 to Harry Johnston, U.S

Presidents Special Envoy on Sudan, Oct 1999.

al-Mirghani, the SPLA leader John Garang, and the Umma Party leader. He declared that the anticipated meeting would be held with the title, *The Search for Peace in the Sudan: 1989-2001* and the participation of Egypt and Libya would help to prepare for a dialogue conference, improve the atmosphere, and discuss all the outstanding issues to enable the Initiative to meet its goals. He further stated that the Sudanese government was seeking a comprehensive solution to the crisis and described Garang and the SPLA position towards the Egyptian-Libyan dialogue as vague. He urged Garang to take a clear-cut, frank position and declared that he would support peace. Mahdi also stated that Garang had been accused of using the war as a profitable industry and that Garang had returned from his visit to the USA in July of the previous year more determined to reject the Egyptian-Libyan Initiative and was willing to kill it off due to temptations and promises made to him in Washington.

[In 2001 there was an **Agreement in Geneva** between the People's National Congress (Dr. Hassan El Turabi) and the SPLM/A (Dr. John Garang) which recognized the right to self determination for the people of the southern Sudan and criticized the Libyan – Egyptian Initiative on this point.]

The Cairo agreement, signed on June 22nd 2005, was between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, who chairs the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA), and the Sudanese Vice President, Ali Osman Taha, signed the document.

The Nigerian Initiatives in the Southern and Western Sudan crises

Between the 26th May and 4th June 1992, the first Abuja peace talks were held between the Sudanese Government and the SPLA under the auspices of President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria. Both parties recognised that Sudan is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious country and

agreed to work towards a peaceful resolution of the Sudanese conflict. Mohammed Al-Amin Khalifa, leader of the Sudanese delegation, stated that the two sides agreed to meet again in Nigeria.

The second Abuja peace talks were held in Nigeria between 26th April and 17th May, 1993. A wide number of constitutional, political and social issues were discussed. The peace-talks focused on several themes: power-sharing between the central authority and the federated states, the powers of a central authority and the use of referendums as a means of judging the wishes of people in southern Sudan. It was agreed that any future dispensation would involve a distinct separation of powers within Sudan. A number of interim measures were discussed, including security and military considerations, the resettlement and rehabilitation of those affected by the civil war and the status of the south during any future interim period. A considerable amount of common ground was covered and agreed, and the Nigerian hosts of the talks began drafting the final communiqué. John Garang arrived in Abuja a day before the end of the talks and demanded the redrafting of what had previously been agreed upon. He called for the inclusion of the devolution to the states of powers not specifically vested with central government. This was a reversal of the accepted federal models whereby those powers not vested with the states are reserved for the federal government. These demands effectively derailed the negotiations. The Nigerian Government issued a statement outlining the course of the talks, the agreements and disagreements, and called upon the two sides to continue their dialogue. Nigeria also declared its willingness to continue its mediation efforts.

Besides these two serious meetings, Nigeria is one of the main actors in the Sudan peace process through her position as an IGAD partner. Nigeria was also involved with the Darfur issue.

The Darfur Peace Agreement, signed May 5th 2006, by the largest rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Movement and led by

Mini Menawi, and the Sudanese Government, was an important achievement for peace in Darfur. It was a fair agreement that addressed the long-standing marginalization of Darfur, and charted a path for lasting peace for the innocent victims of the crisis. The agreement required that the Sudanese Government of National Unity complete verifiable disarmament and demobilization of the *Janjaweed* militia by mid October 2006 and placed restrictions on the movements of the Popular Defence Forces and required their downsizing. A detailed sequencing and phasing schedule ensured that the African Union could certify that the *Janjaweed* and other armed militia have been disarmed before rebel forces assemble and prepare for their own disarmament and demobilization. The agreement stipulated that 4,000 former combatants be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces, 1,000 be integrated into the police forces, and 3,000 be supported through education and training programmes. The former combatants would be integrated in groups of 100-150 and would comprise 33 percent of each integrated battalion.

Democratic processes have been laid out for the people of Darfur to choose their leaders and determine their status as a region. Rebel signatories of the agreement were awarded the 4th highest position in the Sudanese Government of National Unity: Senior Assistant to the President and Chairperson of the newly established Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). The TDRA will be responsible for the implementation of the peace agreement in Darfur and the rebel movements will have effective control of that body. In July 2010, a popular referendum will be held to decide whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region with a single government. For the three-year period prior to elections, the agreement grants the rebel movements twelve seats in the National Assembly in Khartoum, 21 seats in each of the Darfur State legislatures, one State Governor and two Deputy State Governors in Darfur, senior positions in State Ministries, and key posts in local governments.

The accord commits the international community to holding a donors' conference to pledge additional funds for Darfur, and invites the TDRA Chairperson to present to that conference a summary of needs and priorities. The GNU is mandated to contribute \$300 million initially and then \$200 million/year for the next two years to rebuild the region. A Joint Assessment Mission – modelled on the one for Southern reconstruction after the Comprehensive (North-South) Peace Agreement – will be established to determine the specific reconstruction and development needs of Darfur.

Buffer zones are to be established around camps for internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance corridors, and a commission has been created to work with the United Nations to help refugees and displaced persons return to their homes. The agreement includes a provision by the Sudanese Government of \$30 million in compensation to victims of the conflict⁵.

THE IGAD INITIATIVE TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SPLA/M AND THE KHARTOUM GOVERNMENT

The Greater Horn region is well-known to be one of the most politically explosive areas in the world. The root causes of the several wars hosted by this area are deeply internal. With the exception of the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute of the Ogaden region, there has not been any inter-state war, but every domestic conflict should be considered as wider due to the porosity of the boundaries and with the economic inter-dependency of the Horn. During the last decades the relations between Khartoum and regional actors has been characterized by a tit-for-tat pattern. A diplomacy based on mutual intervention is the result of the common belief among the countries of the Horn that "*the enemy of my enemy is my friend*".

5 21.04.2007 United States institute of peace <http://www.usip.org/research/rchr/sudanconf/panel6.html>



Since 1961, the Eritrean Liberation Front has been supported by the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A has been backed from Addis Ababa and in turn both interfered in Sudan affairs. There was also a Uganda regional dimension. By the early 1990s, the NIF's government of the Sudan began to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. This caused, in 1993, a decline in the relations between Sudan and its former allies such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt and caused the isolation of Khartoum in the region.

As a result of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998 and with more moderate foreign policies thanks to the marginalisation of the NIF leader Turabi, Khartoum achieved conciliatory relations with neighbouring countries. With the current status of the relations between the GoS and the regional countries, IGAD is poised to be a more suitable sponsor of the 'Peace Process'. As the Sudanese conflict is related to Sudan's relations with its neighbours, it is more beneficial that a regional organization manages the peace talks. The IGAD mediation started with concerns that the Sudanese conflict was a security threat to the region and could cause a spill-over into the neighbouring countries. Whilst regional states may benefit in the short-term from the conflict, *"their long term interest may change, and they may see internal conflict in broader regional terms"*⁶.

An attempt to solve the crisis in southern Sudan involved a 24-step initiative set up by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This was more likely to be successful because it came from real need, had a logical agenda and clear method. The IGAD members are Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya⁷.

6 Conciliation Resources / www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/negotiating-naivasha.php

7 Adar, Korwa G., 1998. *A State Under Siege: The Internationalisation of the Sudanese Civil War*.



IGAD's History

Its original title was the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) when formed in 1986, with a very narrow mandate around the issues of drought and desertification. The founding members decided in the mid-1990s to revitalise the organisation into a fully-fledged regional political, economic, development, trade and security entity similar to SADC and ECOWAS. It was envisaged that the new IGAD would form the northern sector of COMESA with SADC representing the southern sector.

One of the principal motivations for the revitalisation of IGADD was the existence of many organisational and structural problems that made the implementation of its goals and principles ineffective. The IGADD Heads of State and Government met on 18 April 1995 at an Extraordinary Summit in Addis Ababa and resolved to revitalise the Authority and expand its areas of regional co-operation. On 21 March 1996, the Heads of State and Government at the Second Extraordinary Summit in Nairobi approved and adopted an Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In April 1996 on the recommendation of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government, the IGAD Council of Ministers identified three priority areas of cooperation:

- Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Humanitarian Affairs;
- Infrastructure Development (Transport and Communications);
- Food Security and Environment Protection⁸.

Between the 17th and 23rd March 1994, the Government and SPLA met in Nairobi for the first time for peace talks under the

⁸ Anyang' Nyong'o, P. 1991. 'The Implications of Crises and Conflicts in the Upper Nile Valley', in Deng, F.M. & Zartman, I.W. (eds), *Conflict Resolution in Africa* 95-114, Washington D.C. Brookings Institution.



auspices of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Both sides agreed principles of neutral humanitarian assistance carried out by Operation Lifeline Sudan and corridors of tranquillity for ten weeks for child vaccination.

Between 17th and 20th May 1994, the second round of IGADD-sponsored peace talks took place in Nairobi. The government outlined a unitary federal state with *Sharia* as a source of law with some exemptions for non-Muslims. The SPLA put forward self-determination and a complete rejection of *Sharia*. There was no political agreement. The mediators issued a 'Declaration of Principles' outlining a secular state with guarantees of equality. If agreement could not be reached on this, then a referendum on southern self-determination was envisaged⁹.

Between 19th and 29th July 1994, the third round of IGADD sponsored talks was held, in Nairobi. No progress was made on the issue of a secular state. The Khartoum Government accepted the principle of a referendum on southern self-determination. The Government declared a cease-fire effective from 23rd July.

On the 6th September 1994, the fourth round of IGADD talks took place between the Government and the SPLA and was held in Nairobi. No progress whatsoever was made and the meeting was adjourned.

During July 1997, at the IGAD Heads-of-State summit meeting, Sudanese President al-Bashir stated that Sudan accepted the IGAD 'Declaration of Principles' as the basis for a negotiated end to the Sudanese conflict. The five leaders at the IGAD talks also issued a statement saying: *"The summit welcomed the acceptance by the government of Sudan of the declaration of principles as the basis for discussions and negotiations. The summit considered this development a major breakthrough in*

⁹ The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, May 2002. *The search for peace in the Sudan: A Chronology of the Sudanese Peace Process 1989-2001*.



the peace initiative. This will enable the parties to the conflict to freely discuss and negotiate on all the points enshrined in the declaration of principles. The summit requests the chairman of the IGAD peace initiative to take the necessary measures aimed at a speedy resumption of the negotiations."

In addition, the US Government stated that it strongly supports IGAD as the only viable interlocutor for peace talks on Sudan at this time¹⁰. *"We support the IGAD declaration of principles as the basis for such talks. We do not view the April peace agreement signed between the government of Sudan and the splinter rebel southern factions as a viable alternative to peace in Sudan. We have actively countered the government of Sudan's efforts to utilise other mediators and the April peace agreement as vehicles to divide international support for IGAD."* ('Meeting on Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan', United States Institute of Peace).

During 1994, IGAD started to undertake conflict management tasks when the Authority hosted and facilitated negotiating sessions between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the rebel forces from southern Sudan in an attempt to end the civil war.

During the same year the IGAD Declaration of Principles was presented to the Government of Sudan. It was rejected not because it referred to self-determination but because it was presented as an ultimatum related to the question of Sudan's secularization and as a precondition to formal talks. Although the government delegation was understandably disappointed that the question of self-determination had been pre-empted by Ali el-Haj's discussions with the SPLM-Nasir in Frankfurt in 1992, its real concern was that *Sharia* should remain a source of law in Sudan, at least among Muslims. For the southerners, the question of self-determination was critical, but it was

¹⁰ United States institute of peace <http://www.usip.org/research/rehr/sudanconf/panel6.html>



unacceptable to the Government of Sudan (GoS) that this became a precondition for negotiation¹¹.

By 1997, both sides were more war-weary; the government had negotiated the Khartoum Peace Agreement with a number of southern militias and was seeking to improve its relations with the other IGAD member states. Therefore, the conditions for talks were more conducive. There was also more international pressure, stimulated by increased public awareness of the 'forgotten war'. But it was not clear whether the SPLM/A was committed to finding a peaceful solution, and between 1997 and 1999 little was achieved. The language remained hostile and both sides kept their cards close to their chest and maintained maximal positions. However, one important factor had changed. The people had tasted peace in the form of increased freedom of movement and economic activity, and they began to put pressure on their leaders not to go back to war¹².

The new Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) created a department for conflict management. Article 18 of the agreement established that the IGAD member states should act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic development¹³.

IGAD as an institution and as an association of states is weak. The IGAD Secretariat has not been able to sustain the momentum of the peace process by detailed follow-up of peace talks and examination of technical issues. The negotiation mechanism is cumbersome and slow. The Ethio-Eritrean dispute has shattered the unity of IGAD's two most active states, and has challenged the very credibility of the organisation itself.

11 H el-Mukhtar M, 2006 'Negotiating peace: the road to Naivasha', Academic paper presented to Accord Forum in Khartoum.

12 Conciliation Resources / www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/negotiating-naivasha.php

13 Deng, F.M. 1995. Mediating the Sudanese Conflict: A Challenge for the IGADD, CSIS Africa Notes, No. 169 (Feb), 1-7.

The original Ministerial Subcommittee has since been replaced by a permanent secretariat on the Sudan Peace Process, based in Nairobi, to mount a sustained effort to resolve the conflict. President Moi appointed Lieutenant-General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, as special envoy to Sudan. The first round of talks held under this arrangement began in February, 2000. In July 2002, talks in Machakos, Kenya, resulted in the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) signing the Machakos Protocol.

The Machakos Initiative

The Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (the Parties) met in Machakos Kenya, from 18th June 2002 to the 20th July 2002, under the auspices of the IGAD Peace Process¹⁴. Machakos was indeed a breakthrough. It not only generated a basis for a common text but it also saw the parties agree on both principles and details on issues that had previously seemed intractable. Firstly, the two parties agreed substantively on a way of dealing with the relationship between the Sudanese state and religion. This issue had been the stumbling block in previous talks between the parties and had served to prevent the parties from progressing to other substantive issues. It had been suggested that if this issue could be resolved other issues would fall into place. Secondly, the parties agreed on a set of general principles to govern a federal Sudan. Thirdly, the parties agreed significantly on the right of southern Sudan to hold a referendum on its continued union with northern Sudan after a six-year trial period. The last two issues, in essence, constituted a trade-off between the parties, while the first contained an internal compromise on the part of both parties¹⁵.

14 Machakos Protocol, Text of the Agreement between The Government of Sudan & The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on July 20, 2002.

15 Press interview in 2006, with Nicholas (Fink) Haysom, who has extensive direct experience of mediation and facilitation in a number of peace processes.



A six-year interim period (dated from 9th July 2005) was agreed on, during which the southern Sudanese will have the right to govern affairs in their region and participate equitably in the national government. Peace implementation is to be conducted in ways that make the unity of Sudan attractive. After the interim period, southern Sudan will have the right to vote in an internationally monitored referendum, either to confirm Sudan's unity, or to vote for secession. *Sharia* law is to remain applicable in the north and parts of the constitution are to be re-written so that *Sharia* does not apply to any non-Muslims, throughout the Sudan. The status of *Sharia* in Khartoum is to be decided by an elected assembly¹⁶. With the signing of the Naivasha Agreement in January 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement process would seem to be complete, but in many ways this is only the beginning with many pitfalls ahead, not least because the various parties were compelled to make concessions of which neither really approved and because there were so many loose ends.

The Agreement on Power Sharing:

It was agreed on 26 May 2004 that Sudan will have both a national government, with representation from both sides of the North/South conflict, and a separate Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). The Southern Sudan Constitution and state constitution must comply with the Interim National Constitution. A Government of National Unity is to be formed. There shall be a decentralized system of government, granting more power to individual states.

Positions in the state governments are to be split 70:30 in favour of the NCP in northern states (20% for other northern parties and 10% for the SPLM) and 70:30 in favour of the SPLM in southern states (15% for other southern parties and 15% for the

¹⁶ Avruch, K. & Black, P. 1991. 'The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution,' *Peace and Change* 16, 22-45.



NCP). In Abyei, the Blue Nile State and Nuba Mountains, the division will be 55% for the NCP and 45% for the SPLM¹⁷.

The executive will consist of the Presidency and the Council of Ministers. Two Vice-Presidents will be appointed by the President. The First Vice President is the Chair of the SPLM.

A bicameral national legislature will be established: the National Assembly will be comprised of specific percentages (NCP 52% SPLM 28% other northern parties 14% other southern parties 6%); two representatives from each state will be represented in the Council of States.

Elections will be held by the end of the third year of the interim period.

The Agreement on Wealth Sharing

A National Land Commission, Southern Sudan Land Commission and a State Land Commission, are to be established. A National Petroleum Commission is to be established to manage petroleum resources.

2% of oil revenue will go to oil-producing states in southern Sudan, in proportion to their output. The remaining net revenue will be divided evenly, with 50% allocated to the GoSS and 50% allocated to the national government. The GoSS has no power to negotiate any of the oil leases granted by the national government prior to the CPA¹⁸.

The National Government is able to collect revenue from personal income, corporate and customs taxes; the GoSS can collect revenue from personal income taxes, luxury taxes and business taxes in southern Sudan. Taxes that can be collected by states are also outlined. A commission to ensure the transparency of collection and use of revenues will be formed.

¹⁷ Conciliation Resources / www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/negotiating-naivasha.php

¹⁸ Conciliation Resources / www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/negotiating-naivasha.php

Two banking systems will be formed in the two areas, with the Bank of Southern Sudan as a branch of the Central Bank of Sudan. Essentially, the dual banking system means that banks will be commonly stationed with two different windows for service.

Two separate currencies in the north and south are to be recognized, until the Central Bank has designed a new currency that reflects the cultural diversity of Sudan.

National and southern funds for reconstruction and development will be established, along with two multi-donor trust funds.

Flashpoints: Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei

As the people of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the implementation of the CPA, and coupled with the drifting away of the focus of the international community from their cause, more assistance to their governments or through the NGOs and UN agencies will be extremely important¹⁹. The recent Focus Group Discussion Report prepared by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) on the 'Three Areas', depicted a rather pessimistic picture of dismay and disappointment of the people as they are gradually losing faith in the CPA and with a strong feeling of being abandoned and forgotten²⁰. These areas are strategic for the future of the Sudan in cementing relations between the North and South, particularly if the South opts for secession²¹.

The Abyei Protocol

The problem of Abyei is a local boundary problem, which has elevated to become a national and an international problem. The commission which was delegated to arbitrate upon whether oil-

19 *The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*. www.ajtmh.org/cgi/content/abstract/61/6/941

20 Bradbury, M. 1998. 'Sudan: International Responses to War in the Nuba Mountains', *Review of African Political Economy* 77 (25) (Sept), 463-474.

21 Anyang' Nyong'o, P. 1991. 'The Implications of Crises and Conflicts in the Upper Nile Valley', in Deng, F.M. & Zartman, I.W. (eds), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, 95-114. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution.



rich Abyei belonged to the North or the South became nationally significant, because if it belongs to the South, then the South is entitled to 50% of its oil revenues. If not, the South has no share in it. The commission was described as composed of neutral experts. The GoS is not happy with the Abyei Boundary Commission Report. The conflict is and should be viewed as one between two neighbouring tribes. It is up to them to settle the conflict, and if they resort to arbitration, then it is up to them to appoint a genuinely expert and neutral team, whose judgment they vow to respect²².

Abyei will be accorded special administrative status during the interim period, following the definition of the Abyei areas by the Abyei Border Commission. Abyei will have representation in the legislature of Southern Kordofan and Warap states. At the end of the six-year interim period, Abyei residents will vote in a referendum either to maintain special administrative status in the north or to become part of Bahr al-Ghazal (Warap) state in the south.

Wealth-sharing of oil revenues from Abyei is to be split between the north and south (50:42) with small percentages of revenues allocated to other states and ethnic groups: 2% each to the Ngok Dinka people, the Misseriyya people, Bahr al-Ghazal (Warap) state, and 1% each to Southern Kordofan state (SKS) and the Western Kordofan sub-state component of SKS.

Having outlined some of the macro-level successes I now highlight one of the key challenges to the implementation of the CPA, which relates to the demarcation of the Abyei boundary. The Abyei boundary dispute reflects the severity of the trust deficit (emanating from years of war and abrogated peace deals) between communities of the North and South. As such it also provides a major stumbling block to reconciliation, a key

22 Imam Al Mahdi, A, 2006. Escaping the Resource (Oil) Curse: Revenue Management for Sustainable Development, Khartoum.



element in attaining durable peace, regardless of whether the south secedes or not.

Historically, the oil-rich Abyei region has been a site of shared grazing resources for the Misseriya (Baggara) Arabs and nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms since the 18th century. It is part of the Bahr El Arab river system that is shared with the state of Kordofan, and used by both Ngok Dinka and Misseriya Arabs. In 1905 during the then Anglo-Egyptian Condominium era, the administration of Abyei was transferred from the Southern Bahr-El Ghazal province to Kordofan in the North. The Abyei area was a major point of tension between North and South during both the first and second civil wars. More importantly, the discovery of oil in Abyei has given the area an added burden as a strategic pawn in national politics. Certainly, the inclusion of Abyei into the CPA demonstrates the importance of the region's political and economic value to both the North and South.

One of the major consequences of the history of armed warfare is the impact this has had on displacing local settled, predominantly Dinka, communities, something that has exacerbated land claim tensions in the post-settlement era. According to the Protocol on Abyei, the region will be able to determine whether it wants to join the South or remain in the North through a referendum to be held at the same time as the referendum on the South. It also established the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) to *"define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905"*. The ABC was composed of international and independent experts and representatives of the governments of North and South. It was meant to present their findings to the President of Sudan who would *"take the necessary action to put the special administrative status of the Abyei area into immediate effect"*. Douglas Johnson, one of the international experts and author of major works into the complexity of Sudan's wars, noted that *"from the point of view of imposing a new political boundary (in*

Abyei), it is naturally going to cause concern for people on either side of the boundary. And if they feel that boundary is a prelude to withdrawing their right of use, they are naturally going to resist it”.

Most importantly, the Abyei Protocol clearly stipulates the distribution of oil revenues during the interim period: 50 percent to the Government of Sudan, 42 percent to the Government of Southern Sudan and 2 percent each to Bahr el-Ghazal, Western Kordofan, and the local Ngok Dinka and Misseriya. Should the boundary define a certain territory containing large oil potential and Abyei decides to go to the South, the wealth emanating from oil would thereafter go to the Government of Southern Sudan.

The demarcation made by the Abyei boundary commission raises questions about environmental stress in terms of local resource politics and how these local conflicts have been manipulated by elites as a part of the scramble for the national oil pie. One UN observer explains that the situation in Abyei is one of ceasefire rather than peace-building post-CPA, and that the next frontier on which violence between North and South could occur might very well be that of Abyei, as so many groups are unhappy with the Abyei Boundary Commission Report. At the joint NCP-SPLM leadership council meeting, the parties failed to agree on the adoption of the ABC report and referred the matter back to the Presidency, to consider the following four options:

- To reach a political agreement on the matter;
- To recall the ABC experts to defend their recommendations;
- To refer the matter to the constitutional court; or
- To seek arbitration by a third party.

The parties agreed, however, to form a transitional administration for Abyei, composed of representatives of all groups in the area.

While the parties certainly thrashed out some of their key concerns about the implementation process, it is also important to note that the CPA institutions may be emasculated by the introduction of new mechanisms such as those put forward in the four options above. This relates to the question of capacity building and its sustainability. Some of the other questions to be asked of this process relate to the mandate of parliament. As one opposition leader concluded, *"we have a parliament that should be able to have input on the CPA mechanisms since the agreement itself was non democratic. This is one way of broadening it."* While this view is self-interested in that it seeks to carve out a space for the opposition party, it nevertheless addresses the need to coordinate institutions so that the 'slicing up' of power cannot go unchecked. Returning to the central issue of the ABC report, many observers have raised concerns about the potential 'flashpoint' and the manipulation of tribal loyalties. As one NGO worker put it:

*"Abyei is in a state of cease-fire and not implementation of the CPA. It has very little to do with pastoralism, the Dinka and Misseriya are fine with each other on the ground"*²³.

The legislature of the two states will evaluate the implementation of the CPA. Where the State Land Commissions and the National Land Commission clash and cannot be reconciled on decisions, the Constitutional Court will decide on the matter.²⁴

OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVING PEACE

Many obstacles face implementation of the CPA. Most of the political parties in the Sudan argue that peace in the Sudan is not comprehensive because it deals with peace between two parties: the National Congress Party and the SPLM. Neither are

23 Situation Report from the Institute for Security Studies by Mariam Bibi Jooma1, on 17 July 2006.

24 Adar, Korwa G. 1998. *A State under Siege: The Internationalisation of the Sudanese Civil War*.

representative of the whole of the Sudan. The CPA of January 2005 was signed as a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the mistaken assumption that conflict in Sudan is exclusively between the North and South, and that the two negotiating parties represent the two regions adequately. The gap of distrust between the two negotiating parties was also very wide. The image that comes through is that of two unwilling negotiators, who were whipped along by an International third party.

With the signing of the Peace Agreement, however, the basic building blocks of compromise, as have been suggested, are welcome.

Security

The security arrangement legalized the existence of two armies during the interim period as the most important guarantee for stability and implementation of the CPA. 40,000 Joint Integrated Units (JIU) of equal numbers from the SAF and the SPLM are to be deployed in Southern Sudan, Abyei, the two border areas between South and North and the national capital. Whilst the SPLA, the armed wing of the SPLM, participated and was fully involved in the security arrangements, the SAF were not fully participant, as an institution, in these arrangements.

During the military conflict between the GoS and SPLA, the GoS encouraged splinter groups to break away from the SPLA and encouraged tribal and personal rivalries. On the other hand, the SPLA had harboured its own militias. This led to the emergence of numerous armed militias allied to the GoS and opposed to the SPLA, and vice versa. The militias supported by the GoS were grouped together under the name of the Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF). There were also other armed groups of the NDA, Beja, Rashayda (Free Lions), Umma Party, and Darfur armed movements and groups.

The Agreement indicated that the Armed Forces in the Interim Period should be professional and non-partisan. It should consist of the two Armed Forces and the Joint/Integrated Units.

In fact, the Armed Forces is a partisan organization; the Agreement states that it is a military alliance between the two parties, with basically different doctrines, enforcing all other armed groups and militias to join one of them and be acknowledged by and benefit from the Agreement of Security Arrangements. The rationale was that the strength and integrity of the SPLA is the surest guarantee that the CPA will survive. Apart from, and as an extension of, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the SSDF was both a major threat to the SPLA and to the peace process.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought a formal end to the state of hostilities between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A, but it did not end the many internal conflicts in southern Sudan. A critical element in that on-going process was the Juba Declaration of 8th January 2006, between the SPLM/A and the GoS aligned South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), a broad grouping of armed groups.

Thus in the wake of the CPA, neutralizing the SSDF became a priority for the SPLM/A. Against that background, since its founding in 1997 the SSDF posed a serious military threat to the SPLA. It had the capacity to disrupt the lives of many civilians in south Sudan; it provided security to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) garrisons in the south and for the oil fields and later it threatened progress in the peace process. Although largely under the control of the Sudanese army, members of the SSDF were at all times deeply distrustful of the GoS, and their relationship was always unstable and at risk of collapsing.

The late SPLM/A leader, Dr. John Garang's efforts to win over individual SSDF commanders, or the military defeat of the SSDF not only failed, but there were growing fears of a major conflagration between the two groups.

After the death of Garang on the 30th of July 2005, his successor, first Vice President Salva Kiir, took a radically

different approach. An approach which emphasized southern unity and reconciliation, and this quickly changed the political climate in the south. As a result, relations between the SPLM/A and the SSDF rapidly improved, and this provided the basis for the Juba Declaration which involved the absorption of the SSDF.

In the wake of the Juba Declaration, a large majority of the SSDF soldiers joined the SPLA and SSDF Chief of Staff, Major-General Paulino Matieb, was appointed deputy to Salva Kiir. At the time of writing, (late November 2007), problems remain in both the integration of the SSDF forces and in the assignment of ranks to its officers. A rump SSDF remains in the SAF camp and in isolated cases its components are causing local level security problems, for example the Malakal fighting that claimed the lives of 150 people both military and civilian.

Whilst the Juba Declaration was a diplomatic triumph, until the SPLM/A resolves its leadership problems, fully integrates the SSDF, and successfully transforms its forces into an army accountable to the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) on the one hand, and the SAF stops supporting armed opponents of the GoSS on the other, security problems will continue.

The information provided by the SAF to the United Nations is radically insufficient, and this poses an extremely serious obstacle to UN peace support operations. (UN SG Report, Sept 2006).

There is also the security dilemma of the national capital. There were complaints of lack of balance and inclusiveness in the recruitment of Khartoum's law enforcement agencies and the disparity in their composition at the non-commissioned and commissioned ranks. Reform and institutional strengthening pose a major challenge, as well as a threat. Many incidents have taken place, beginning with the events that followed the death of Dr. John Garang, the Soba events, the murder of Mr Mohamad Taha and similar accidents, the confrontation between the SLM

and police, and the latest killing of a policeman in Jebel Aulia by individuals from the SPLA. All these manifestations need serious handling and addressing.

As a result of such serious gaps and erroneous assumptions in the security arrangements, there are new types of wars taking place and others evolving.

The agreements (CPA, DPA and EPA) all recognize the demands of armed groups, and totally ignore non-armed groups and civic organizations. Setting such an approach of getting recognition through armour, established this trend through the precedent of CPA that is, defining marginalization as synonymous to rebellion. So, for example, the Southern Blue Nile is by no means worse, in terms of lack of development, services, and power sharing, than the Northern Blue Nile. Setting this example for any group or area in the Sudan by way of demanding their rights by means of arms, is a dangerous precedent, as poverty, lack of development and basic services is predominantly the case all over the Sudan.

The Security arrangements of the CPA do not acknowledge many armed forces outside of the SAF and the SPLA. Such groups are resisting disarmament and are continuing the violence and conflicts already started. Whilst the SPLM accuses the SAF of supporting these militias (the killings around Juba and the fighting that took place in Malakal), the Arabs tribes living on the border between the North and South are supposed to give in their arms to the SPLA. They refuse such a settlement and armed confrontations have already started as in South Kordofan.

Armed conflicts have transferred from rural to urban areas (El Fasher, Nyala, and Khartoum). Until the status of militias and armed forces is settled, these groups are staying in major cities with many incidents of violence and armed conflicts.

The return of IDPs, who are well integrated in the North cash economy and skilled labour, from the national capital and the

cities of the North to the South is minimal. Most of the IDPs who have gone back to their homelands in the South have returned, due to lack of services, the problem of land mines, the stagnant economy and unemployment, and the problem of the lack of funds for development schemes due to the diversion of most funds to the catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The repatriation of IDPs, if enforced, will lead to violence and armed conflicts. (Reports from IDP Camps: Jebel Aulia, an IDP camp of more than 50,000 people, is 50 kilometres south of the capital. Most have lived here for decades, although recently there has been an influx of families from Darfur. Recent attempts to register the IDPs for voluntary repatriation to the South have failed due to political tensions in the camp. The older residents who remember their homes in the south would like to return, but are reluctant to go unless they receive guarantees of help).

The Abyei issue reached a dead end because of the way it was handled. The so-called experts of the ABC gave their report, which was given the authority of being final and binding according to the Abyei Protocol of the CPA. This report is totally rejected by the Misseriyya and fully adopted by the Ngok Dinka. The Presidency has failed to settle this outstanding problem. Tension is rising high, and armed conflict is a potential threat.

Trans-Border Wars

There is also the threat of trans-border wars. Under threat are the borders of Sudan and Uganda (the LRA, Ugandan Army) Central Africa, and Chad (spill over of wars from Darfur); consequences of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war after the new Sudanese-Eritrean reconciliation developing after the new ESPA, and its manifestation in Somalia (both Sudan and Eritrea support Islamic Courts, whilst Ethiopia backs the Government of Somalia). These are opening spaces for wars by proxy.

Power Sharing and Reconciliation:

Contrary to the declared objectives, the Articles of the Agreement established a bilateral deal. A faulty interim system was intended as a permanent system for the Sudan, with 80% of majority power for the two partners, securing a 52% mechanical majority for the NCP in the central executive and legislative bodies, able to do whatsoever, and rendering the presence of others as mere decoration.²⁵

Finally, on the question of reconciliation, there is little momentum in the North on the popularisation of the CPA. This can be seen to be one of the major factors contributing to the general confusion around the guarantee of rights under the agreement, as well as the easy manipulation of disaffected communities through lack of information. On the 2nd July 2007, a UN sponsored radio station was inaugurated in Juba. The station is meant to popularise issues surrounding the CPA and its implementation. A similar initiative has been blocked in the North, another sign of the tensions between the United Nations and the NCP-dominated Khartoum government.

That the signing of the CPA on 5th January 2005 was a watershed moment in Sudan's tortuous history cannot be denied. Indeed, the momentum for peace that came with the initial euphoria of the agreement was fundamental to paving the way for the possibility of a "New Sudan", based on common citizenship. However, the challenges of making this vision a reality lie not only in the enormous task of rebuilding a devastated South, but also in initiating a reconciliation process between the fractured groups. The lack of trust also extends to relationships between Southerners themselves, and in fact may pose a serious obstacle to a unified vision for the South during the interim period. The outstanding questions on the Abyei boundary provides a concrete platform for a possible return to hostilities between pastoralists and sedentary farmers, as politicians seek to exploit the area for both oil resources and

²⁵ Almahdi, M., April 2007. The Assessment by the Umma National Party of the Implementation of the CPA.

potential voters for the 2011 referendum. Without the visionary leadership of John Garang, the SPLM have had to review their internal policy towards the "unity" option with mixed results. Certainly, the narrow support for the NCP in the North also suggests that its marriage with the SPLM may not be enough to legitimise its dominant stake in government. For now, it is important that international observers and Sudanese actors remain focused on implementing the deal as a secure and prosperous South and North will be necessary for long term stability of the region, regardless of the outcome of the referendum²⁶.

CONCLUSION

"There is a growing sense of frustration and disappointment among the people about what they perceive as a lack of progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)," Assessment and Evaluation Commission Chairman, Tom Vraalsen, told reporters in Khartoum. Apart from the structural weaknesses of the Agreement, and the fact that negotiations have sacrificed National interests for partisan cupidity, the Government of Sudan now tops the failed states index and is close to the top of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The track record of the two parties is replete with authoritarianism, corruption and bad governance. The 2006 International Corruption Perception Index of Transparency gives the Sudan very low marks, ranking it the fourth from the bottom and many Sudanese have yet to see a peace dividend.

A plan for National regeneration needs to be hatched by a Comprehensive National Forum to develop the bilateral Agreements to become National, to outline a Programme for genuine democratization, to select a truly National Government. A CODESA-type conference, which would transform the bilateral accords into National ones, is required. All the

²⁶ Situation Report from the Institute for Security Studies, by Mariam Bibi Jooma1, on 17 July 2006.



agreements need to be comprehensive and inclusive, by giving all stakeholders a part in the National process of transition towards a peaceful, democratic, and united Sudan. There is a need for regional fora, such as South-South, East-East, Darfur-Darfur, and North-North Dialogues, to precede this comprehensive national conference. These regional fora need to discuss in detail, the problems specific to the region, and consolidate common positions on the National process. All Sudan's neighbours, as observers, should attend such a National gathering, because as things stand at the moment, some of our neighbours are fuelling proxy conflicts in Sudan and the GoS is repaying them in the same currency. In fact, the Regional situation is now so complicated, that Sudan's National Peace Plan must be accompanied by a Regional Peace Agreement. Both plans call for UN involvement if we are to avoid half-baked solutions which unravel as quickly as they are tied. Rather than spend valuable energy in the promotion of vulnerable Agreements, the UN should seek to promote workable agreements.

Experience from other countries shows that, to immunize itself from the state's pre-emptive and restrictive measures, civil society needs self-discipline, ethical codes and an internal commitment to the values of democracy, transparency and accountability it preaches. This will help international donors identify genuine partners. Effective, non-dependent partnerships with international organizations, the private sector and the state should be based on mutual trust and shared experience, not just financial support²⁷.

27 Almahdi, M., April 2007. The Assessment by the Umma National Party of the Implementation of the CPA.

ASSOCIATE PARLIAMENTARY GROUP'S VISIT TO SUDAN, 2007

Pieter Tesch

The parliamentary visit to Sudan at the end of August 2007 again shows how fluid and volatile the situation in Sudan can be and how difficult it is to draw up conclusions, as subsequent events and developments may give them either a new, and an often at the time unsuspected twist, or make them utterly redundant. It is the danger associated with writing contemporaneous history, but what has survived events following the parliamentary visit to Sudan is the unanswered question whether the glass is half empty or half full. The parliamentary delegation came away not only with grave concern about the possibility of any viable progress towards a meaningful peace process for Darfur, but also grave concern about the viability of the CPA.

Before the visit between the 22nd and 29th August by a three-strong delegation of the Associate Parliamentary Group (APG) in Westminster, consisting of MPs Chairman David Drew (Labour, Stroud), Susan Kramer (Lib Dem, Richmond Park) and Mark Lancaster (Conservative, Milton Keynes NE) there was some optimism about Darfur, the CPA and the East Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA). The APG delegation was accompanied by the APG co-ordinator Chris Milner, Michael O'Neill, the newly appointed UK special representative to Sudan and the author, known as the 'historian'. We visited Khartoum, Juba and El Geneina with an excursion to Beida southwest of Geneina hard on the border with Chad on the Wadi Howar. A plan to include Port Sudan on the itinerary to look at the situation in the East had to be dropped because of time restrictions.

The practical organisation of the visit was in the hands of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in particular the British



Embassy in Khartoum. The new ambassador, Rosalind Marsden, accompanied the APG on all its legs assisted by Political Officer David Hinchon in Khartoum, in Juba by Ian Ruff, Consul General, and on the trip to El Geneina by Defence Attaché Col Tim Watts and Senior Political Officer Omar Daair. In Juba a Dutch diplomat, Marisia Pechaczek, assisted while in West Darfur the Second Secretary of the Dutch Embassy, Sjoerd Veen, was present as the Dutch are often joint donor partners with the British, as for example with the Joint Donor Office in Juba. NGOs like Tearfund, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Oxfam and Save the Children assisted in meeting beneficiaries, representatives of civic society on the ground and partly hosted the trip.

As the APG was in Darfur, it missed the official return from Asmara and swearing in of the three Eastern Front/Beja Congress figureheads in Khartoum, but it is hoped that a second trip, possibly later in 2008, will be able to include the situation in the East in a meaningful way. Even though the field trip was short, it had a heavily packed programme covering a wide range of meetings at senior level and visits to programmes on the ground, but travel, including transfers between Khartoum, Juba and el Geneina, made a heavy demand on time.

Prior to departure there was some optimism that things might finally improve in Darfur following the meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, earlier to get all the non-signatory Darfur rebel factions to sign up to a single agreed position prior to a new round of comprehensive peace negotiations planned for Sirte, Libya on 27 October, and after the UN Security Council resolution on 31 July to send a so-called hybrid AU and UN peacekeeping force, or UN and African Mission In Darfur (Unamid) to replace Amis. There was concern that Abdel Wahid Al Nur might stay in Paris, but GoSS (Government of South Sudan) Vice President Riek Machar told the parliamentarians in Juba that he was optimistic of being able to convince Al Nur to attend. In the end it was not only Al

Nur's SLM/A faction that did not turn up in Sirte, but also other major factions, including wings of JEM, did not, and while subsequently Unamid replaced Amis in Darfur on 1 January 2008 renewed serious fighting in West Darfur and Chad and continuous fragmentation of rebel factions have left the situation even more intractable. But, as Wali Abdel Gasim who split from the latter and is a Fur from Zalingei said, Al Nur cannot have a veto if the others want to move forward and sign up.

On the ground in El Geneina and Beida, West Darfur, the parliamentarians learned that the arrival of Unamid was causing much apprehension among the humanitarian community that had asked for a peacekeeping force with a stronger protection mandate than Amis in the first place. It is one of those apparent contradictions between media coverage and the by and large simplistic reportage, and trying to get to grips with complexities on the ground where difficulties lie. There is the demand by the 'International Community' for a robust force, but on the ground there are strong anxieties among NGOs and even UN organisations involved in the civilian side of UNMIS that were responsible for humanitarian activities in Darfur prior to the arrival of Unamid about the future relationship between the military and civilian sides of the new mission.

Unamid's task is to create more, larger and securer 'humanitarian spaces', but then the humanitarians do not want the military side of the mission near them, while they are not sure how robust the new military mission will be able to respond to challenges from either rebels or pro-government tribal militias and what the repercussions of such events will be. Subsequent events like the attack on the Amis base in Hasakanita, South Darfur, on 28 September resulting in the death of 10 Amis soldiers for which non-signatory JEM and SLM/A-Unity are being held responsible and an escalation of fighting in West Darfur have not only shown again how volatile Darfur has remained, but also the pitfalls of peacekeeping

mandates where there is no peace to keep in the first place, and of the continuing lack of resources for such a peacekeeping despite the rhetoric of the 'International Community' that Unamid should be fit for purpose.

And while one may arrive at an agreed definition of fitness, an agreed definition of purpose may be far more problematic, especially if one takes into consideration the dynamics of two separate but related external factors. Firstly, the departure of the APG took place under the shadow of a threat of a Jihadist plot against specific western targets including the British, which was uncovered a few days earlier in Khartoum. The British Government took it seriously and subsequent information and events only confirmed that there was and is an Al Qaeda linked threat against western interests fuelled by the resentment in sections of Sudanese society and in the wider Sahara and Sahel region against the deployment of Unamid. Secondly, the situation in Chad has escalated to such an extent that for a second time in two years the French had to bail out the embattled regime of President Idriss Deby with, as a consequence, the impartiality itself of the UN sponsored EU mission (EUFOR), of which the bulk is supplied by the French to protect Darfuri refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic, parallel to the deployment of Unamid in Darfur, has been called into question.

As much as the APG has long asserted that the characterisation of the conflict in Darfur as 'Arabs' versus 'Africans', borrowed from the shorthand to describe the civil war in southern Sudan, risked oversimplifying the complex issues, it became aware that to describe the conflict in eastern Chad as a 'spill over' from Darfur does not do justice to complex historical and ethnic links and collateral dynamics between Darfur in western Sudan and Wadai in eastern Chad, as equally there are internal and external regional dynamics for the conflicts in southern Sudan with northern

Uganda, and eastern Sudan with Eritrea, Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa.

Within Darfur, questions like appropriate compensation between all ethnic groups and that of disputed land has to be solved, but some Darfur campaigning groups have muddied the water, for instance with claims made at the time of the APG visit that 'Arabs' from Chad and from further west in the Sahara and Sahel were being invited by the Khartoum Government from countries to the west of Chad. But the UN told the APG delegation in El Geneina that there has been the seasonal influx of Chadian Arab tribes and that there was evidence that they were being pushed out by the Zaghawa in eastern Chad as much they are asked by related clans to settle in Darfur. Therefore, UNHCR had asked the Sudanese authorities to accommodate 30,000 Chadian Arabs on not disputed land if need be.

APG chairman David Drew MP stressed that the nomadic/pastoralist ethnic groups who were regarded and did regard themselves as Arab should be included in any future settlement in Darfur. The APG also concluded in its report published in January 2008 that the success of the CPA is vital for the solution of the other regional conflicts in Sudan, most prominently in Darfur: *"If the CPA fails, then peace in Darfur will be impossible"*. At the same time, the APG concluded, that a solution for the conflict in Darfur must not come at the expense of the CPA or the rest of Sudan. In fact, the APG believes that the CPA provides a valuable framework for peace and reconciliation that can be applied across the whole of Sudan as a basis from which to build engagement.

But what is the state of the CPA? A glass half full or half empty, that is the question! Already before departure, the APG had become aware of the growing distrust between the National Congress (NC) and the SPLM, as well as of reports filtering

through, signalling serious disillusionment of important sections of the southern population as well as of international aid agencies (NGOs and UN) with the SPLM/A and the GoSS. There was for instance concern about the level of hostile rhetoric between Juba and Khartoum about the implementation of the CPA, but then after the arrival of Riek Machar in Juba as GoSS Vice-President and of the then Foreign Minister in the Government of National Unity (GoNU), Lam Akol in Khartoum, the parliamentarians were assured that the CPA was basically safe and on course. Subsequently, Akol lost his position as Foreign Minister in a reshuffle meant to get the SPLM back in GoNU following its withdrawal because the SPLM and the national Vice-President of Sudan and GoSS President Salva Kiir were unhappy about the progress of the CPA specifically in relation to the preparation of the 2008 census and 2009 elections, and the sharing of oil revenues.

Last, but not least, was the unresolved question of the Abyei boundary and complaints that there were still some northern Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) units in the South after the 9 July deadline for withdrawal. The SPLA wanted to move into the areas that were supposed to be vacated by the SAF by 9 July but were stopped by Salva Kiir as their Commander in Chief and the SPLM's Secretary of Cabinet Affairs in GoNU, Kosti Manibe, told the APG delegation. But it is also learned that by then only 8% of some 59,000 SPLA troops had been redeployed south of the approximate border.

In fact, it is estimated that the SPLA is 230,000 strong, consuming some 60% of the budget, which is for a large part depending on the oil revenues. Since January 2007 the GoSS had received US\$778 mln with US\$8.9 mln being transferred to the Southern States Governments. Despite these revenues the GoSS was faced with a financial crisis last year, not in the least because its payroll breached its target of establishing a civil service of 30,000 by

appointing 200,000 people, while there were also concerns about government contracts and governance in general.

In this context, it was quite disturbing for the APG delegation to hear evidence from UN agencies and NGOs that not only were services (health, education, water-sanitation etc) to the people in Juba and its environs not improving but were in fact deteriorating on what was being delivered previously during the war. There were also increasing complaints that the GoSS and SPLM were in effect hindering development by interfering in the recruitment process by preventing the employment of the most qualified and suitable staff, in particular discriminating against those who stayed behind or returning IDPS for the internationally funded reconstruction and development project by insisting that certain people be hired, whether qualified or not, often on the basis of people with what was regarded as the right ethnic (tribalism) and/or family (nepotism) backgrounds.

Equally, increasing were complaints about the indiscipline of SPLA soldiers in Juba, harassing not only foreigners like Ugandans etc, but also often the local Bari people, who had stayed behind under very difficult circumstances, and were virtual prisoners in Juba during the war. In a meeting with community protection officers at Payam Munuki the APG was told in no uncertain terms that the people who had stayed behind in Juba were treated by the SPLM and in particular by the SPLA soldiery as *Jallaba* (or 'traitors') and as such were regarded as the lowest and so received the lowest in the share out of services, recovery/development projects and employment; even Ugandans would be preferred over them, they said.

Two years is naturally a very short time in which to see a concrete peace dividend for the people, but they see that new government buildings are being constructed as well the new parliament building for the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, a gift from

China, whilst other things have not improved. The deterioration of services has been caused by the fact that NGOs who delivered health, education and water-sanitation services during the conflict were leaving as their mandate was related to emergency relief like MSF and they had handed over responsibilities to the GoSS, which has so far, by and large, shown itself to be unable to maintain the same level of services, let alone improve them; in the case of education an actual deterioration was noted as class sizes have increased and unqualified persons are given teaching jobs. The IRC and the UN Office for Humanitarian Administration (OCHA) admitted that there was a problem when NGOs with an emergency mandate withdraw as peace progressed and other NGOs with a reconstruction and development mandate arrived. There should be a transition period with its own funding to allow this, they said, but they were equally adamant that a substantial part of the blame lies with the SPLM and GoSS!

The APG delegation also felt in this regard deep concern about an apparent democratic deficit developing in the South with the arrest of the editor of *The Citizen* newspaper, highlighting corruption and the events around the formerly independent Juba based weekly, *Juba Post*.

In Khartoum the APG delegation was treated as the official guests of the National Assembly by the joint deputy speakers Hassan Mohamed El Amin (NC) and Atem Garang (SPLM), who were then in very cordial mood, joking about Sharia law among other things. But it was clear that the status of Sharia law in relation to non-Muslims in northern Sudan, in particular in Greater Khartoum where there is a substantial non-Muslim minority, is an issue that has to be solved. This is part of the bigger issue of what kind of state Sudan will become through the implementation of the CPA, in particular the 2009 elections and 2011 referendum in the South on secession or unity. The character of the evolving national state will influence whether the unitary wing of the SPLM or its

secessionist wing will be in the ascendancy. Riek Machar, for instance, clearly saw a role for the SPLM as a national secular party in Sudan in his meeting with the APG delegation. But in a meeting in Khartoum Dr Ghazi Salah el Din, 'Leader of the House' in the National Assembly and senior Presidential Adviser, said that he expected the SPLM to campaign in the elections on a pro-CPA platform rather than an anti-CPA platform with (northern) opposition parties.

With secession or unity hanging like a sword of Damocles over the future of Sudan as a unitary state, the direction the SPLM has to decide will influence the relationship between the NC and SPLM at national level. As alluded to above, Riek Machar hinted in his meeting with the APG that the SPLM wanted to run in the elections as a national party and, depending on its success in the elections in the North and with linkages to the SLM in Darfur and other northern opposition groups, to field a serious candidate for the national presidency; but will the SPLM insist that their allies also stand on a pro-CPA platform? The wish to become a national Sudanese party would contradict a wish to secede, but while important sections in the SPLM leadership may favour unity there is no doubt that if the referendum was held now the majority of the people in the South would vote for secession, despite the fact that most of the international community is favouring unity.

It is still to be seen how this proposed linkage with opposition groups fits in with the SPLM as partner in the GoNU with the SPLM sharing or carving up power at national level with the National Congress while each rules more or less solely in its own part of Sudan respectively. Machar seemed also confident that the SPLM will win seats in its own right in some districts in Khartoum and elsewhere, but again that depends on voter registration following a census.

The APG delegation met, besides Lam Akol, Deng Alor, the then Minister for Cabinet Affairs (now Foreign Minister), Kosti Manibe, Minister for Humanitarian Affairs and Mansour Khalid, Special Adviser to Vice-President Salva Kiir (also on the Standing Committee of the National Assembly). All the SPLM members in GoNU stressed that there were some problems, see above, but all could be solved, they believe, and also stressed that the SPLM had genuine influence through GoNU on the NC and President Al Bashir.

Since the APG visit, however, relations between the SPLM and NC have deteriorated even further, in particular over the status of Abyei and the North/South Border demarcation, leading the former to suspend its participation in GoNU. Only after further agreement about how to solve these issues was reached did the SPLM formally return to GoNU by the end of December 2007. There is no doubt that 'Abyei' has iconic status as it is related both to the question as to where the border between the 'North' and 'South' of Sudan will be geographically delineated as well as to question of how the 50/50 share of the oil revenues will be calculated and the actual division formula will be implemented. *"All the problems related to Abyei derive from oil. If this continues, we may not even reach 2009 [the national elections]"*, Deng Alor, a native from Abyei, told the APG delegation. Not only was he subsequently promoted to Foreign Minister, but was also tasked together with NC Minister Idriss Abdel Qadir to present a report to the NC-SPLM joint executive committee. However, the problem is that in the absence of agreement and consensus at national level about Abyei, local incidents that otherwise may not have a great significance and would have no impact at national level, may indeed have national repercussions; there have been incidents in South Kordofan that have had and have still the potential to spread beyond its immediate locality, especially as some non-signatory Darfuri rebel groups have tried on several occasions to export armed conflict into Kordofan to tap into local grievances and link

these with Darfur as well as other unresolved north-south issues. At the same time the APG feels that if 'Abyei' is solved other outstanding demarcation disputes and other disputes concerning the status of the other transitional zones like the rest of South Kordofan/Nuba and Upper Blue Nile could be solved amicably.

It became further clear that the SPLM's expectations of the actual revenue for GoSS from oil were not met and this led to its fiscal crisis last year. In turn, this gave further rise to suspicion that what was actually transferred of 50/50 share out was not fair. "50% of what", GoSS Culture, Youth and Sports Minister John Luk Jok asked rhetorically as one of the two southern representatives on the National Petroleum Commission (NPC). It should be understood, however, that Sudan does not get the world market price for its crude from China or other Asian partners. Luk Jok was also disappointed that the GoSS was forced to abandon its deal with the British company White Nile for the exploration and exploitation of the block in southern Sudan originally held by the French Total. Original rights had precedence under the terms of the CPA.

With the GoNU restored the climate for a mutually acceptable solution of 'Abyei' is more likely and it looks more feasible that the tight deadlines for the 2008 census, set now for 15 April, and the 2009 national elections could be met. But even in the most favourable outcome of this scenario, a census and elections in Darfur without any dramatic change for the better seems to be impossible, or as the new Wali of West Darfur, Abdel Gasim Ahmed Imam, told the APG delegation, before any census the IDPs have to be returned in safety to their villages. A view shared by Prince Asaad Abdul Rahman Bay el Dein, younger brother of the Sultan of Dar Massalit.

At the time of writing in February 2008 one could say that the glass of the CPA was again half full, certainly in relation to the South and north-south relations if it remains on course and keeps

its momentum in relation to 'Abyei', the census, elections and referendum. But besides the in-built uncertainties in the CPA in this context there are not only the unresolved questions of Darfur, but also the future success of the ESPA in the East and the solving of other regional grievances in other parts of Sudan.

The weakness of any settlement in Sudan is the apparent message that one has to take up arms to fight for a place at the negotiating table for peace and a slice of the cake, possibly with foreign support. Or in the words of Sadig al Mahdi, now very much on the sidelines, to the APG delegation, these were only agreements between 'coup makers' and 'warlords'.

However, the CPA offers at the same time a real possibility for the Sudanese to go forward and leave the past behind with the conflicts in the West and the East properly linked in. It is up to the Sudanese parties to grab that chance and for the so-called 'International Community' to assist this rather than to follow, different, hidden agendas.

The APG's full report *Sudan's Comprehensive Peace: Three years on towards elections* is available by contacting its coordinator Chris Milner at Room 4.10 Norman Shaw North, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA; Tel: 02072196113; or e-mail: milnerc@parliament.uk

AN EARLY HISTORY OF THE SHUKRIYA AND THE ABU SINNS

John Udal

The tribal history of the Shukriya people has been researched and published by but few scholars, which hardly reflects their important part in the history of the Northern Sudan. Most notable have been the publications by Samuel Hillelson: *Historical Poems and Traditions of the Shukriya* in 1920; and Stefan Reichmuth: *Rise under Foreign Rule: Ahmad Bek Abu Sinn (1790-1870) and the Shukriya* in 1990. The contested lineage of the Shukriya from the Juhayna Arabs has been investigated by Sir Harold MacMichael and Dr Yusuf Fadl Hasan, and the tribe features intermittently in the context of the chronology of the Fung Kingdom 1504-1820, especially in O.G.S. Crawford's *The Fung Kingdom of Sennar* and in Jay Spaulding's *The Heroic Age of Sennar*. However, only after the Shukriya's defeat of the forces of the weakening Fung Hamaj and of the Butana Rikabiyin at the end of the 18th century did the Shukriya, under Abu Sinn leadership, become a preponderant force in the 'Isle of Meroe', lying between the Rivers Atbara and Blue Nile.

EARLY LEADERSHIP

The Shukriya trace their tribal ascendancy back to Sha'a El Din wad El Tiweim, born around 1635 AD/1045 AH when the principal focus of the tribe was at Kalkol on the east bank of the Blue Nile opposite Kamlin. Captured as a boy by a Fung raiding party he was taken to Sennar in the reign of King Badi II (AD 1642-77/AH 1052-1088). He was ransomed by his uncles and the negotiated arrangement provided for him to be educated in the capital. Still a young man, he volunteered to procure the surrender of a contingent of Badi's guard who had absconded, and with the help of his Shukriya people successfully handed them over to Badi.

Sha'a El Din, now perhaps in his late teens, was rewarded with a marriage to one of Badi's daughters in about 1655/1065, by whom he had two sons: Nayil and Abdel Karim. The new leader settled, in enhanced status, at Jebel Geili which became the ancestral home of the Abu Sinn family, and he was probably still resident there at the time of the visit of Evliya Celebi, the Turkish traveller, to Arbagi and Sennar late in 1671/1083. Sha'a El Din was succeeded by his elder son Nayil who, we are told, "*over Abu Deleiq [of the Batahin to the north] he spreads his cloak*". Nayil begat Adlan (?born 1680/1091) who begat Mohammed El Idayghim (born 1710/1122) but little is told of their years of authority, and their territorial influence is judged generally to have been subordinate in the Butana to that of the Batahin and Rikabiyin. Based on Jebel Geili and Kalkol, not far south of Arbagi, the Shukriya would have remained under close supervision of the dominant *manjils* of the Fung kings of Sennar, and of the Sheikhs of the Abdullab, based at Gerri (Guerri) and Arbagi. Jackson (1912) tells us that the rank of *manjil*, said to be a Hamaj word, was much prized carrying ownership of the land on which his followers dwelt, disposed of to him by deed of grant from the Sultan. Of the Sheikhs of the Abdullab, we learn much from the accounts of the Jesuit and Franciscan mission expeditions from Upper Egypt to Ethiopia via Sennar in the period 1698-1705/1110-1117. These expeditions took place in the reign of King Badi III, ('*El Ahmar*'), the last in the line of direct descendants of Amara Dunqas. Sheikh Nayil would perhaps have established his residence at Jebel Geili.

Sheikh Awad El Karim Mohammed, 'Abu Ali' c.1775/1189 – 1779/1193

Sheikh Mohammed El Idayghim, Nayil's son, was to be succeeded by a son who would lay the foundations of an era of increased political power wielded by the Shukriya. Hillelson translates from a Shukri genealogical poem of the 19th Century:

"There arose Abu Ali loved by his father's country; he fills the eye with armies of his kin and his slaves; the rulers of the land strive to conciliate him, but his wrath increases; against Funj and Arabs he carries victory in his hand."

This son was Sheikh Awad El Karim Mohammed, better known in tribal history as 'Abu Ali'. Early in Abu Ali's time as *nazir*, ruler of the Shukriya tribe, c.1775/1189, his people came under frequent attack from the Rikabiyin of the Butana – seemingly of the Kamlin area (MacMichael 1922) who controlled the watering places used by the Shukriya. In the reign of the contemporary Fung King Adlan II 1775-86/1189-1200 (who effectively was no more than a puppet of his *vizir* Badi wad Ragab, nephew of the great Fung general Mohammed Abu El Keylik), the son of the Rikabi Sheikh killed Abu Ali's son Mohammed while the Shukri camels were being watered at Jebel Mandara (due east of Kamlin). Aware of the superior strength of the Rikabiyin and their influence with the Hamaj *vizir* in Sennar, Abu Ali forbade his people take revenge. However, shortly after the killing, a Shukriya party by chance encountered the Rikabi killer of Mohammed and slew him. The Rikabiyin rejected Abu Ali's proposal of a truce on the basis of a life for a life, and called on Sennar, presently discountenanced by the rejection by the Shukriya of the new Taka *manjil*, for support. The two forces prepared for a joint attack on the Shukriya near Jebel Mandara. Ali, Awad El Karim Abu Ali's eldest son, and his brother Hassan led the Shukriya in the subsequent battle of 1778/1192, Hassan killing Krenka, one of three Hamaj commanders, in single combat, putting Hamaj and the Rikabi forces to flight, and capturing many maidens and horses.

The Shukriya now spread eastwards over the Butana to the Atbara while the Fung *vizir* and king nursed their public humiliation. Plotting revenge *Vizir* Badi wad Ragab deceived Abu Ali and his sons, in about 1779/1193, into accepting an invitation of the King to take counsel with them at Abu Haraz, thus enticing the Shukriya

back from the distant Atbara River. The invitation provided the opportunity to plot the execution of Abu Ali and his sons as they sat as honoured guests. Abu Ali stubbornly refused to believe the warning from his young nephew, Ali wad El Nur, of their intended murder. The latter, unsuccessful in preventing the treacherous murders of Abu Ali and his sons, nevertheless, escaped to warn the Shukriya camping outside Abu Haraz. This warning was heeded and they fled to Jebel Geili with their cattle, and thence back to the Atbara.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE ABU SINNS

Awad El Karim Ali: Abu Sinn: 1779/1193 – 1802/1217

The election of a new *nazir* to succeed Abu Ali took place at once in 1779-80/1193-4. The young Ali wad El Nur boldly resisted the elders' nomination of Mohammed Dakin and, with unanimous assent, proposed instead the election of Awad El Karim wad Ali, the very young son of the Abu Ali murdered in 1760. He would be henceforth known as Awad El Karim Abu Sinn, one of his front teeth being black. Notwithstanding his youth, the new *nazir* shortly set about vengeance on the Hamaj rulers of Sennar for their perfidy and defeated them decisively at the battle of Isawi, otherwise called the '*Day of the Camel Litters*'. Abu Sinn was immortalised, described in Shukriya verse:

"The Son of Night Power the son of Ali... has avenged Abu Ali and Hassan and dispersed our gloom? The vanquished son of the Fung King Adlan retired to lick his sores."

The death of the Fung Hamaj *Vizir* Badi Ragab left the Shukriya no longer under direct threat from the Sennar quarter for the next decade, at least until the death of King Adlan II in 1789/1203. The *Vizir* Badi Ragab was succeeded by his younger cousin Nasir Mohammed who, through the mediation of Sheikh Yusef Abshara of the Arakiyin in Abu Haraz in 1790/2005, made peace with

Sheikh Abdel Karim Abu Sinn, the last marrying a daughter of Sheikh Yusef as a pledge of good faith.

The peace was ratified by a decree promulgated by the new Fung King Badi (V) Dakin, the following year, 10 November 1791/12 Rabie el Awwal 1206, granting irrevocably to the Shukriya in private ownership rainlands encompassed and delineated as follows (but specifically excluding the lands of the Abdullab). *The Shukriya territorial boundaries would be on the east, the River Atbara; on the north, Abu Deleiq; on the west, the rivers El Adeek (Blue Nile) and El Rahad; and on the south the Abdullab.* The witnesses of the decree included Vizir Nasir Mohammed and the Sheikhs of Guerri, Taka, Beyla, Khashm el Bahr, 'Masabat Kordofan' and Arbagi as assenting signatories, all powerful chiefs holding the *manjilia*, themselves possessors of freehold by gift of the king. Sheikh Salih Ali of Abu Deleiq was not a signatory. Jackson (1912) affirmed that in the majority of cases where large tracts of land were bequeathed by the Sultan, the gift implied a corresponding return on the part of the landowner which might take the form of forty *okes* of gold, fifty *kantars* of lard, or a number of she-camels. King Badi Dakin died the next year, 1792/1207, but Awad El Karim Abu Sinn now had his charter and for the remainder of his life the Shukriya would successfully dominate the Butana, enjoying secure access to its watering places and to the peripheral grain markets, notwithstanding the necessity of countering frequent hostile raids from the militant Batahin, one of which, in 1802/1217 would at Shambat cost Awad El Karim Abu Sinn his life.

Of Abu Sinn's eight sons the eldest, Hamad, 1802/1217 – 1818/1233, would succeed his father as *nazir*, but would himself be ambushed and killed by a Batahani notable, Ali wad Bireir, in 1818/1233 the year of a memorably high Nile in which Beshagara, north of Kalkol, was inundated. In self-protection Ali Bireir threatened to seek help from Mek Nimr Mohammed's cousin and

enemy, Mek Musa'ad ibn Sa'ad of Metemma, across the Nile from Shendi. Only Ali Bireir's flight to the west in the event averted bloodshed.

THE EGYPTIAN INVASION

Within a couple of years both Mek Nimr at Shendi and Sheikh Mohammed Abu Sinn, successor as *nazir* to Hamad, and his youngest brother Ahmed Awad El Karim, were confronted with the Egyptian invasion in 1820 led by Viceroy Mohammed Ali's son Ismail Kamal. Sennar capitulated in June 1821/1236. Nimr had already surrendered to the invaders in Berber and, after six months in attendance to Ismail Pasha, was allowed to return to Shendi where, following Ismail Pasha's recall to Cairo, the latter was murdered by Nimr and Musa'ad acting together in November 1822/1238 in revenge for personal insult. The Shukriya meanwhile had split in their reaction towards the Egyptian conquerors. Sheikh Mohammed Abu Sinn had retired to the Atbara to avoid any contact, while Sheikh Ahmed Awad El Karim, who had grown up with his mother's family in Abu Haraz, allied himself with the new Turkish rulers, maintaining his headquarters on the Blue Nile.

Sheikh Ahmed Awad El Karim Abu Sinn 1822/1238 – 1869/1286

The assassination of Ismail Pasha in November 1822/1238 would lead, within a few months, to a visitation of wrath and revenge on Shendi and Metemma by Ismail's successor as *seraskir*, Mohammed Bey Khusraw el Daramali, the *Defterdar*. Nimr by then had quit the town to take refuge with the Batahin at Abu Deleiq and to raise a rebellion against the invaders, backed by the Abdullab, the Bisharin, the Hassaniya and the Shukriya. The inhabitants remaining in Shendi and Metemma would be put to the sword or burned in the houses by the *Defterdar* early in 1823.

Nimr, Musa'ad and the Abdullab Sheikh El Amin Nasir, circumventing their Turkish pursuers, escaped back to Shendi and then to Abu Deleiq where their force was slaughtered. Nimr and his 'Nimrab' fled this time to the Abyssinian foothills. His allies the Eastern Shukriya and the Bisharin paid a heavy price for their part in the rebellion.

Meanwhile following the capitulation and abdication of the Fung King Badi to Ismail Kamal Pasha in Sennar in June 1821/1236, Ahmed the youngest son of Awad el Karim Abu Sinn, now aged 21, educated and living at Abu Haraz, elected to deputise for his brother Mohammed, the tribal *nazir*, who with the main body of the Shukriya, had retired beyond the Atbara to evade contact with the invader. Ahmed, having accepted the conqueror's proffered robe of honour on behalf of the Shukriya would set out to recruit tribal support in the Butana, returning with them to make their submission to Ismail. Following the latter's murder at Shendi in November 1822/1238 and the merciless suppression of the subsequent rebellion the new *seraskir*, *Defterdar* Mohammed, charged Ahmed at the new capital of Wad Medani with responsibility to restore order in the eastern Nile region. Ahmed was successful in persuading the main body of the Shukriya to reoccupy the Butana, whilst his elder brother Mohammed, the *de jure nazir*, determined to remain on the Atbara, leaving a *cordon sanitaire* between his followers and the Turkish government. Many years later, as an ageing leader, *nazir* for some 30 years, he is believed to have abdicated the tribal leadership to Ahmed, probably at the time of the visit of the Viceroy, Mohammed Ali Pasha, to the Sudan in 1838/1254. Ahmed nevertheless, throughout his own career of advancement in government, continued to treat his elder brother Mohammed with accustomed respect, ensuring that one of the latter's sons was in his own entourage and, on the latter's retirement, appointing another son Sheikh of the Atbara region.

Throughout the early years of Turkish occupation and rule, Ahmed Awad el Karim Abu Sinn grew progressively in political stature and authority. The camel-owning Shukriya of the Butana, however, looked somewhat askance and with suspicion at an Abu Sinn educated in Abu Haraz, married to a local wife of the Arakiyyin and mother of his eldest son Awad el Karim Abu Hilba, notwithstanding that Ahmed had spent some while as a young man in the Butana, where he was presented with his own camel herd and would take a second wife from the Hassanab. She bore him a son Mohammed el Hardallu at Rufa'a in 1830/1246, who would become famous as a romantic poet and, in time, be appointed *sheikh el masheikh* of the Shukriya by the government, settling, however, as a nomad at Raira east of Jebel Geili in the Butana.

Hardallu's father Ahmed having improved the water wells at Raira, had meanwhile persuaded some Shukriya as well as Ja'aliyin to settle as agriculturists in the area of Rufa'a on the Blue Nile; and also at Gedaref where Ahmed founded Suq Abu Sinn with its trade routes into Abyssinia. For these settlers, that development marked a distinct departure from the traditional Shukriya nomadic way of life. In the coming years Ahmed doubtless was pressed to cooperate with the contemporary Governor-General, Ali Khurshid Pasha, in the enforced recruitment of slave conscripts for the Viceregal army, a policy tempered perhaps by the shrewd intervention of another more senior *sheikh el masheikh*, the redoubtable Abdel Qadir El Zain, the Ya'agoubabi, of Sennar.

It is in the time of Ahmed Pasha Abu Widan, Governor-General of the Sudan 1838-43/1254-59 and Ali Khurshid's successor, that Ahmed Abu Sinn comes to the fore. He would be among the senior Sudanese notables summoned to pay their respects to the Viceroy in Khartoum in November 1838/1254, electing to behave with greater deference than his neighbour Sheikh Sulieman Abu Ruf of Rufa'a who, at Roseires, is reported to have addressed the Viceroy: *"Reflect that thou art in my kingdom in my power, and*

not I in thine." He would forfeit his life by poisoning for his misjudgement.

Six months later in 1839/1255 Ahmed Widan was faced with a rebellion by the Sha'iqiyin at Berber, in protest at the dishonouring of his predecessor's agreement to exempt them from tax on abandoned Ja'ali lands. Declining to parley, the Sha'iqi Mek Hamad of the Amrab section destroyed the crops and withdrew south to the Shukriya dominated Butana. There is suspicion that Ahmed Awad El Karim warned Ahmed Pasha of Mek Hamad's presence in his *nazirate*, but that he also warned Hamad that Ahmed Pasha, with the support of the senior Sha'iqi Mek Kambal, would be attacking him. This enabled Hamad to counter-attack Ahmad Pasha in Shendi before escaping with a group of his supporters to the proximity of the exiled Mek Nimr of the Ja'aliyin on the Abyssinian border, thus able to threaten Ahmad Pasha anew. Publicly rebuffed, Ahmed Pasha wisely took counsel both with Sheikh Abdel Qadir El Zain and Sheikh Ahmed Awad El Karim, in consequence of which in November 1839 Mek Hamad was granted an amnesty to return a free man to Khartoum, thence to Shendi and Dongola, and his followers allowed to repossess their Shendi lands without retrospective payment of taxes.

This was a shrewd mediation, and evidence of Ahmed Pasha's increasing trust in him was provided by the latter's invitation to Sheikh Ahmed to participate in the Pasha's expedition to take full possession of Taka province east of the Atbara in March 1840/1256. The objective was to exact substantial tribute from the Beja and their fertile cultivations in the Gash Delta. By November the powerful Hadendoa as well as the Halenga had been subdued and a new province headquarters established at Kassala.

Kassala was now to become the centre of the new spiritually influential Khatmia sect, founded by Sayyid Mohammed Osman el Mirghani, with whom Ahmed Abu Sinn had already established a

good relationship, seeking the mediation of the Sayyid's eldest son El Hasan in settling a feud between the Shukriya and the Hassanab.

The murder of Ahmed Pasha Abu Widan in early October 1843/1259 under suspicion of planning an independent Sudan, prompted an insurrection of the Mitkenab of the Gash Delta within weeks of the arrival of Ahmed Pasha Manikli to supervise the devolution of the Sudan *hakimdar* into provinces. Ahmed Abu Sinn, along with Sheikh Abdel Qadir el Zain and other paramount chiefs of the Gezira, was forced to accompany Marikli and they became helpless spectators of the massacre of the rebels perpetrated in 1844/1260 by Manikli in retribution.

Successor Governors-General – for centralised rule of the Sudan soon reverted to them – would continue to rely on the active cooperation of these influential Sheikhs of the Blue Nile region. Ahmed Pasha Widan had for his part been responsible for the dispatch of three riverain expeditions towards the source of the White Nile in the period 1839-42/1255-58, and these had revealed the commercial profits to be had from trafficking in ivory tusks on the Bahr el Jebel. By October 1850/1266 Abdel Latif Pasha, Governor-General, would summon European traders, who had now established themselves in Khartoum, to organise ivory expeditions up the Nile on what had already been proclaimed a Government monopoly, warning them that, of their collection, one third of the ivory would belong to the government. Sheikh Ahmed Abu Sinn accompanied the Governor-General on this occasion. Indeed on the firm authority of Sheikh Ahmed and of his tribal paramount chief colleagues would depend the stability of the government over the following years. Sheikh Abdel Qadir was promoted *mu'awin* of the *hakimdar*, effectively Assistant-General, whilst Ahmed Abu Sinn was made Bey.

In 1854/1270 the American traveller James Hamilton en route from Kassala to Khartoum relates that he was taken by Awad El

Karim, Ahmed Abu Sinn's eldest son, to meet his father at Rufa'a. Much struck by Ahmed's presence and height, he described him as *"straight as a lance with a keen fiery eye and a grey beard which flowed to the waist"* (Hamilton, 1857).

By 1856/1272, following the cholera epidemic, Ahmed's Sudanese colleagues of the first rank would be dead, Ahmed himself was now 66. In Cairo, Mohammed Ali as Viceroy had been succeeded in turn by his stepson, Ibrahim Pasha and his grandson (Toussoun's son) Abbas I; and now would be by Mohammed Sa'id Pasha 1854-63/1270-80. The last had, soon after his succession, purposed on a personal visit to the Sudan. Came the time of his actual departure from Cairo 1856/1273, and concerned by the Sudan's vulnerability to attack from Abyssinia and by the depletion of the garrison through the cholera epidemic, the Viceroy reconsidered, contemplating a reversion in the Sudan from Turkish provincial military government to the pre-Turkish regime of native administration, backed centrally by a Turkish armed force under a *seraskir*.

Ahmed Bey and the Shukriya would probably have found such a reversion welcome. For thirty-five years he had served the Turkish-Egyptian rulers and his seniority and experience would, in such an event, have naturally recommended his appointment as Governor of Sennar if not also of Khartoum. However, in the course of his journey to Khartoum via the Atmur desert, the Viceroy became so disenchanted with what he saw and learned that he now determined on repatriating all Turkish officials, pausing only in Khartoum to dictate a new constitution. Drafted into the Vice-regal entourage at the last moment, however, had been the younger brother of Nubar Nubarian, the Armenian Christian, and first dragoman and private secretary to the Viceroy. His brother, Arakil Bey El Armani, aged 30, was currently serving as second dragoman in Alexandria. As the Viceroy planned in Khartoum the Turkish withdrawal, Arakil's willingness to volunteer for the post

of General-Governor of Khartoum and Sennar wrought a further change of mind by the Viceroy and the reconstitution of the Sudan into four provinces, reporting to the Viceroy's son Ahmed as Minister of the Interior in Cairo.

Ahmed Bey Abu Sinn found this unacceptable. Arakil was a stranger, a Christian and inexperienced and shortly after the Viceroy's departure for Cairo, Ahmed publicly challenged Arakil's political authority with the support of the Mufti (official expounder of religious law), Ibrahim 'Abd El Dafi'. Arakil responded 1857/1274 by riding out with an escort into the northern Butana to confront Ahmed Bey, who rode to meet him with a squadron of Shukriya cavalry. Stefan Reichmuth affirms that Ahmed Bey himself, in taking this action, was being undermined in his authority by the disgruntled sons of his brother and predecessor as *nazir*, Mohammed.

The meeting brought no resolution of the antagonism towards Arakil which, his elder brother Nubar Bey would claim, Ahmed Bey confirmed had stemmed from Arakil's Christian background – an appointment that was indeed unprecedented. Arakil's authority continued to be undermined by other senior Sheikhs, among them Abdel Qadir El Zain's son Zubeir, and by local traders discomforted by his tax reforms; but not so as to dissuade Arakil from embarking on a serious programme to mitigate government officials' corruption and the burden of taxation on the poor; and to abolish torture and the bastinado, which would for posterity earn him the title '*the just*'. However, Arakil's rule was of a short span, for in September 1858/1275 he died of dysentery.

Ahmed Bey's own authority had, nevertheless, been weakened by his challenge to the Viceroy's appointment, and diminished further by local insinuations that Ahmed was involved in personal discussions with the Abyssinian emperor, Theodore II, who was threatening an invasion of the Sudan. By 1858/1274 both Ahmed

Bey and the Mufti had been summoned to Cairo, to languish there under house arrest for 18 months. They would be pardoned in 1860/1277 and by July the next year 1861/1278, Samuel Baker, on his exploration of the Nile Tributaries would encounter Ahmed Bey back in the eastern Butana. The following year, 1862/1279, Ismail Pasha Ibrahim had assumed power in Cairo as Regent, and Musa Pasha Hamdi had been appointed Governor-General of the Sudan. Musa would arrive in Khartoum in August with reinforcements to prepare the Sudan's defences against Abyssinia.

Ahmed Bey Abu Sinn, now in his declining years, would profit signally from these events. Musa Hamdi had known Ahmed Bey in the campaign against Taka in 1840/1256 and, subsequently, when Musa was Governor of Khartoum and Sennar 1841-3/1257-59. On presenting his respects to the new Governor-General, Ahmed Bey was received with honour by Musa and made Governor of Khartoum and Sennar in 1862/1279, handing over the Shukriya *nazirate* to his younger brother Ali Awad Abdel Karim. Ahmed Bey figures in subsequent history as aiding Musa Hamdi in the organisation of annual recruiting expeditions to the Fazughli region (in lieu of tribute) in order to augment the other rank cadres of the additional infantry battalions authorised by Cairo for the army; assisting Adham Pasha El Arifi's column in his forced march to reinforce Kassala at the time of the 1865/1282 mutiny; and arranging the marriage at Rufa'a of his eldest son Awad El Karim to a daughter and direct descendant of a Hamaj *vizir*. Ahmed Bey would continue to encounter hostility from eastern Shukriya clans who claimed, by way of direct descent from Sheikh Mohammed Awad El Karim Abu Sinn, the succession to the *nazirate*, but the hereditary succession of Ahmed's line was assured. In his eightieth year in 1869/1286 he set out once more for Cairo, perhaps to attend the formal opening of the Suez Canal, but died in the course of that visit.

SHEIKH AWAD EL KARIM AHMED AND THE MAHDIYYA, 1872-98

Since 1862/1279 and Ahmed Bey's appointment as Governor of Khartoum and Sennar, Ahmed's younger brother Ali Awad had been *nazir* of the Shukriya and thus, following Ahmed Bey's final visit to Cairo in 1869/1286, it had fallen to Ali to remonstrate, if unsuccessfully, in 1870/1287 against the hostile actions of Ahmed Bey Mumtaz, now General-Governor of the Red Sea littoral, in supporting the defection of a sub-tribe of the Shukriya to Taka. Following Ahmed Mumtaz's subsequent dismissal as General-Governor of 'The South' (Khartoum) in 1872/1289, Ahmed Bey's eldest son Awad El Karim was appointed a salaried *mu'awin* of the General Governorate and later Pasha, and in 1874/1291 on the death of Ahmed Bey's younger brother Ali Awad El Karim, Awad El Karim Ahmed's younger brother, Ali Ahmed, became *nazir* of the Shukriya.

If Ahmed Mumtaz Pasha was unhelpful to the Shukriya in enticing their Atbara sub-tribe to emigrate to the Gash delta, he had recognised the value of their Blue Nile cultivations and encouraged the introduction of cotton in the Gedaref area whence, in 1875/1292 under Ismail Pasha Ayub's *hakimdaria*, Khartoum would buy in 1,000 cwt of raw cotton for ginning and dispatch to Berber. Although the years 1872/1289 and 1875/1292 were years of poor rainfall, the 1870's were generally years of prosperity for the Shukriya, with their ample herds and flocks as well as cultivation. In 1877/1294 on one of his rare visits to the eastern Sudan Gordon Pasha as Governor-General would encounter *Nazir* Ali Ahmed at Gedaref who had, unknown to Gordon, joined the latter's caravan over the 120 mile journey from Kassala.

Two years after Gordon Pasha's earlier resignation as Governor-General in September 1879/1296, the Mahdi was established at Jebel Qadir and a government expedition from Fashoda against

him was annihilated. In the interim between the removal of Gordon's successor Mohammed Ra'uf Pasha and the arrival in Khartoum of Abdel Qadir Pasha Hilmi as Resident Minister of the Sudan in May 1882/1299, Awad El Karim Pasha Abu Sinn, now at Sennar, demonstrated his authority by riding to meet up with Christian Giegler Pasha's expedition with his Shukriya cavalry and some 20 of his sons and relations. Giegler writes, "*all dressed in mediaeval breast plates with steel helmets*". Together they successfully defeated a Mahdist rebellion threatening Abu Haraz thus safeguarding Sennar. Following Abdel Qadir Pasha's arrival Sheikh Awad El Karim relinquished his Governorate and resumed the responsibilities as *nazir* of the Shukriya.

Shortly, however, the Shukriya would be faced with the dilemma which had divided the sons of Awad El Karim Abu Sinn, Mohammed and Ahmed, on the Turkish conquest of the Sudan back in 1821/1236. The defeat by the Mahdi of the Hicks Pasha expedition against El Obeid in November 1883/1301 determined the British Government to enforce the Egyptian abandonment of the Sudan and, if the writing was not already on the wall, Gordon's proclamation of evacuation at Berber on 12 February 1884/1301 and his offer to recognise the Mahdi as *Sultan* of Kordofan, invited a Mahdist advance on Khartoum.

The Abu Sinn brothers: Awad Karim in Khartoum, Ali in Rufa'a and Abdallah in Gedaref took counsel together. [It is not certain whether Abdallah was the younger brother or the son of Awad El Karim Ahmed Abu Sinn]. It seems that Abdallah's insistence on his defection to the Mahdi in El Obeid was accepted, if not instigated, at least by Awad El Karim Pasha, now reverted to *nazir*. It offered at least the option of a negotiated settlement with the Mahdi, while justifying Awad El Karim, as *nazir*, maintaining his loyalty to the Egyptian government and cooperating with Gordon's evacuation plans, following the latter's arrival in Khartoum on 18 February 1884/1301.

At this point when Gordon's *firman* from the Khedive was read in Khartoum and a Council of Notables appointed, Sheikh Awad El Karim was persuaded to accept its presidency. Gordon however had at once telegraphed home that his successor must be Zubeir Rahma Mansour despite the latter's earlier refusal in Cairo: "*Zubeir alone has the ability to rule the Sudan and would be universally accepted by the Sudan*". Did Gordon listen to the urging of Sheikh Awad El Karim (as claimed by the Abu Sinn family), that Gordon should evacuate immediately and handover rule to Awad El Karim, the latter negotiating a surrender through the offices of his brother Abdallah now with the Mahdi in El Obeid? Gordon would after all have known Awad El Karim from his time as *hakimdar* 1877-79/1294-96. Haste may be of the devil, but Gordon's mind had been made up well before he reached Khartoum. Zubeir must come, and Gordon would only hear that it had been vetoed by the British Government after 22 February 1884/1301.

Within the month following Gordon's arrival the Mahdist forces had cut the escape route to the north at Halfaya, while the Mahdi's father-in-law had been dispatched again to incite the Blue Nile tribes to rise against the Government garrison at Messelemya. This was historic wealthy Shukriya country and Sheikh Awad El Karim insisted that unless Gordon responded immediately to the call for reinforcements from the Egyptian commander at Mesellemya, he would lead the Shukriya to defect to the Mahdi. He was backed by the Council of Notables, and reinforcements were sent, but within two months the Egyptian commander had been forced to surrender, and Gedaref too had been handed over by *amir* Abdallah Awad el Karim.

On 26 January 1885/1302 Khartoum was overrun by Mahdist forces. Sheikh Awad El Karim made good his escape to Raira in the Butana, leaving Sheikh Abdallah to surrender the tribe to the

Mahdi. On 22 June 1885/1302 the Mahdi died and the succession of the Khalifa Abdallahi brought a summons to Khartoum to pledge his loyalty to which Awad El Karim Pasha declined to respond. Arrested, he was imprisoned in Omdurman, where he died in 1886/1304.

His brother Abdallah, already created *amir* of the Ansar, was now obliged with his young family to reside in Omdurman. The lands of the Shukriya became an ancillary granary for the Mahdists and the prosperity of the tribe plummeted. Abdallah would become lieutenant to the *amir* Mahmoud Ahmed, and when the latter was defeated by Kitchener at the battle of Atbara in April 1898/1315 Abdallah, unlike his commander, succeeded in escaping to continue the struggle in Gedaref where the *amir* Ahmed Fadil was still campaigning after the capture of Omdurman. Relieved by the latter from his allegiance to the Khalifa, Abdallah surrendered to the Anglo-Egyptian victors and in 1902/1320 was recognised as *nazir* of the Shukriya, to be succeeded on his death in 1923/1341 by his eldest son Awad El Karim.

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
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
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GENEALOGICAL TABLE: ABU SINN
(AFTER HILLELSON, 1920)

THE DESCENDANTS OF EL TIWEIM (SHA'ED-DIN) AT KASSALA



THE DESCENDANTS OF ABU SINN



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[If members are aware of other books relating to the Sudan which have been published recently, please let me know so that a supplementary list can be included in a future issue. Ed]

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Sudan Studies Society of the UK 22nd AGM and ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM

**Will be held:
(in Association with the Centre of African Studies, University
of London)**

On

Saturday, 4th October 2008

In

Khalili Lecture Theatre, 09.45 to 16.50

**School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
(off Russell Square)**

***Symposium & Lunch: £12 (Student with ID £5); Symposium
only: £5.***

Further details on papers enclosed

Further, final details on our web-site: <http://www.sssuk.org>

[This event is being held later than usual to avoid Ramadan]

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