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Society for the Study of the Sudans (UK)

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Members receive two issues each year of Sudan Studies; the right to a reduced rate on copies of the Society's occasional papers; the right to attend the joint Annual General Meeting and Symposium and other occasional meetings organized by the Society.

Editorial

Welcome to Issue 53 of *Sudan Studies*. As you will have noticed, this issue is in colour, making use of new publishing software. We also have a new (draft) logo for Sudan Studies, also in colour. The use of a colour format enables us to include photographs to accompany some articles. We plan further changes in the layout and style of the journal in future issues, including a map.

Another important change to the Society is the name change decided at the Annual General Meeting in October 2015. We are still SSSUK but this now stands for 'Society for the Study of the Sudans (UK)' so as to better reflect the reality of two Sudans: South Sudan and Sudan. Our Website Manager, Michael Medley, is developing a new logo for the Society and other graphics.

Readers may notice that the inside cover pages of the journal which detail membership and information about *Sudan Studies* have been updated. This includes Notes for Contributors and we hope that you will read this and become inspired to write an article or book review for a forthcoming issue, whether with or without colour photographs, maps and so on.

Most of the articles in this issue are by people who spoke at the 2015 Symposium and cover a wide range of subjects and geographical locations. We begin with an appreciation by **Jack Davies** of the life of **George Harold Williams,** who worked for many years in the Sudan and sadly, recently died at the age of 95.

The first article is by **Chris Milner** and details the role of theatre in contemporary South Sudan, outlining its history, themes and audience engagement and participation. He ends by reflecting on the important role that cultural activity plays as a "strategic national resource" in South Sudan, not least by providing a space in which traumatised people can express themselves and by facilitating national dialogue and reconciliation. Chris's article is accompanied by some exciting photographs of theatre actors and audiences in South Sudan in 2015.

Next, in another excellent article **Chris Vaughan** illustrates some of the key themes of his recent book about colonial Darfur suggesting that recent violence in the region emerged out of a "deeper history of state violence " in the colonial era. That doesn't mean that he neglects modern factors, however.

This is followed by the illustrated *'Story of the Macallè'* an Italian submarine that sank in the Red Sea off the coast of Sudan during the Second World War. **Ricardo Preve** who makes and produces television documentaries came across the story when diving in the Red Sea and used archival sources in Italy and the UK to trace its history and the background of the sailors who manned her. One of the crewmen died on the barren island of Barra Musa Kebir after the *Macallè* sank and the author relates his fascinating search to find and verify the young man's grave with the aim of repatriating his remains to Italy.

Our fourth article is a short report of a panel that was convened at SSSUK's 2015 Symposium on, 'Youth Radicalisation among Sudanese', written by one of the speakers, Ashraf Khalifa. This important topic was addressed by four eminent speakers, who contributed their professional expertise and personal perspectives to a discussion about the reasons for the radicalisation of some young Sudanese living in the diaspora in the UK.

The next article is by **Philip Winter**, who writes some observations about the recent articles by Gérard Prunier in Sudan Studies, on the idea of the Sudanese government as *hukum*. Winter uses his experience of Sudan and South Sudan and his knowledge of Sudanese history to interrogate the power of *hukum* as an "explanation as to why South Sudan freed itself from oppression by governments in Khartoum only to mirror its worst practices itself". It would be interesting to have other opinions about Prunier's theory or the wider issues of governance in South Sudan and Sudan, so please feel free to write comments or articles for publication in *Sudan Studies* if you would like to.

The penultimate article is by SSSUK Committee member **Derek Welsby**, who writes about the archaeological and historical work of the Sudan Archaeological Society (SARS) in southern Egypt and Sudan. He sketches the history of the development of archaeology in Sudan and the earliest visits to the region by antiquarians and travellers, before detailing the contemporary work of SARS in Sudan and the UK. His article is illustrated by several interesting photos.

Finally, we have reproduced a recent note by **Peter Verney** about the participation of Darfurian singer Shurooq Abu el Nas in 2016's World Holocaust Memorial Day. He includes the words of her moving song *Um al Yatama*. Many readers will have been present for Shurooq's wonderful performance at the recent Symposium and we are publishing a picture of her at that event.

As usual we have some book reviews in this issue, all of which are reviewed by experts in their field. The first is **Nicki Kindersley's** review of K. Grabska's book, *Gender, Home and Identity* about Nuer repatriation after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005; **Jack Davies** reviews an edited collection by Gertel et al entitled, *Disrupting Territories* about land commodification and conflict in Sudan and South Sudan; **Peter Woodward** reviews Mansour Khalid's latest book, *The Paradox of Two Sudans*, which was launched at our Symposium; **Rashid Sidahmed** reviews a book of *Sudanese Proverbs* by **Muna Zaki** and **Edmund Wyatt**; and finally **Fergus Nicoll** reviews a biography by Martin Daly of Sir William Luce entitled, *The Last of the Great Proconsuls*.

Finally, we present the minutes of SSSUK's 2014 AGM and the Accounts. I hope you enjoy reading Issue 53 of *Sudan Studies*.

George Harold Williams

An Appreciation

Harold (he never used George) died on 12 December 2015 aged 95. His memorial service was held at St Mary's Church, Pennard, on the Gower Peninsula on Friday,15th January 2016.

Harold graduated from Edinburgh in 1942 with a degree in Forestry. During World War II many well-qualified people were told where they were required to serve their country. Harold was drafted to serve as a forestry officer in Sudan. Accordingly, he had to report to Liverpool on 12th November 1942 and sailed for Port Sudan the next day.

His ship was fully loaded with munitions for the Western Desert campaign. The ship was torpedoed off Port Elizabeth. Officialdom, knowing what the vessel was carrying, assumed that it had sunk without survivors. Fortunately the torpedo hit the engine room, the only part of the ship where there were no munitions. The whole story was told in Sudan Studies 43 (Jan 2011). By the time he reached Juba, his replacement had already arrived in Khartoum! He then set about building sawmills to provide timber for the Western Desert campaign.

Harold served in the Sudan until independence. By 2015 He was the last surviving Sudan Service Pensioner. After the Sudan he served in Zambia and Fiji as Chief Forestry Officer. As might be expected his garden, in Gower was magnificent.

Jack Davies

South Sudanese Theatre in 2015

Chris Milner*

Introduction

South Sudan is an exciting and difficult place for artists. The stakes are high and audiences hungry. Film-makers, poets, dramatists, novelists, cartoonists, singers, musicians and fine artists abound, producing sincere work that is both challenging and establishing, and pushing the boundaries of what it means to be South Sudanese.

This review examines a small sample of theatre activity through 2015, including at World Theatre Day in Juba (27-29 March), 'Citizen's Theatre' community forum theatre performances in Wau, Bor, Aweil, Terekeka, Yambio, Torit and Juba (May-December) and at the Citizen Theatre Inter-School's Theatre Festival (September). In what follows I aim to: place theatre activities in 2015 within a historical theatre tradition; identify and describe six key devices and themes around which dramatists were compelled to work during the twelve-month period; shed light on how audiences engage and interact with theatre as a cultural and political activity; and finally, make some general comments about the role of cultural activity in the South Sudanese context.

An Orupaap member dancing at the Schools Theatre Festival at Nyakuruon Cultural Centre, Juba, September

The idea for this review came from one simple observation: that disparate drama groups, without prior connection and from varied community, socio-economic and geographical backgrounds, used remarkably similar devices and focused on a handful of common themes. Through the exercise of identifying these aspects of contemporary theatre, it is hoped that the reader will gain a useful insight into some of the critical debates taking place within South Sudanese societies at this critical juncture.

The development of a theatre tradition

Theatre is not new to South Sudan. Storytelling is an extant tradition and powerful indigenous theatrical tradition. In addition to often-acted folk tales and narrative dances, many South Sudanese rituals contain well documented dramatic elements, such as the consecration of the Shilluk *Reth* (King)[1], the ritual associated with the birth of twins in the Mundari ethnic group,[2] the *Jieng* spear tale and so on. Today's work must be considered in the light of this rich history.

The consensus among South Sudanese dramatists is that a 'modern' theatre – actors devising and performing new plays or sketches to an audience in a generated setting – arrived with a popular Southerner nick-named 'Amuna Cabase', on his return from service with the British Army during the Second World War. He undertook impromptu performances around Juba, and memories of his acting, singing, dancing and "moving puppets" in the streets has inspired a tradition of street theatre that continues to this day.[3] This theatre grew deep roots during both first and second wars. Churches and even Sudan People's Liberation Army groups performed interactive plays, usually bound up with securing various social or political changes.[4]

After the Addis Ababa Accord was signed in 1972, returnees from East Africa again brought different notions and functions of theatre to Southern Sudan. Theatre festivals were organised across the South and a plethora of drama groups sprung up, including the Skylark and Kondokoro Drama Associations in Juba, and the Catholic Drama Association and the Episcopal Church Drama Association. Following the celebrated example of jailed Kenyan dramatist Ngugi Wa Thiong'o (with whom Southern Sudanese had interacted in exile), the new

1. See for example, Joshua Ojwok Yor, (1993) "The installation of the Reth of the Shilluk, Kwongo Dak Padiet 1993", Sudanese Folklife Research and Documentation Center http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/src/00147-EN.pdf

2. The ritual associated with the birth of Mundari twins is documented in a public letter by Professor Simon E. Kulusika, June 2014

3. This consensus has been expressed at many theatrical gatherings in South Sudan, including at lectures and in discussions involving diverse groups at World Theatre Day 2013, 2014 and 2015

4. Interview, John Kudusay, June 2013, Juba

emphasis was on using local languages and challenging local power. The soul of this theatre came from within – reflecting the Southerner's Sudan, which was not adequately represented on the stage or in the radio and books coming from Khartoum.[5]

Skylark Drama Association in the 1980s. Joseph Abuk (kneeling at the front is now the director of South Sudan Theatre Organisation.

Political space diminished after 1983 and drama associations disbanded or went underground. Meanwhile, important cultural groups were established in Sudan, East Africa and the West. *Kwoto* in Khartoum served to maintain southern traditions and foster shared identity within the displaced areas. An informal street style evolved in response to the prevailing security situation across the whole of Sudan, with plays performed in the round, 'African style', and predominantly in safe spaces, especially churches.[6]

Restricted freedom of expression or political association, and lack of economic opportunity in the periods after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Independence have severely hampered dramatists in recent years. However, artists have continued to develop their networks and activity. Just one example is the South Sudan Theatre Company (originally forged from members of *Kwoto*, Skylark and the University of Juba School of Drama, and now registered as South Sudan Theatre Organisation) that performed at Shakespeare's Globe Theatre in

5. Interview, Ester Bagarasas, Lecturer in Drama at the University of Juba, 2 October 2013

6. Lecture, Ester Bagarasas, Lecturer in Drama at the University of Juba, 23 January 2015

London in 2012 as part of the Cultural Olympiad. It was the first time South Sudan had participated in an international festival as an independent country and the group won positive reviews against massive odds.

The organisation has since embarked on an ambitious programme of 'Citizen's Theatre', organising inter-school theatre festivals, establishing theatre clubs and training young people in six states in theatre techniques. Other groups, notably Woyee Film and Theatre and *Orupaap* are also building theatre networks and producing many theatre-based events. And finally, there are the countless independent theatre groups, which have either migrated back to South Sudan from Khartoum or further afield (e.g. *Emmaus*) as well as countless community-based (e.g. the Acholi Cultural Association) or school drama groups (e.g. the Bor Schools Theatre Club).

Training of Trainers in Forum Theatre, Juba, January 2015

Theatre activity in 2015: key devices and themes

The performances under review in this article were generally convened by the South Sudan Theatre Organisation but involved over 20 independent drama groups and 20 secondary school drama groups from across the country. The participants generally live in or near urban centres but beyond that, represent all sections of social and economic groups.

A street theatre perfomrance by South Sudan Theatre Organisation, Juba

Devices

The first device, common to many drama performances in 2015, could be called 'The State of Nature'. Groups using this approach depict on stage a conception of the lives of South Sudanese peoples before the development of complex states and modernity: overwhelmingly presented as a true state of freedom and harmony with the natural world. The narrative then typically charts a 'Fall' towards division and cruelty before most, but not all, end with an ultimate reconciliation. In a breathtakingly beautiful exposition by the formerly Khartoum-based drama group Emmaus entitled '*Al Ouda*' (the Return), South Sudanese were first shown naked, in animal skins and smothered with ash, peacefully interacting among meticulously mimed fauna and flora direct from the bush. Two noble characters play, cavort, almost dance, in unison and the impression is of a time in which the individual does not exist; the tone overall is one of primitive communism.

The 'State of Nature' device, Emmaus Drama Group, World Theatre Day, 28th March 2015, Juba

As in many classic social contract theories, divisions evolve around material and sexual desires and lead to acts of imaginative cruelty.[7] In the case of *Al Ouda*, one of the characters eventually plucks an eyeball from his adversary's head, stretches the optic nerve and stakes it to the ground, before proceeding to play an exquisite symphony on the taut line. What was remarkable about such scenes was the sense of nostalgia invoked, as if this fall from grace were not in a distant past but alive and in recent memory. As a result of this proximity, the 'State of Nature 'and 'Fall' became collective yearnings: 'How did we get to this point' and 'How did we allow this to happen?'

In the second device, the political symbolism of chairs is used to describe and diagnose the current situation. Chairs are common symbols of authority in Africa (e.g. the Golden Stool, Throne of David and Chieftaincy Stools of Nigeria) and the word 'Chair' is regularly used in South Sudan to refer to political positions. In 2015, in the context of a divided polity and entrenched high-level negotiations, Stephen Ochalla's music and dance group *Orupaap* created a fusion piece entitled '*Amuna Cabase'*. The show was an ambitious exploration of the

7. Frequently, such conflict was shown to emerge between three parties and coincide with the introduction of modern firearms. Equatorian groups were more likely to show one party as the mediator between two aggressors.

history of theatre in South Sudan, intertwined with a narrative of conflict and cooperation.[8] In *Amuna Cabase*, the stage was set with four heavy wooden chairs and a number of ropes that dangled from a scaffold structure. The performance was primarily a complex interplay between dancers, musicians, chairs and ropes; at times, dancers were imprisoned and at others, competing for position. In another example, '*Kisib'* by drama group *Negum al Ghad*, an ambitious underling coveted an outrageously oversized throne that was occupied by a king; the underling eventually poisoned the king before taking his place.[9]

'Amuna Cabase' by Orupaap, World Theatre Day, Nyakuruon Cultural Centre, 27th March 2015

Thirdly, drama groups use newspapers to illustrate what many see as the misplaced emphasis on politics *vis-à-vis* everyday concerns and to show the corresponding gap between the headlines and the reality of life for people in South Sudan. A number of performances, including *Amuna Cabase*, discussed above, took place against a wall literally pasted with newspapers. Atem al Fatih's untitled piece performed by the New South Drama Group featured a man reading a newspaper loudly on one side of the stage, whilst a group of characters entered in rags, carrying their belongings (and even one or two live animals) and struggled

8. *Orupaap* performed this 40-minute work at the World Theatre Day celebrations (convened by SSTO) at Nyakuruon Cultural Centre on 27th Match 2015.
9. *Kisib* was also performed at the World Theatre Day celebrations at Nyakuruon Cultural Centre on 27th March 2015.

to build a temporary shelter. *Al Libda's 'Shamarat'* also explicitly dealt with the gap between elite narratives and daily life. Throughout the 40 or so performances informing this review, displaced persons staggered hopelessly, people died in conflict or banditry, young girls died in childbirth, stomachs ached, women were beaten and dreams were frustrated. Suffering was relentless, so heavy that it simply demanded justice. The theatre was saying enough is enough. We will not stand for more.

Fourth, resolution of conflicts was associated with the use of traditional symbols of reconciliation. To mark negotiated settlements, chiefs are shown using palm leaves to shake *marissa* (local beer) over the reconciled parties and their witnesses; marissa is also passed around so that all may share from the same gourd; former adversaries submit to the authority of a court by crawling through the legs of their chiefs; animals are slaughtered (acted); and food shared. There was not a shiny suit and banker's tie in sight during a single reconciliation scene.

Presentation of traditional reconciliation, South Sudan Theatre Organisation, World Theatre Day, Juba, March 2015

The fifth device is linked to images of traditional reconciliation and explores the concept of a people coming under one roof. This metaphor will be familiar from the 'House of Nationalities' initiative, developed by South Sudanese intellectuals during two workshops held in 2000 and 2001, and which was intended to provide a space for representatives of all the country's ethnic communities to meet in a spirit of mutual respect. Theatre performances in 2015 used the device

in two ways: a formerly combative group of characters would enter a *tukul* (shelter) together or a diverse group of characters would build a *tukul* together. These actions were powerful symbols: demonstrating the possibility of coming together under one roof of all South Sudanese but also communicating the perception that it is the ordinary people who must bear the responsibility of reconciling and building a viable nation.

Themes

An analysis of the common themes in the 2015 performances reveals the surprisingly limited range of social and political subjects that were chosen as a focus, particularly given the diverse backgrounds and locations of the drama groups involved. Of the 40 performances, all focused on one or more of the following culturally or politically sensitive issues and the majority succeeded in clearly exposing the inter-relationship between them:

- Cattle raiding: This was perhaps most elegantly laid out by a Torit secondary school in September 2015. In this example, a partnership was fostered between a local senior government official and a poor man in need of dowry money. The poor man was told to go raiding cattle by the official who provided him with a weapon. Following a botched raid, the government official was involved in pronouncing the young man guilty, taking no responsibility for what had happened.
- Political economy of corruption: These performances laid bare the process in which officials use their position to extract US Dollars and to profit on the black market, and exposed the impact this had on the wider population.
- Political economy of early marriage: Early marriage was among the top three issues chosen by young people as a core theatrical subject in **every** location. The majority of plays involving early marriage as a primary subject concluded with the death of the child-bride in childbirth. The causes of early marriage were addressed in their full complexity i.e. as involving poverty, lack of respect for girls and women, conservative traditions and alcoholism.
- Alcoholism: Alcoholism was a remarkably prevalent feature in the performances, either as primary or secondary subject. Alcoholic fathers were shown as poorly managing household finances, making it harder for children to be educated and for wives to provide basic nutrition to the family; this situation often resulting in serious domestic violence or the early marriage of children. Alcoholic children were also shown bunking off school and being drawn into violence.

- Inequality and class division: Performances tended to criticise a sense of growing inequality and the all pervasive concept of a 'VIP' (Very Important Person).[10] In one short play by a Central Equatorian school group, a VIP is shown talking on her mobile telephone. An extremely poor person requests assistance but is dismissed rudely, before eventually grabbing the lady's handbag in desperation. The VIP sets a couple of thugs to beat the beggar nearly to death. In other plays, fathers are unable to refuse VIP requests to marry their child daughters.
- Tribalism: Tribalism was addressed primarily through the portrayal of 'star-crossed' lovers.
- Culture of admiring wealth and power: The possession of wealth and power is regarded as an admirable quality in many cultures in South Sudan. Some theatre companies are questioning this by examining the impact of the accumulation on others.

Having noted the devices and themes discussed above, we can begin to understand the overarching questions that are at stake in South Sudan's theatre: 'Who are we and who do we want to be?' 'What do we keep from our traditional values and behaviour and what do we let go?' Young people in urban locations are aware that their culture is a double-edged sword: it is both a beautiful source of meaning, identity, mutual assistance and joy and a barrier to freedom for women, individual economic advancement and educational development. It is a confusing and exciting time.

Audience engagement and interaction

So much for the stage; what does audience reaction tell us about theatre in South Sudan and its role? There is much to say about the crowds who gather in market places, schools and churches and the thousands of young people who attend the theatre festivals. There are long, complex and often traumatic stories behind each tear, each cheer and each view expressed in the debates which performances elicit.

Let us consider laughter. As an outsider, it sometimes appears strange that South Sudanese audiences laugh so loudly at adversity: a woman is beaten and the crowd erupts, a man cries because he cannot feed his family and the assembled gathering is in stitches. The coordinator of the South Sudan Theatre Organisation, Nichola Lado, explains this in the following terms:

10. In many informal conversations with a variety of South Sudanese, the term 'VIP 'was used to refer to a 'class' in South Sudanese society.

An audience member provides her feedback on issues raised in a performance, Gumbo, Central Equatoria

> Poor people all over the world, nobody hears them. So you have the poor people and you have the people with everything, who just don't listen. For example, the rich lady who arranged the beating of the beggar [in the play described above] did not even take the chance to listen, let alone help. So, what theatre is doing is like giving a voice to the voiceless. In South Sudanese culture, in our traditional life, there are many things that we cannot say or question, like woman beating or early marriage. These things fall into 'the tradition' that you have to understand. Politics, tribalism and corruption are similar; these are things that only those we call our uncles, not even our fathers, can discuss. So when it comes to watching them on the stage it is like… ahhhh [release]... The audience feel so strongly that they have wanted to say these things out loud, but they didn't know how to say them and do not have the freedom to say them. So the audience get a huge release... ahhh… and this is when the audience laughs.[11]

Nichola went on to explain how theatre is taking people one step further from recognition to motivation and action:

> The good thing about the method of our Citizen's Theatre – which is using forum theatre – is that people do not just watch, it gives people a voice to speak out and to join the dialogue.[12] At a certain point in the performance a chance is offered to the audience to intervene. The first people who laugh are the first people with their hands up, who want to join the actors on the stage and to act out what they would have liked to see rather than what happened in the play, because these are the people who really want to talk. Their laughter means, 'Yes, this is happening in our community and we need to see that these things go out.'[13]

In the case of the rich VIP story described above, one member of the audience bounded on to the stage and re-enacted the entire scene as an onlooker who

11. Interview, Nichola Franco, SSTO Coordinator, 6 September 2015, Bor Town, Jonglei State

12. Forum Theatre is designed to create spaces for community-led dialogue around cultural, social and political issues. This enables participants to voice what is usually culturally impossible to discuss and to dialogue together to develop alternative solutions to the problems they face. Forum Theatre is the common term for a collection of techniques which use theatre to facilitate dialogue and action, most famously elaborated as 'Theatre of the Oppressed' by Brazilian theoretician, director and playwright Augusto Boal (1931–2009). See, for example, Boal, A. (1993) *Theatre of the oppressed*, Theatre Communications Group

13. Interview, Nichola Franco, SSTO Coordinator, 6 September 2015, Bor Town, Jonglei State,

intervened to assist the beggar.

Conclusion: the role of cultural activity in South Sudan

To conclude, I will make some general comments about the role of theatre in South Sudan. These are inspired by the discussion of devices and themes above and the experience of sharing in theatre activities in South Sudan through 2015.

The starting point is to recognise that the intrinsic value of theatre in South Sudan is the same as it is anywhere. It can enrich both inner and outer worlds by providing a mix of enjoyment, fulfilment, association, expression and vital social and political commentary.[14] However, South Sudan's arts, and its cultures, are also a strategic national resource.

Firstly, at the individual level, millions of South Sudanese have been exposed to direct and indirect violence with the natural consequence that symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are widespread.[15] These symptoms include intrusive memories, disengagement from learning, avoidance of discussion of traumatic events, lack of ability to think creatively in social, political and economic activity, fear, negative moods, anger and aggressive behaviour. Although many kinds of activity may help to address these issues, theatre appears particularly well placed to help participants grow in confidence, think creatively and overcome fears – of expressing themselves, considering alternative futures and trusting others.[16] The presence of these skills is also closely related to developing the capacities that are necessary to reconcile and forgive.

Secondly, theatre and cultural activity may help to demonstrate and reinforce a key component of reconciliation, i.e. a sense of a shared future and the possibility of mutual assistance and interdependence within conflict-affected societies.[17]

14. Cultural theorists such as Francois Matarasso question the value of 'arts for arts' sake' arguments, pointing out that art has always been instrumentalised. See for example, this short blog article "What's the Point" http://arestlessart.com/2016/01/06/what-is-the-point/, 6 January 2016.

15. See for example, Peace and Justice: Trauma, Healing and the Plight of Displaced Persons in South Sudan, a newsletter by the South Sudan Law Society (SSLS), http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/press-releases/trauma-healing-and-the-plight-of-displaced-persons-in-south-sudan

16. There are specific theater techniques such as 'Playback Theatre' that is designed to assist in trauma healing. An evaluation of participants in the 'Citizen Theatre 'initiative identified 'reduction of fear' as a key effect of the program. On closer analysis addressing this 'fear' involved thinking about other South Sudanese communities, speaking to parents, having confidence in ones abilities and considering alternative futures.

17. Phuong N. Pham et al., Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in Rwanda, Implications for Attitudes Towards Justice and Reconciliation, *Journal of the American Medical Association,* Vol. 292, No. 5 (2004), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?arti-

A common pitfall of some reconciliation efforts is that they become political battlegrounds, used to mobilise support, provide political platforms or push interest-serving narratives. Many artists are very careful not to become the tools of the government or of donor-driven agendas and are therefore able to create impartial spaces that are rare in contemporary South Sudan. In these spaces, grievance and loss may be brought into the open and be publicly recognised, and divisive issues may be constructively addressed in a non-violent space.

A third and related issue is that theatre may be able to contribute to a much-demanded process of national dialogue.[18] An understanding of national dialogue as solely a high-level 'political' process is misguided. Many South Sudanese have fought as much for local reasons as they have in support of any national platform. The reality is that interaction among many South Sudanese communities is non-existent; daily injustice is linked to the bigger ideal of national reconciliation; and underlying drivers of conflict are deeply entrenched in culture and memory. This demands a broader conception of national dialogue that includes a whole range of formal and informal approaches, local and national.

Fourthly, forum theatre produces spaces in which communities can directly and safely communicate concerns and advocate solutions to their traditional and political elites.

The fifth point is that participation in activities such as drama groups may reduce young people's incentives to respond to calls for their mobilisation, by providing opportunities to develop positive and non-violent identities, a sense of belonging, some status and possibly income.

Finally, theatre can provide a window into underlying conflict dynamics that can inform both South Sudanese and concerned foreigners by providing early warnings of conflict and a better understanding of the complexity of the different actors in conflict situations, thus enabling them to gain insights into what is really going on.

Through a deeper engagement with cultural activity, we can all learn more about what makes this country as violent and conflicted as it is vibrant and beautiful.

**Chris Milner is the Director of 'Transformedia', a non-profit production company and digital agency that supports peace and security. He has worked closely with what is now the South Sudanese Theatre Organisation since 2011.*

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18. See, for example, International Crisis Group (2014) *South Sudan: A civil war by any other name,* 10th April

Colonial Governance in Darfur During the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium: Violence and Accommodation

Chris Vaughan*

Introduction

In this brief article, I have condensed and illustrated some of the key themes from my recent book, published by James Currey: *Darfur: Colonial violence, Sultanic legacies and local politics, 1916-1956*. This work is concerned principally with the history of Anglo-Egyptian colonial governance in Darfur. One key aim was to demonstrate the ways in which the deeper history of Darfur as an independent Muslim Sultanate from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century shaped the character of colonial governance, whilst also showing where colonial rule departed from those historical legacies. I also wrote the book with an eye on recent events in Darfur, with the intention of historicising some of the key features of recent conflict and politics in the region. One key argument I make is that the recent violence in Darfur has emerged out of a deeper history of state violence in the region than is usually acknowledged and that state violence has for a long time been entwined with and exacerbated local rivalries and divisions between the various peoples of the region.

In contemporary reporting, the violence of the *janjaweed* – the militias armed by the Government of Sudan in the mass violence of 2003-4, now re-cast as 'Border Guards' or 'Rapid Support Forces' by the government – often appears to be a new phenomenon in Darfur, emerging out of a kind of historical vacuum. Indeed, there is no historical precedent for the scale of violence experienced in Darfur in 2003-4 nor for its explicitly racialised character but some key characteristics of the mechanics of violence were not new. The violence of the *janjaweed* was licensed by the Sudanese state and indeed the Sudanese military fought alongside the *janjaweed* militias. In other words, the mass violence of 2003-4 was the product of a **politics of alliance** between the state and some peoples of Darfur, an alliance formed against other peoples of Darfur.[1] This politics of alliance – and in particular the arming of local militias to achieve the military objectives of the state – was also a central feature of the years of the Anglo-Egyptian conquest and so-called 'pacification' of Darfur. More generally, violence was integral to colonial governance: either its explicit use or the threat thereof

1. This phrase is borrowed from J. Monson, 'Relocating Maji Maji: The politics of alliance and authority in the southern highlands of Tanzania, 1870-1918', *Journal of African History,* 39 (1998), pp. 95-120.

remained central to the relationship between state and society throughout the years of British rule.

However, I also suggest that the idea of the state has for many centuries occupied a more constructive role in the political imagination of Darfuris, especially among the leading families within the various ethnic groups of the region and the chiefs who emerged from these families. For these people especially, the state represents opportunity as well as threat; it has long played a central role in settling local disputes and intervening in local politics. Indeed, for ordinary people, it also appears that the ruler's proper role was to protect his subjects from the violence and predation of local agents of government: oppressive and abusive officials and chiefs should be punished and removed by the ruler. These expectations of government shaped the history of colonial governance and to some extent the notion of the state as opportunity and resource remains important to the present-day, even in the context of apparent state failure and collapse in the region. The rest of this essay briefly develops these core themes.

Conquest, pacification and indirect rule; the changing faces of state violence

When Britain conquered Sudan in 1898, it decided not to extend its conquest to Darfur – rather, it made a treaty with the Sultan, Ali Dinar, that guaranteed his autonomy in return for the payment of a nominal tribute that recognised ultimate British sovereignty over his kingdom. The relationship with Ali Dinar was never close but neither was it particularly hostile until the outbreak of World War I (WWI). By 1915, British officials in Sudan claimed that the Sultan was intriguing with the Ottomans and Sanussiya, their enemies in WWI, and made a case for the invasion of Darfur and the deposition of the Sultan. The strategic argument was thinly evidenced – it seems more likely that British officers in Sudan were eager for their share of glory, particularly glory gained in battle against a greatly inferior foe.[2]

As well as sending 2,000 troops from the Egyptian Army in the guise of the Darfur Field Force to conquer the region, Britain also recruited militias among tribes living under British rule on the borders with Darfur. These militias were used to support the conquest but also pursued their own interests in raiding against rival tribes in Darfur. Some British officers expressed reservations about this policy but Governor General Reginald Wingate suggested that the militias had been 'found a harmless vent for their energies'.[3] As the conquest progressed, it was noted that the militias were attacking and 'looting the inoffensive civilian

2. For more on the preparations for conquest, see Martin Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow,* pp. 108-112 and J. Slight, 'British perceptions and responses to Sultan Ali Dinar, 1915-1916'. *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 38 (2010), pp. 237-260.

3. Wingate to Kelly, 21 Apr. 1916, Sudan Archive, Durham (SAD) 128/2/47.

population'.[4] This did not deter Wingate, who went on to expand the militias, involving new tribes loyal to government, in order to avoid 'jealousy between the tribes' and ensure all would be able to 'take their share' of the looting that was going on.[5] He suggested that the militias will 'inevitably carry on their natural bent when they see a chance of doing so with impunity'.[6] Officers and officials were well aware their strategy allowed significant violence against civilian populations but were ultimately unconcerned about this. What was depicted here as the 'natural bent' of nomadic tribes was the conscious licensing and facilitation of local violence by the state. The parallels with the present are obvious; and for several months following the British invasion, raiding between rival groups continued without British intervention.

While this wave of violence died down a few months into colonial rule, militias were revived to repress rebellion which broke out four years after the conquest and state violence more generally remained at the heart of colonial government. Colonial government in Darfur in its first years was oriented around the use of force to coerce obedience from local populations. There is little detail on the early years of colonial rule in western Darfur in the archival record but the reports of one particular official illustrate much about what was considered normal practice in this period. Notably, the collective punishment of communities deemed to be resistant to state control was clearly regular practice – again, a key feature of the counter-insurgency of 2003-4. In 1918, a prisoner escaped from custody and was sheltered by villagers in the Jebel Marra massif. The inspector of the district, Angus Gillan, saw this as 'an excellent opportunity to inflict a sharp lesson on those somewhat turbulent people'. He burnt all three villages in the area where the prisoner was reported to be held. Approaching the last of these villages, 'the people were seen to be fleeing and, as they refused to stop, fire was opened on them, unfortunately with no results, owing to long range'.[7] This and other material seems to suggest that colonial government in these years seemed to equate to floggings, public hangings, the destruction of villages and the mass theft of people's key livelihood resources. So it was unsurprising that a major rebellion broke out. In September 1921, nearly five years after the campaign of colonial conquest, a force of 6,000 rebels attacked the government headquarters at Nyala in southern Darfur, led by one Abdullahi Suheini, an Islamic holy man who declared himself the *Nabi 'Isa* (Prophet Jesus), sent to overthrow the Antichrist (the British authorities). The Inspector of Southern Darfur District, Tenant McNeill, was among those killed in the attack. The government

4. Kelly to Wingate, 2 June 1916, SAD 129/1/33.
5. Wingate to H. Jackson, 3 May 1916, SAD 128/4/53–54.
6. Wingate to Kelly, 5 June 1916, SAD 129/2/25.
7. J.A. Gillan, Report to Governor re. tour in Jebel Marra, 28 Mar. 1918, SAD 723/3/2.

was saved from utter humiliation only by the resistance put up against the rebels by government troops and police led by Sudanese officers. This was the largest rebellion seen during the period of British rule anywhere in Sudan: it was driven by specific grievances about tax collection and the local politics of land which the British authorities had blundered into, as well as a wider sense of opposition to an alien regime.[8]

The killing of a British Inspector and the scale of the rebellion spooked the colonial administration and it responded with ruthless repression. A major military patrol was put on tour to crush any remaining resistance but more importantly, to move through Darfur 'with as much display of force as possible'[9]. Patrol 99, as it was known, involved two Mounted Infantry companies, three Camel Companies, one hundred Western Arab Corps infantry, seven Vickers Guns and two hundred 'friendlies' (local militias). The patrol again imposed collective punishment on the communities perceived to be the key supporters of the rebellion: the Masalit and Fellata of southern Darfur. Both peoples lost thousands of cattle to the depredations of the patrol, almost everything they had, according to the Governor of Darfur.[10] Again, in this patrol, British officials made use of local rivalries among the peoples of southern Darfur: Habbania friendlies were particularly active in the seizure of cattle from the Masalit, most of which they were allowed to keep by the government. Mahmud Abu Saad, the Habbania chief close to government, seized around two hundred cattle for himself.[11]

Even more striking was the emphasis placed on the use of military technology to make an impression on the minds of the people. In the late 1920s, stories were told by Habbania about the conduct of the patrol (which they or their fathers accompanied) under the leadership of OC (Officer Commanding) Grigg:

> I heard my father say that when Grigg Bey led the patrol against the Masalit their *fikis* [holy men] wrote lists of the Koran on paper and washed off the ink and drenched a bull with it and then sent the bull to charge the Government army; but it was shot dead with a machine gun before ever it reached them![12]

The power of the machine gun is the dominant motif here, including its

8. For more on the causes of the rebellion, see C. Vaughan, *Darfur: Colonial violence, Sultanic legacies and local politics, 1916-1956* (Woodbridge, 2015), pp. 72-3.
9. Governor Darfur to Director of Intelligence, 28 Feb. 1922, National Records Office, Khartoum (NRO) Darfur 1/2/7.
10. Savile, Governor Darfur to Director of Intelligence, 28 Feb. 1922, NRO Darfur 1/2/7.
11. Savile, Governor Darfur to Civil Secretary, 25 Oct. 1922, NRO Darfur 1/1/6.
12. bid, SAD 735/1/170.

capacity to overpower spiritual forms of protection. In northern Darfur, *Bimbashi* (Major) Craig gave 'a demonstration ride… in the Rolls Royce box car (an armoured car equipped with a machine gun turret). The demonstration created a great impression – a large number of the people locking themselves in their houses.'[13] As well as the use of military technology, British officials also readily made use of the corpses of their vanquished opponents to create more gruesome spectacles for their subjects to internalise. The ringleaders of the rebellion were declared outlaws and rewards were promised to those 'bringing the head of each man together with some persons known to the Government who can identify the head as that of the person for whose killing the reward is intended'.[14] The lack of reliable intelligence which officials suffered from is revealed clearly by such statements and meant that officials preferred it if the ringleaders were killed: the governor of Darfur was 'very glad Adam el Gellabi (one of the ringleaders) was shot' as it prevented the 'farce' of having 'no evidence whatever' against him.[15] Vanquished ringleaders then sometimes had their heads displayed in Nyala; two corpses were also burnt in the centre of the town before a crowd of its inhabitants. All this spectacle was explicitly intended to deepen 'the impression that the government is too strong to fight against'.[16]

After 1921, the threat of rebellion fell away and Britain developed a more consistent approach towards governing in partnership with local elites as a means to build legitimacy. The policy of 'Native Administration' – or Indirect Rule as it was known elsewhere in colonial Africa – depended on harnessing existing local rulers to the authority of the colonial state. In Darfur this involved the empowerment of 'tribal' chiefs with wide-ranging judicial authority over their people but also involved the resuscitation of supra-tribal positions of administrative authority that the Sultans had used to project their power over the more remote parts of their kingdom. Notably the role of the *maqdum* – translatable as viceroy – was recreated by Britain with varying degrees of success in northern, western and southern Darfur to provide oversight of local affairs. Britain sometimes claimed it was thus restoring the true traditions of the Sultanate; in fact, its policies often involved a great deal of innovation and change, particularly in terms of the centralisation of judicial authority in the 'Native Courts' system.

The spectacular violence of conquest and pacification ebbed away once this policy was adopted, though the everyday violence of colonial government remained. As others have argued of colonial Africa more generally, local chiefs

13. OC Darfur to Chief Staff Officer Egyptian Army, 23 Nov. 1921, NRO CIVSEC (1)122/1/1.
14. Proclamation by Savile 11 Dec. 21, NRO Darfur 1/1/4.
15. Savile, Governor Darfur to DC SDD, 14 April 1923, NRO Darfur 1/1/4.
16. ADC SDD to Governor, 7 Sept. 1924, NRO Darfur 1/1/5.

were re-invented as government functionaries during the colonial period, doing much of the administrative work of the state.[17] Colonial government bestowed wide powers on these chiefs without providing effective oversight of their actions and demanded they ensure the compliance of local peoples with the demands of government. In parts of Darfur, notably in the Fur heartland of western Darfur, flogging, torture and extortion became everyday experiences of government and chieftaincy for ordinary people and chiefs often exacted their own personal demands alongside the formal demands of the state for taxation. In one case where a man refused to pay the personal tribute demanded by his chief, he was whipped and tied to a tree with his underwear removed in the heat of the day. The British official who happened to hear of the story noted this was 'obviously regarded as nothing out of the ordinary. I even doubt if it occurred to the spectators that the Government might disapprove.'[18] Indeed for local people, this kind of extortion and violence very much embodied their experience of colonial government.

Pre-colonial governance: violence and complaint

It does not diminish the egregious character of colonial governance to point out that many of the practices described here did have some precedent in the earlier history of the Darfur Sultanate. The Sultans used ruthless force against populations deemed to be rebellious, particularly nomadic Arab groups on the margins of the state.[19] Accounts of the nineteenth century in particular demonstrate the repeated use of military expeditions against and massacres of resistant populations; collective punishment was a key aspect of such violence.[20] Local rivalries were also exploited by the Sultans in similar fashion to the ways of the British rulers, allying themselves with one group against their neighbouring, rebellious rivals.[21] The heads of rebels were exhibited by the Sultans in the capital city, El Fasher.[22] At a local level, the officials of the Sultanate were known for their tendency towards predation and oppression: royal charters regularly addressed officials and chiefs as 'those oppressive [officials] who are overbearing with the rights of the Muslims'.[23] Travellers' accounts report stories of the sons of the Sultans or their slave agents roaming the countryside on horse-back and

17. M. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject* (Princeton, 1996).
18. Keen to Governor Darfur, 18 Dec. 1934, NRO CIVSEC 1/1/23/67.
19. G. Nachtigal, *Sahara and Sudan* Vol. 4 (London, 1971), p. 302; A.B Theobald, *Ali Dinar: last sultan of Darfur* (Bristol, 1965), pp. 46–48.
20. Muhammad b. Umar al Tunisi (1845), *Voyage au Darfour,* translated by Bayle St. John., p. 59; Nachtigal, *Sahara*, 308-313.
21. Nachtigal, *Sahara*, p. 302.
22. R.S. O'Fahey, *The Darfur Sultanate* (London, 2008), p. 215; Theobald, Ali, p. 76.
23. O'Fahey, *Sultanate*, p. 191.

extorting wealth from ordinary people with the threat or use of force.[24]

Alongside that history of oppression and violence, there is also evidence in the same sources for a deeply rooted conception of some form of contract between ruler and ruled. In particular, sultans were judged by their ability to rein in and control the misdeeds of their subordinates. The idea that the ruler's central role was to hear complaints and act upon these, common across the Muslim world, was obvious in Darfur. When Sultan Umar Lel received complaints of oppression against 30 leading chiefs in the 1730's, he had them executed outside his own palace in the capital of the Sultanate.[25] Sultan Abd al Rahman in the early eighteenth century was lauded because he had no pity on those who committed an act of violence or spoliation of any kind, however nearly related'.[26]

The British authorities frequently justified the violence of local chiefs with reference to a deeper history of predation and violence in the pre-colonial state: one district commissioner was told by the Governor General of Sudan on his posting to Darfur that he was going to 'a very backward district where the chiefs in the past have had absolute control and there has been a good deal of oppression. Some of it is healthy oppression and do not forget this.'[27] However, their conception of local history did not acknowledge the role of the ruler in controlling the behaviour of subordinates – and where they shirked responsibility in this respect, British officials surely also destroyed any chance of winning even a degree of local legitimacy. Particularly in western Darfur, for the first two decades of colonial government, officials did not speak the local language, Fur, which made it impossible for ordinary people to make complaints to local officials.[28] Chiefs also worked hard to monopolise communication with British officials and prevent the possibility of complaints reaching their ears. One District Commissioner described his interactions with the chiefs of western Darfur in unpublished memoirs, drawing attention to the skills local chiefs had developed in managing agents of government over a long period of time:

> They were squat, burly men, whose people were always kept at a distance by retainers. They greeted me with bluff, hearty welcomes and sent presents of meat on the hoof. They put up straw shelters for me to sleep in and brought clean white sand from the *wadi* [river-bed] to cover the floor. They carried complete *tukls* (huts) out from the village for the police and servants. In this way they did far more for me than I would have expected anywhere

24. Al Tunisi, *Voyage,* p. 31
25. O'Fahey, *Sultanate,* p. 46.
26. Al Tunisi, *Voyage,* p. 45.
27. H. Boustead, *The Wind of Morning* (London, 1971), p. 110.
28. Dupuis, Governor Darfur to Civil Secretary, 28 Mar. 1929, NRO CIVSEC (1)/1/21/62.

else. I believe they regarded me as a representative of the Sultan – and everyone was expecting me to shout 'Off with his head'. So everything possible had to be done to prevent this. I could almost hear the older men saying to their sons 'Don't tell him more than you must. It always leads to disaster.' They pretended not to understand, they played the idiot boy... It was some time before I began to realise what was happening.[29]

Negotiating oppression

It was only in the later 1930s that some officials became proficient in Fur and it was also only then that ordinary Fur people started to approach British officials directly to bring complaints against their chiefs. Elsewhere in Darfur, particularly in the pastoralist areas of the north and south of the region, it is clear that people made their complaints very vigorously known to the British authorities from the earliest years of colonial rule. Protest against the misdeeds of chiefs was common in these areas – this was often driven by rivalries among leading families but the language used by protestors appealed both to local conceptions of the morality of rule, as well as to state law. Protestors were said to be 'quick to observe the opportunities afforded by the thorough dislike of the new Government for thieves, robbers and their harbourers', in other words, drawing attention to the ways chiefly behaviour contravened the new laws of government.[30]

In 1919, the Habbania chief El Ghali Taj el Din was deposed by the government after the investigation of various allegations brought against him by rivals to the chieftaincy. The District Commissioner of southern Darfur commented that, 'the atmosphere of Buram is not that of the seat of a tribal leader but rather that of the headquarters of a flourishing business establishment.' Rumours of an illegal 'dungeon' used by El Ghali and his involvement in slave dealing also aroused the government's ire.[31] In other cases, complainants claimed that the chief was not their 'proper' leader and disputed the ethnic and cultural authenticity of the chiefs installed by government over them. For example, in the late 1920s, protestors suggested that a Ta'aisha chief, Zubayr Sam, 'was not a Ta'aishi but half a Salami, a mule they called him in their fury.'[32] Another Habbania chief, Mahmud Abu Saad, was rejected by protestors because of his apparent lack of cultural affinity with his people: during the Mahdiyya, Mahmud was one of many Habbania who had been brought to Omdurman to live under the surveillance of the Khalifa. Habbania who had never left their own homeland in Darfur cred-

29. Sandison memoirs, SAD 691/5/137.
30. Moore, note on Jebel Meidob (nd), NRO CIVSEC (1)66/6/43
31. McNeill, Inspector SDD to Governor Darfur, 7 Dec. 1919; Savile, Governor Darfur to Civil Secretary, 19 Feb. 1920, NRO 2. D. Fasher 54/3/12.
32. Lampen diaries, SAD 739/9/44.

ited Mahmud with 'knowing how to talk to the government' but were also said to hold him in contempt because of his association with 'the river [Omdurman/Khartoum]'.[33] One official noted, 'his habits are sedentary… He appears to prefer the company of the *Gellaba* traders [Arabs from riverain Sudan] living at Buram to that of his own tribesmen.'[34] The idea that chiefs should have authentic roots in the communities they governed was one expressed repeatedly through the colonial period and leaders who seemed to be imported from the Nile Valley were repeatedly attacked as inauthentic outsiders.[35]

Protests, complaints and petitions were made to local District Commissioners as in the cases above but were also often presented to the Governor of Darfur – and in some cases complainants journeyed many hundreds of miles to Khartoum to approach central government officials directly to hear their grievances.[36] Again, this behaviour fitted into deeper historical patterns: rivals for power in the chieftaincy politics of Darfur often approached the Sultan for support and the Sultans had long had the casting vote in local chieftaincy disputes. British officials often ignored complaints and petitions but officials would sack chiefs if they felt their lack of local support risked undermining the legitimacy of colonial government. Alongside the coercive force of colonial rule, then, ran an equally significant process of often torturous negotiations between the state and local populations in the field of local politics, in which people clearly expected the state to play a role in the regulation of local affairs. In this context, protest against chiefs should not be seen as protest against the state: rather, it should be interpreted as an attempt to win the state's support in local disputes. In this sense, protest contributed to the colonial state's attempts to build legitimacy.

It should also briefly be noted that chiefs played a more ambiguous role *vis-à-vis* their subjects in parts of the region than my account here might have suggested. As well as enacting the demands of the state, chiefs might also to some degree shield their people from those same demands: notably the tendency for chiefs to deal with cases of camel theft or raiding for camels out of court or for them to impose fines rather than sentences of imprisonment on those involved.[37] Attempts by the state to criminalise activity that had important economic and

33. ADC Baggara to Governor Darfur, 12 Dec. 1926, NRO 2.D. Fasher (A) 54/3/12.
34. Bence-Pembroke, Governor Darfur to Civil Secretary, ibid.
35. It is worth noting that in the 1953 self-government elections, attempts by the nationalist political parties to impose candidates from Khartoum to run for election in Darfur met with repeated failure: successful candidates usually enjoyed the endorsement of or association with the chieftaincy elite. See Vaughan, *Darfur,* pp. 194-5.
36. Civil Secretary to Governor Darfur, 5 July 1928. NRO CIVSEC 66/6/43.
37. S.A. Harir, 'The politics of numbers: mediatory leadership and the political process among the Beri Zaghawa of the Sudan'. PhD, Bergen University, 1986.

social functions in nomadic pastoralist societies were thus deflected by chiefs. Moreover, whilst Native Courts appeared to provide new opportunities for chiefly despotism, it is striking that chiefs perceived to be effective in the settlement of disputes and complaints were eagerly sought out by ordinary people: people quickly came to expect that chiefs would fulfil these functions.

The British authorities complained of one inter-tribal court in southern Darfur that 'the public crowd in too close and interrupt too easily', and that there seemed to be 'nowhere in the court the seeds of governance'.[38] Yet it was very well attended and used – and both men and women vociferously argued their cases in court. Finally, it should also be noted that people clearly expected their chiefs to protect their interests in dealings with the outside world – both neighbouring populations and an alien government. This became particularly obvious in the later years of colonial rule in Darfur, when Britain started to invest relatively small but locally significant amounts in development resources. Competition to secure the establishment of schools, dispensaries and wells in their own territories among the various chiefs of Darfur was repeatedly played out in the settings of local government councils established in the 1940s and 50s.[39] This competition reflected the popular expectation that chiefs should win the resources of the state for their own people. Moreover, eight of the eleven representatives elected from Darfur in Sudan's self-government elections of 1953 were either chiefs or members of chiefly families.[40] The view of the chief as mediator, judge and intermediary with government was well-established in the colonial period and remains important to the present day.

Conclusion

Elsewhere in Sudan, both academic scholarship and popular discourse have repeatedly talked of the dual-faced character of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial states: the state has been seen as both predator and protector; as both the agent of destruction on the one hand and as a patron, a force whose support was a crucial resource in local politics on the other.[41] This was also true in Condominium Darfur and when we look at the recent history of conflict in the region, this complex set of expectations of the state seems to remain in place, even in

38. G.D. Lampen, Report on Native Administration in Darfur, 21 Nov. 1931, NRO CIVSEC 1/22/65.

39. Southern Darfur District Annual Report, 1949, NRO Darfur 47/6/29.

40. Daly, *Sorrow,* p. 175.

41. For example see J. Ewald, *Soldiers,Traders and Slaves: State formation and economic transformation in the Greater Nile Valley, 1700-1885* (London, 1990), p. 182; S. Hutchinson, *Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with money, war and the state* (Berkeley, 1996), p. 110; G. Lienhardt, 'The Sudan: aspects of the south government among some of the Nilotic peoples, 1947-52', *Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies,* 9 (1982), p. 27.

the midst of unprecedented levels of state violence. The violence of the Sudanese state in recent years is rightly prominent in analyses of the Darfur conflict; one purpose of this article is to suggest that this has emerged out of a deeper continuum of violent processes of state formation in the region, rather than simply representing an episode of state failure or a specifically contemporary crisis of governance, as some authors have recently suggested.[42]

This is not to deny that recent processes set in train by the Sudanese state have led to a substantial collapse in the state's authority in the region and notably, in recent years the militias armed by Khartoum to fight their war have increasingly turned against the government and pursued their own agenda. Clearly the state has failed to control its subordinates and indeed has greatly undermined its authority as a result. However, the idea that the state represents a crucial source of support for local ambitions – that it is a powerful patron as well as a dangerous predator – remain very real. The ambitions of rebel leaders in the region are articulated around redressing Darfur's marginalisation in Sudan's political and economic structures and systems but in practice, this has often translated into high positions of state for themselves and jobs in the military for their supporters. Over time, some members of the traditional elite families in Darfur have moved back and forth between association with government or rebels in attempts to augment their own influence – and sometimes have blurred rebel and state affiliation in their own person as a means of achieving these goals. Notably, Tijani Sese, a member of the family of the *dimangawi* in Zalingei district – chiefs who trace their inherited authority back deep into the history of the Darfur Sultanate – served as Governor of Darfur in 1986–89 and more recently headed both the rebel Liberation and Justice Movement between 2010 and 2015, and the Darfur Regional Authority from 2011. So despite the continuing dangers of 'dealing with government' in this region, to coin Cherry Leonardi's phrase, the politics of alliance between ambitious local elites and state actors continue to shape the dynamics of politics and conflict right through to the present day.[43] Whether the Government of Sudan has any hope or intention of rebuilding a more stable political order in the region is, of course, quite another question.

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42. Cf. R. Cockett, *Sudan: Darfur and the failure of an African state* (New Haven, 2010); S. Hassan and C. Ray (eds.), *Darfur and the crisis of governance in Sudan* (New York, 2009).
43. Leonardi, C., *Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of chiefship, community and state* (Oxford, 2013).

The Story of the Macallè

Ricardo Preve*

Abstract

This article tells the story of the *Macallè,* an Italian submarine based in the Red Sea at the beginning of the Second World War. In 1940, the *Macallè* ran aground on a reef near the barren Sudanese island of Barra Musa Kebir. The vessel sank and its crew members managed to reach the shore with very little food or water. While they waited to be rescued, a young sailor died and was buried on the island. In 2014, film maker Ricardo Preve returned to Barra Musa Kebir in search of the wreck of the *Macallè* and the submariner's grave. While circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that his team found the site where the vessel sank and Carlo Acefalo's grave, verification awaits a future expedition. It is hoped to repatriate the young sailor's remains to his family in Italy, in time for the 100th anniversary of his birth in 2016.

The historical context

On June 10th 1940, Italy entered World War II by allying herself with Nazi Germany. At that moment, Italy was in possession of what is today Eritrea, then known as *Africa Orientale Italiana* (AOI, Italian East Africa). The strategic position of the colony was precarious, as it was isolated from Italy and its other colonies on the African continent and had no means of receiving reinforcements.

At the time, Britain controlled the Suez Canal, the only seafaring route to Europe other than the immensely longer passage around the Cape of Good Hope and southern Africa. The Cape route was far from being open to the AOI, as the British naval base in Aden controlled the southern approaches to the Red Sea and in particular the narrow and shallow Strait of Bab el Mandeb.

A good example of the problems facing Italian shipping is provided by the experience of the *Umbria*, which on the day before the declaration of war, passed through the Suez Canal on its way from Italy to the AOI carrying military cargo. The ship was boarded by British naval personnel and was being towed to Port Sudan when her commanding officer, Captain Lorenzo Muiesan, decided to scuttle her to keep her from falling into enemy hands. We shall return to the *Umbria* later.

In an attempt to gain control of the sea-lanes, the AOI military authorities, led by Amedeo, Duke of Aosta, who was Governor General, decided that a strategy of maximum and early effort was needed so as to achieve an element of surprise. As a result, the AOI gave orders to its naval forces to attack British shipping in the Red Sea.

At the outbreak of war, the Italian naval forces in Eritrea were very modest in capacity and included almost no surface combat units. They did include eight submarines based at Massawa, on the Red Sea coast south of the Sudan. These were outdated vessels, six of which were considered ocean-going and two smaller 'inshore submarines', one of which was the *Macallè*.[1]

The fate of the Macallè

The *Macallè* was an Adua class submarine that displaced about 600 tons while on the surface and some 850 tons when submerged. Its length was 60.18 metres, its beam 6.45 metres its keel draught averaged 4.70 metres when fully loaded (the significance of this will become clear). It was intended primarily for coastal warfare operations and had two diesel engines (used on the surface) and two electrical engines for underwater propulsion. It was built at La Spezia in Italy and delivered to the country's navy, the *Regia Marina*, on March 1st, 1937.[2] Figure 1 shows the *Macallè* under construction.



Figure 1: The Macallè under construction
Credit, Fondazione Fincantieri - Archivio Storico del Muggiano.

1. Guerra Negli Abissi, (1991) *I Sommergibili Italiani nel Secondo Conflitto Mondiale* (War in the depths: Italian submarines in the Second World War). Riccardo Nassigh. Ugo Mursia Editore S.R.L., Milan, Italy, Page 108.
2. *Sommergibili e Mezzi D'Assalto Subacquei Italiani* (Italian Submarines and underwater attack craft). Turrini, Alessandro; Miozzi, Ottorino Ottone; and Minuto, Manuel Moreno. *Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare*, Rome, Italy 2010. Volume II, page 661.

The vessel left Massawa on June 10th 1940, under the command of Lieutenant Alfredo Morone, with the mission of attacking British shipping in the approaches to Port Sudan. What happened during the *Macallè's* first and only war mission is known from the Commission of Inquiry testimony into its loss (see below) and also through at least two personal diaries kept by crew members. One is by Adriano Trovo,[3] the other by an unknown crew member who was probably the chief electrician, Ambrogio Grimoldi.[4]

The *Macallè* sailed north along the Eritrean and Sudanese coasts searching for enemy shipping. Adverse weather conditions prevented the navigator from taking accurate position readings during the brief times when the submarine surfaced. Most of the time, it stayed submerged to avoid detection.[5]

Like other submarines of its type, the *Macallè* was air-conditioned using methyl chloride gas, a deadly compound that could not be detected by sight or smell and which had caused death and injury among the crews of several submarines in earlier sea trials. With daytime temperatures in excess of 40°degrees centigrade, the submarine had to be air-conditioned even when submerged, as the heat generated by the electrical systems and other equipment could not be dispersed. A strong leak developed in the methyl chloride system of the *Macallè* and the crew, who began to feel the adverse effects of the gas, became partly incapacitated. The majority experienced vomiting, nausea, delirium, convulsions and a loss of consciousness.

Lt. Morone and his staff officers held a meeting to discuss whether to abort the mission and return to Massawa or to continue searching for British ships. They opted to continue the mission despite the fact that the crew that was not fully functional. They were on a course of 310 degrees towards Port Sudan when they struck the reef of the small island of Barra Musa Kebir (approximately 65 nautical miles southeast of Port Sudan), at 2:35 am on June 15th1940.

Figure 2 shows the estimated route of the *Macallè* in the last hours before she grounded. It should be noted that the area is a very difficult one for shipping to navigate, particularly at night and in bad weather. Even today, with the benefit of modern technology such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and other electronic devices, most naval traffic takes place during the day and at a reduced speed.

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3. Trento in Cina. Il Sommergibile Macallè nel Diario di Adriano Trovo. http://www.trentoincina.it/mostrapost.php?id=359

4. Unsigned diary. Durham University Library Special Collections. Sudan Archive, Durham: SAD.600/8/5-9.

5. Records of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Loss of the Submarine *Macallè*, *Ufficio Storico Marina Militare*, Via Taormina 4, Rome, Italy.



Figure 2: The route of the Macallè. just before it sank at Barra Musa Kebir.
Credit, Ufficio Sotico Marina Militare

It was a dark night with overcast skies. At the moment of impact, the submarine was travelling on the surface at a speed of about 8 knots. Suddenly, the captain and the lookouts sighted a line of waves breaking near the bow of the *Macallè*. The captain gave the order of 'hard port' and the submarine began a slow left turn which, however, could not prevent it hitting the coral reef that surrounds the island with such force that the boat climbed on top of the reef for about two thirds of its length. The submarine came to rest on the reef, lying on its left side at an angle of nearly 70 degrees.

Lt. Morone ordered most of the crew to make for the shore, which lay a short distance from where they had grounded, leaving on board only essential personnel. Those most affected by inhaling the gas and those who did not know how to swim were carried by the submarine's dinghy across the reef in breaking seas. This was a difficult process as, due to the heavy list of the boat, the hatches were partially submerged and could only be opened at brief intervals so as to reduce the volume of seawater that entered the hull.

At first Lt. Morone thought that they had hit the reef that surrounds the Sanganeb Lighthouse, which was manned by British forces, so he immediately

got into the dinghy and rowed into deeper waters off the coast where he sank the communication codes and other confidential papers, before returning to the *Macallè*.

At daylight, when they realised that they were not at Sanganeb, attempts were made to counter-flood the hull and correct the heavy list of the submarine. On at least two occasions, teams entered the hull and tried to activate the drainage pumps and also to lighten the bow of the boat to see if the movement would right the submarine. However, these attempts were not successful.

It was decided to radio the base at Massawa to give the alert. At the time, submarines were equipped with radio antennas consisting of long wires, strung along the length of the boat. The radio would not transmit unless the entire length of the antenna was in a usable condition. However, the *Macallè* was under water at the stern and so part of the wire was submerged. It was realised that it would be necessary to detach the rear end of the wire and bring it above the surface in order to send a May Day message. After much effort, the crew managed to do this but when a radio telegraph operator was sent into the hull to make the transmission, he found out that the radio compartment had flooded and that the batteries of the electric motors were leaking acid and giving off fumes, making it very difficult to stay inside the boat. Thus, the radio message was never sent.

It became evident that the boat could not be rescued and the *Macallè* finally sank in the afternoon of the same day by slipping stern first into deeper water, its bow pointing vertically at the sky, before sliding underneath the waves. Several crew members were on board when this happened but they managed to jump into the sea and make it ashore. All 45 crew made it to the island but they had almost no food or water.

That same evening, Lt. Morone ordered three crew members to row the dinghy along the shore and attempt to alert the Italian command in Massawa to the loss of the submarine. The mission was to be accomplished by heading not for the nearest coast in Sudan, which was under British dominion, but much further south to the Italian-controlled territory of Eritrea.

After their companions had departed, the remaining crew members began the ordeal of surviving on a barren sand island with only a few low shrubs for protection against the sun. Figure 3 shows the beach at Barra Musa Kebir as it appears today. For the first two days, only water rations were issued. Attempts were made to distill water using glass bottles found on the island but the quantity produced was insufficient to support life for the entire crew. Crabs, seagulls and seabird eggs were incorporated into the meagre diet, but Morone feared that this would prove too little to keep the crew alive and that they would all perish on the island.

Figure 3: The beach at Barra Musa Kebir where the crew of the submarine awaited rescue
Credit, Ricardo Preve

The crew kept a lookout over the Red Sea from a small knoll, only a few metres in height, that rose over the beach where they were stranded. The men who were the most seriously ill from inhaling the gas were kept under the shelter of a few pieces of canvas, while the rest of the crew spent most of the time in the water, trying to escape the effects of the heat.

In the meantime, the three crew members who had been sent on the rescue mission headed to the Sudanese coast and then attempted to row south along it to Eritrea, with almost no food or water. After a harrowing journey that was made more difficult by shoals and sand bars that required them to push the boat through low water, they eventually made it to an Italian lighthouse in northern Eritrea. They had traversed approximately 270 kilometres of sea in their mission to raise the alarm.

The Italian submarine *Guglielmotti* was sent to the rescue and took the crew of the *Macallè* aboard on June 22nd, just hours before the arrival of an armed tug sent from Port Sudan by Britain to capture the crew, who had been spotted by a British Royal Air Force plane and been told to prepare for capture.

While waiting on the island, Torpedo Petty Officer (*Sottocapo Silurista*) Carlo Acefalo, a 24-year old from Monastero di Vasco, a small town near Cuneo in

Piedmont, northern Italy, died from the effects of inhaling methyl chloride and a lack of food and water. He was buried in a shallow grave.

The rest of the crew made it back to Massawa and the fate of some of them is known. The executive officer (second in command) Bruno Napp and the navigational officer (who was one of the three who had rowed to get help) Elio Sandroni, returned to Italy on the *Perla*, another inshore submarine based in Massawa. This involved an extraordinary navigational feat, as the *Perla*, along with the only other surviving Italian submarines in Massawa, had to force through the Straits of Bab el Mandeb and circumnavigate all of Africa, meeting on the high seas with German supply ships, until they finally reached the Italian naval base at Bordeaux in France. Sandroni was seriously wounded later in the war but was made an Admiral in Italy's post-war navy.

One of Sandroni's two companions in the dinghy, Paolo Costagliola, also made the trip around the Horn of Africa and survived the war. Another crew member, Adriano Tovo, escaped to Yemen when the AOI fell to British forces in 1941. He eventually found his way back to Italy, fighting later in the war with the famed naval assault force called *Decima Mas*. He also survived the war.

The Special Commission of Inquiry into the loss of the *Macallè*, held in Massawa in July-August 1940, exonerated Lt. Morone and the rest of the crew of any blame for the sinking of the submarine, though it did recommend disciplinary action for the third member of the dinghy expedition, Sergeant Reginaldo Torchia, as it felt he had acted disrespectfully towards Sandroni. It is not known whether the punishment was ever carried out.

Contemporary efforts to recover the body of Carlo Acefalo

In 1962, a priest working at the Comboni School for Boys in Port Sudan wrote to the Italian Embassy in Khartoum alerting the authorities to the presence of Acefalo's grave on Barra Musa Kebir. He also mentioned that the British forces had found the diary of one of the *Macallè's* crew on the beach where the vessel had sunk. The Italian government's response was to delegate finding the grave to the Sudanese government. Khartoum conducted a search on Barra Musa Kebir but concluded that the sailor's grave could not be distinguished from those of local fishermen who are also buried there.

In the 1980s, a series of attempts to repatriate the remains began, starting with the appearance on Italian television of survivors of the *Macallè*. A very popular programme at the time, *Portobello*, which was hosted by the Italian journalist Enzo Tortora and aired by the state broadcaster RAI, featured an episode where Acefalo's comrades, as well as some of the crew of the *Guglielmotti*, appealed to the *Marina Militare* (the post-war successor to the *Regia Marina*) to bring his remains home. They offered to guide a rescue mission to the grave.

The *Marina Militare* also received an anonymous letter (signed "A Sailor") that supported the survivors' request. However, internal documents kept on file in Rome at the naval archive, the *Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare*, show that the authorities decided to let the request go unanswered, as they thought interest in the story would soon diminish, which it did.

Searching for the wreckage of the Macallè

In June 2014, I was on Barra Musa Kebir photographing marine wildlife, when I heard reports that the island was the site of the sinking of a World War II Italian submarine named the *Macallè*.

I have had the privilege to work with a number of television channels (e.g. the National Geographic) where my interest in archaeology, history and anthropology was able to develop. So, when I heard the story of the lost submarine and that one of its crew had died on the island, I was interested. Unfortunately, we had just been on Barra Musa Kebir and we couldn't return there during that trip. I searched frantically through my underwater photos and videos, to see if I could spot any evidence of the wreck or the grave but found nothing. I became determined to return to the island when I had more time.

In preparation for this new expedition, I decided to research the wreck further, by securing permission to access the documentation of the *Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare*. I was helped in this task by my family connections to the Italian military: my grandfather was Flight Lt. Riccardo Preve, an Italian World War I flier who was attached to the Royal Naval Air Service and earned the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). He built a 24 metre yawl (the *Caroly*) in Italy just after WWII and had eventually donated her to the *Marina Militare*, where she still operates as a training ship.

At the *Ufficio Storico* I consulted the records of the Commission of Inquiry in Massawa into the loss of the *Macallè*. The file contains testimony from most of the crew of the submarine, as well as graphs and maps that explain in detail its first and only war mission. Based on an analysis of this documentation, I organised a return trip to Barra Musa Kebir in October 2014, accompanied by a team of divers from the United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium.

Our first stop before heading to Barra Musa Kebir was the site of the wreck of the *Umbria*, the Italian transport ship scuttled near Port Sudan in 1940. I wanted my divers to get accustomed to the colour and texture of metal pieces from a ship that was similar in build and age to the *Macallè* and which had sunk in nearby waters at almost the same time. I assumed that any metal we might find at the site where the *Macallè* was lost would be similar to that found at the wreck of the *Umbria*. Once this task was completed, we headed for Barra Musa Kebir.

When we arrived at the island, my search team divided the search area on its

southeast coast into five sections, each approximately 100 metres in length. We later expanded it to seven sections, to cover parts of the northeast and southwest coasts. The Commission of Inquiry maps showed that the *Macallè* had sunk on the southeast coast.

For each section, we conducted a meticulous inspection of the near-vertical cliff that drops off to a depth of about 400 metres from the shallow reef that surrounds the island. One team of two divers searched at depths of between 10 and 25 metres, another at 25 to 55 metres, while a single diver carried out an inspection down to 80 metres. Each area was inspected visually from both directions; divers inspected the wall from one direction and then retraced their route to make a second inspection from a different angle of light. In between the daily morning and afternoon dives, the divers positioned themselves five metres apart and searched the shallow reef in the immediate proximity of the island at depths of 1 to 10 metres, using snorkel equipment.

I noticed that the coral reef begins at a depth of about 10 metres but then as you approach the island, the average depth decreases to about 5 metres. I remembered that the *Macallè* draughted about 4.70 metres of water and I began to understand how the boat could have initially slid over the reef but then as it got nearer to the island, wedged itself on to the coral and remain suspended with its bow out of the water and its stern over the deep sea; its center point acted as a fulcrum that kept the vessel in equilibrium for a few hours on the fateful day that it grounded, until the leaking hull consigned it to its grave.

The snorkel search of the reef was carried out in the hope of finding pieces that could have broken off during the grounding of the boat, before it slipped back and sank in deep water. In particular, I knew that the *Macallè* had a pair of horizontal stabilisers (a sort of large metal fin) near the bow and I was hoping that when it leaned over at nearly 70 degrees on to its left side, the left-hand horizontal stabiliser had become detached and would still be on the reef. Unfortunately, while we did find several pieces of metal that could have been part of the submarine, none could be definitively linked to it.

However, we were to have better luck off the reef. I knew from one of the crew's testimony to the Commission of Inquiry that from the beach, the crew had seen both the *Macallè's* telephonic buoys and the galley floating in the water. These pieces of wreckage were floating about 150 and 500 metres from the coast, shortly after the vessel sank. I thought that there was a fair chance that at least some parts of the submarine had broken off during its slide down the coral wall and would be found in relatively shallow water.

At a location that coincided with the spot where the maps at the *Ufficio Storico* indicated the *Macallè* had struck the reef, we found a very large break in the coral (see Figure 4 below). Below that, at a depth of 55 to 60 metres there were

Figure 4: The author at the estimated point of impact of the submarine against the reef

Figure 5: The author and divers from his team inspect metal pices found underwater at the expected sinking point of the Macallè



Credit for Figs 4 and 5, Arne Van Leuvenhaege

a number of bent and twisted metal pieces which we felt could be part of the superstructure of the submarine (Figure 5). Further research is being carried out to determine whether these pieces of metal are in fact what we think they are.

Although these findings were of interest, we were disappointed not to have found the hull. Initially, when I read the reports by the submarine's officers and crew stating that it had sunk in very deep waters, I was somewhat sceptical and thought these statements were an attempt to reassure their superiors that the British authorities could not recover the submarine. However, having now spent many hours diving at the site of the wreck, I have to admit that the *Macallè* probably lies in very deep waters, far below the level that could be reached by an expedition like mine that had only used recreational diving equipment. These suspicions were confirmed in a report by a later, UK-based expedition, which attempted to locate the main wreck in April 2015. The expedition was considerably better equipped than mine and it reported that even after descending to about 200 metres, no trace of the *Macallè* had been found.

The search for Acefalo's grave

I wanted to establish conclusively the identity of Carlo Acefalo and so I travelled to the small town of Monastero di Vasco in Piedmont to see if I could learn more about his early life before he left his home region to join the navy, the *Regia Marina*.

The first interesting piece of information I found was that Acefalo's father, Pietro, had also served in the Italian armed forces (I do not know which branch) and had died in 1917, during World War I, when Acefalo was only a year old. A stone marker near the town church confirms this. So Acefalo had lost his father at a very young age.

I managed to find the baby's birth certificate, which is dated January 16, 1916 and shows that his mother, Francesca Destefanis, was in fact alone as her husband was away in the war. I later met several of her relatives, who told me that until she died in 1978, she wore a pendant with a photograph of Carlo hanging round her neck. Figure 6 (below) shows a picture of Mrs. Destafanis's grave in the small town of Castiglione Falletto, also in Piedmont, and Figure 7 is a close up of the photo of her son taken from the locket his mother wore. I also found his (brief) service history in the Italian naval records, which shows that at a certain point, he was living in the larger town of Alba near Cuneo. After that, the next we know of him is that he is on the *Macallè* in East Africa.

I was aware of the difficulties facing us when looking for Carlo Acefalo's grave on Barra Musa Kebir, as nearly seventy five years had passed since his burial and the island holds the graves of local fishermen who are routinely buried there. The *Ufficio Storico* records show that at some point after the war and Sudan's

Figure 6: Francesca Destefanis, Carlo Acefalo's mother.

Figure 7: Photo of Carlo Acefalo taken from the pendant worn my Mrs. Destefanis above.

Credit: courtesy of Antonella Brizio.

independence in 1956, the Sudanese government attempted to assist the Italian authorities to find Acefalo's grave. Documents show that there was uncertainty about which of the many islands in the Suakin Archipelago held the grave and that those early investigations reached no solid conclusion. However, I kept hoping that we would somehow be able to identify his final resting place.

I knew of a letter kept in the Sudan Archives of the University of Durham written by the widow of the Port Sudan Harbour-master during the war, C.A. Milward. The letter is dated June 30th 1966 and was written by a Ms. A.F.F. Milward when she gave her late husband's papers to the Archive. She writes that upon arrival at Barra Musa Kebir, the British authorities had found, "… debris, one grave and the diary". Among the papers she deposited is a translated copy of the on-board diary of the unknown crew member referred to earlier. From this, I deduced that, at least in 1940, British officials had been able to identify the grave. I also remembered that in the priest's letter from 1962 (see above), he had written that the British investigators "… saw a grave on the island. [The Harbour Master] did not know if there was a cross, or only a grave marker." So we had at least two statements that indicated that something was significantly different about the way this grave had looked, such that it could be identified soon after the burial took place.

When I was on Barra Musa Kebir, an inspection of the area immediately behind the beach where the crew of the *Macallè* had awaited rescue (see Figure 4 above) revealed a grave that was completely different from others on the island. Unlike the elaborate stone structures and numerous seashells that cover the fishermen's graves, this one was composed of only an oval of flat stones. It points in the general direction of Italy. In addition, a small hill nearby, which we promptly named 'Everest', could have been the site from where the *Macallè's* crew kept watch over the Red Sea.

On the grave itself, we found some rusty metal pieces that were once part of a cylinder and at least one circular piece of metal that resembled the base of a pressure valve. We thought that these pieces could be part of a respirator. We were aware from the testimony to the Commission of Inquiry that like most other World War II submarines, the *Macallè* had carried on board rescue/emergency escape and breathing apparatus called the 'Davis Auto Respirator'. Each of the crew had one.

The crew accounts state that they donned the Davis equipment when abandoning the sub, in part to avoid the effect of the toxic fumes emanating from the motors and batteries as the submarine began to take on water. So we have direct documentary evidence that the crew wore their Davis apparatus while evacuating the vessel. Additionally, at least one of the crew says they donned their respirators and stayed underwater when RAF aircraft were spotted overhead; so we also

know that they kept them in use while they were stranded on Barra Musa Kebir.

You can see the metal parts we found in Figure 8 and in Figure 9, a similar set of components from a Davis auto respirator currently exhibited at the Technical Naval Museum of the Italian Navy at La Spezia. The resemblance is certainly there. My interpretation is that the parts we found are from Acefalo's Davis auto respirator and that these were placed on his grave by his companions in the hope of distinguishing it from those of the local fishermen. This allowed the British investigators to recognise the grave in 1940.

Figure 8: Metallic fragments found on a grave at Barra Musa Kebir and Figure 9: Detail of a Davis auto respirator unit at the Muso Technico Navale

As the efforts that we made to identify the grave of Carlo Acefalo were informal, we did not have a permit to touch or remove anything on the site and so we left the grave and wreckage undisturbed. We are currently endeavoring to organise a joint Sudanese-Italian expedition to return to the island with a technical team that can positively confirm or deny the presence of his remains. It is hoped that, if the grave indeed contains the body of *Sottocapo Silurista* Acefalo, his remains will be returned to his native town in 2016, the 100th anniversary of his birth.

**Ricardo Preve was born in Argentina and is a film and television director and producer. His documentary work has aired on National Geographic, Discovery Channel, Al Jazeera English and other major international television networks, and his fiction films have been released in several countries. He is also a photographer who has worked for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and a diver with nearly 600 dives in all of the world's oceans.*

Notes

We are particularly grateful for permission from the Fondazione Fincantieri - Archivio Storico del Muggiano.to reproduce the photograph of the *Macallè* under construction in Figure 1.

Report on the Symposium panel 'Youth Radicalisation among Sudanese'

Ashraf Khalifa

Introduction

This is a report of a panel discussion about radicalisation in the Sudanese community with a special emphasis on Sudanese youth. SSSUK organised the panel as part of its annual Symposium at SOAS on the 24 August 2015. The panel was convened to discuss radicalisation within the Sudanese diaspora community where some young people are rejecting liberal views and embracing those of *Da'ish* ('Islamic State'). Such views are alien to most older Sudanese within the diaspora who are heirs to a more tolerant understanding of Islam. Radicalisation has resulted in the tragic loss of young people from the diaspora community and left parents and other members of the community feeling great sadness and struggling to explain the reasons for the radicalisation of some Sudanese youths.

The panel consisted of four speakers, one of whom wrote this report:

- **Dr Kamil Mohamed Sidahmed** is a Consultant psychiatrist in the East Midlands for the National Health Service and an expert witness at mental health tribunals. He founded the Sudan Psychiatric Association.
- **Rashid Sidahmed Elsheikh** is a civic and political activist with an MA in Cultural Policies Management from City University, London.
- **Abdel Karim Ibrahim** is a youth, family and community worker who works with Social Services, Youth Offending Teams, the Metropolitan Police, community support groups and mentoring agencies in the City of Westminster.
- **Ashraf Khalifa** is a technology entrepreneur and activist within the Sudanese community. He founded Sudanpreneur and Sudan Hub. His diaspora experience includes Sudan, Britain and countries on three continents. He has a BSc in Technology Entrepreneurship, University of Surrey. He hopes to 'see Sudan develop and prosper, which can only be done with unity, diversity and prosperity'.

The panel was ably and sensitively chaired by **Dr Sara Beleil**, a Consultant Psychiatrist working at South West London and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust. She is a College Tutor and Medical Appraiser, teaching students at St George's, London University. Dr Sara introduced the panel and they each spoke in turn before questions were taken from the floor. What follows is a summary of the speakers' main points.

Kamil Mohamed Sidahmed, 'Responding to the call for an Islamic state.'

Dr Kamil gave the audience an overview of the history of Islam, noting that without going back to the very beginning, it is very difficult to keep track of what is actually going on in the modern day. He started by talking about the rise of Islam, outlining the flight of Muslims who had sought refuge in Abyssinia and later the flight from Mecca to Medina. This, he said, was a crucial development as there was a distinct difference between what became known as the *Muhajireen* (the Muslims that left Mecca) and the Ansar (the Muslims in Medina who welcomed them); a massive schism would break out between them in due time.

Dr Kamil talked about the last few years of Prophet Mohamed's life and the conquest of Mecca, then the death of the Prophet and the confusion it caused, leading to unrest, turmoil and division. As soon as the Prophet was dead and even before his burial, a meeting was called during which a new leader was chosen. Ali, Mohamed's cousin and son-in-law, did not attend this meeting, choosing instead to prepare his body for burial. Abu Bakr was chosen as the new ruler of the Muslim empire. There followed many battles and skirmishes in which Abu Bakr sought to assert his rule.

Abu Bakr's rule was brief. After his death, another meeting was convened and Ali was again overlooked as leader. Omar was chosen because he was a strong military leader. His rule saw a great expansion of the Muslim empire. After his death, Othman was chosen and again Ali was overlooked. Othman was a wealthy merchant and a brilliant trader and his rule saw many reforms and much prosperity. However Othman's family clan, the *Ummayad*, gained control of key positions and had a huge influence. This led to widespread claims of corruption and abuse of power. This quickly escalated and led to the murder of the Khalifa (Caliph). Following the death of Othman, Ali was finally chosen as ruler. The four leaders were known as the 'rightly guided *Khalifas*'.

The early history of Islam shows clearly that after the death of the Prophet, there were many controversies, disputes and clashes within the Muslim empire, although this is not generally acknowledged today. The perfect Islamic state portrayed by *Da'ish* ('Islamic State') has never existed. It is important to understand this history in order to understand the root of the distortions that are found in some modern interpretations and views of Islam. It is these distortions that can be used by those who wish to twist, corrupt and radicalise unsuspecting minds today.

Rashid Sidahmed Elsheikh, 'Otherness and the question of identity.'

Rashid Sidahmed's main thrust was to highlight what he saw as the Achilles' heel which allows Islamists 'to brainwash our youngsters'. First, he focussed on the the identity crisis experienced by many diaspora youngsters. Parents are

often complacent about this and ignorant of the outside world where their kids spent most of their waking hours. He discussed the 'virtual' identity presented to them through the 'brotherhood of Islam', a notion that transcends and surpasses the narrow affiliation to a state or a region. He also talked of the negative role played by media and the disinformation dished out by the terrorists' websites and virtual games. He also noted the diaspora youngsters' ignorance of the Arabic language, an ignorance that leaves them open to being fed a deliberate misinterpretation of the Koran and Hadith.

Abdel Karim Ibrahim Omar, 'From gangster to jihadi.'

Abdel Karim Omar spoke from the perspective of a community worker in inner city London, where he works with young people. He began by giving an introduction to 'Islamic State' (Da'ish), because he said that you cannot talk about a problem without first defining it. He gave an overview of the rise of the movement and the metamorphosis it has undergone to become what it is today, outlining the beliefs of the organisation and how its members define themselves. He described where the movement stood in relation to differing outlooks within Islam and talked about the difference between what 'Islamic State' members believe and mainstream views.

Abdel Karim detailed the recruitment strategy of ISIS and illustrated how sophisticated it could be, explaining that ISIS not only has a large reach and network but also a big presence on social media. The way ISIS recruits members shares many similarities with the way gangs recruit; both prey on those they perceive as weak minded, those with insecurities and those facing an identity crisis. The largest group that has been successfully radicalised consists of former gangster members and those in the criminal system.

Abdel Karim concluded that parents have to be vigilant and keep an eye out for changes and signs in their children that could indicate the beginning of radicalisation. He warned that mosques are increasingly being targeted by radical groups. Signs to look out for are a change in personality, changes in vocabulary (more 'Islamic' vocabulary), and major ups and downs in mood, along with an increasing desire to spend time alone or more time on the computer. He advised parents to have more communication with their children and speak to them about issues before they escalated.

Ashraf Khalifa, 'The youth diaspora's identity crisis in the West.'

Ashraf Khalifa talked about the identity crisis that is going on in the minds of Sudanese youth living in the diaspora, introducing a concept that he termed, 'the Void'. He noted that having gone to numerous Sudanese events across the board, political, tribal and national, there was always an absence of young people

at these events, especially those aged 17-35. He suggested that there were two reasons for this: firstly, there is a Sudanese Supplementary School that teaches students from a young age up to Arabic GCSE, resulting in a big community feeling; unfortunately as soon as the students finish their GCSEs and leave school, they also leave the Sudanese community.

The second and more important reason is that community events are not organised with the youth in mind: at Sudanese events there is an insistence on Sudanese Arabic music and speeches in Arabic which are not appealing to the youth, not least because they struggle to understand. Once the youths are marginalised, they begin to feel left out of their own community and so suffer an identity crisis. Additionally, Sudanese culture on the whole does not help to facilitate dialogue and discussion between parents and their children. Ashraf Khalifa concluded that the older generation had to change the way they did things, as it was clear that mistakes were being made and that things could not go on as they were.

The Collapse of Governance in South Sudan – some comments on Gérard Prunier's "hukum" explanation.

Philip Winter*

Gérard Prunier has an enviable ability to take a long view and a broad perspective on the course of events in the Horn of Africa and the African Great Lakes region. His two recent pieces in Sudan Studies, on the notion of Sudanese government as *hukum*, offer an explanation as to why South Sudan freed itself from oppression by governments in Khartoum only to mirror their worst practices itself, as it struggled to govern the new state – "two countries, one system", as some have called it.

Prunier looks at the last 194 years of Sudanese history and suggests that the legacies of earlier foreign rule have persisted to the present day. He lists them, slightly paraphrased by this author, as:

- Ready recourse to extra-legal military force;
- Poor performance in social services and economic development;
- A focus on commodity extraction and taxation;
- A low-level of administrative efficiency;
- Manipulation of racial and religious identities to reinforce the central government's power.

His sense of nearly two centuries of Sudanese history is sure, even if there are minor mistakes in the details. For example, Salva Kir was a Major (some say a Lieutenant Colonel) in the Sudan Armed Forces, and a graduate of the Sudan Military College, when he deserted in 1983 during the Bor mutiny, not a non-commissioned officer (NCO); and the troops who mutinied in 1955 were the Equatorial Corps of the Sudan Defence Force, the national army of the Condominium, not "the Southern Corps (Black Troops)" as he has it.

Such quibbles aside, Prunier's central theme is that the practice of government as outlined above became the default setting, as it were, of all rulers of Sudan since 1821. In the first part of his narrative, he gallops through the *Turkiya* and the *Mahdiya*, portraying their extractive nature, their lust for pillage, be it of slaves, gold or ivory, and their violent modus operandi, in line with his view of how Sudan was and the two Sudans now continue to be governed. (Sudanese nationalists of course see the Mahdiya differently – as the first indigenous uprising against foreign rule, with an approach to government rooted in Islam.)

When it comes to the Condominium, I sense Prunier struggles to make it fit his thesis. He points out that it took power because it could deploy "overwhelming military force" and that "its commodity extraction policy was much more

sophisticated than any of the regimes that have ruled Sudan before or since," making "the manifestations of its power milder, even if its principles of government were not basically different from its predecessors or successors."

He goes on to explain that the world's largest irrigated farm, the Gezira Scheme – imperial exploitation or successful development project, according to your point of view – was conceived to make the Sudan pay for its own upkeep, which was "nicer than forcing it to pay for itself at the point of a gun".

Indeed, but fitting the Condominium's record into this pre-determined framework of rapacity, extraction and inefficiency is stretching it too far. In fact, the creation of what looked to many in 1956 to be a more or less viable state after just 55 years of occupation was extraordinarily efficient, in terms of the minuscule size of the Sudan Political Service – about 365 members all told – and the modest resources available.

It took 30 years to "pacify" the country, to put down armed opposition to foreign rule, before the face of government began to look less military and more civilian. Between 1930 and 1955, it appears to have been largely unnecessary to use force to govern the country. Resources to invest in empire from 1930 to 1950 were however minimal, because the world had entered an economic slump brought to an end only by World War II, a war to which the Sudan Defence Force made a significant contribution (as part of the army which liberated Abyssinia from fascist rule.)

After that, it was economic exhaustion, growing political opposition and costs of administration, along with a recognition that all peoples had the right to self-rule, which ended British rule in much of Africa, often in a final burst of belated public investment – such as the Zande Scheme for example, in the case of South Sudan. Despite this small corps of administrators and the limited funds available, Condominium officials mapped the whole country, built a road network, a telegraph network, a steamer service, railways, trade unions, a police force, an army, a respected university, dams on the Nile to provide hydro-electric power, and they proposed many more agricultural and agro-processing schemes which might have been realised had the country stayed at peace. (Many still feature on government wish-lists in South Sudan today.) There is no development agency today – and few governments – which could boast of a comparable record over such a short period. Of course, this progress was foreign-led and did not last, perhaps for that reason, but it does not fit the legacy of misrule and the theory sketched above.

It is also true that Condominium rule can rightly be accused of neglecting the periphery and not educating the masses. However, the most notorious manifestation of this neglect, the "Closed Districts Policy", which applied to other parts of Sudan, not just the South, was in force for less than one-third of the Condo-

minium's existence. It was recognised to be ill conceived and was abandoned in the face of changing times. Lastly and most importantly, the level of public security for the population during the second half of the Condominium far exceeded anything they have enjoyed since 1963, when the Anyanya war really took off.

After covering the Anyanya war briefly, Prunier suggests that "What happened after 1972 was pretty much what happened after the 2005 signing of the CPA: a near complete mess." My own memory of the period 1972-1983, for half of which I was living and working in Juba, was that the semi-autonomous Southern Region achieved more with less money than the post-CPA government, which by its own admission stole most of the oil proceeds to which it had negotiated its right in 2005, leaving the rural areas much as they always had been in terms of subsistence and survival options. Today the South is burdened with a much increased urban population with limited sources of employment, other than mostly rapacious and unproductive armed forces or a poorly-managed public service which has delivered little. The contrast between public security today, when one hardly dares drive out of Juba or move at night, and public security in the 1970s and 1980s, is extraordinary. (When I first went to Sudan in the 1970s, criminality was modest, xenophobia unknown and hospitality the norm.)

Thus it was the central government in Khartoum, having starved the Southern region of resources and destroyed the Addis Ababa Agreement, which helped recreate a governance system which displayed once more the symptoms of Ottoman and Mahdist rule, after a relatively benign interlude. Resistance to Khartoum in the South was violent, divided, protracted and autocratic: where rural populations supported the SPLM/A, they offered recruits, food and shelter to the soldiers. Where they were less enamoured of the SPLA because of the misbehavior of many of its soldiers – one thinks of the Toposa, the Murle and some Mundari for example – then the people might be looted for the goods the soldiers needed and anyone who resisted might be killed by the SPLA or armed by the Sudan Armed Forces as proxies to fight the SPLA, a poisonous, cynical and sadly common counter-insurgency tactic.

Liberation movements are famously poor at post-conflict governance but some do manage to reinvent a degree of local administration and generate enough popular support to legitimise their rule (the National Resistance Movement in Uganda, for example, despite its limited support in the north.) During the SPLA war, all sides had mistreated civilians, looted cattle, sold ivory, hardwoods and gold to buy weapons and ammunition, and relied on force, not persuasion or politics, to get their way. In the case of the SPLM/A then, as Prunier says, "the ghost of the *hukum*" was "landing almost automatically and fitting in perfectly in Juba".

My own recollection of the exact details of the "compensation" payment

of $3 billion to Khartoum differs slightly from Prunier's but his overview of the marginalisation of the "*awlad Garang*" ('Garang's boys') and the increasing openness of the Kiir cabinet to Sudan's ruling National Congress party (NCP) is a convincing backdrop to the catastrophic killings in Juba in December 2013. Like most observers, he does not find the story that Riek Machar planned a coup in 2013 convincing. But he does say that Riek had contacted all key Nuer commanders beforehand to put them on standby, fearing that things would turn violent. So there may well be some truth to the claim that there was a degree of preparation for the fighting which ensued.

No one was prepared for the speed and ferocity with which violence spread across the South, transmitted in part by the new mobile telephone networks. Nor was the speed and scale of the looting of the national coffers by members of the government anticipated, both pre- and post-December 2013, looting which Prunier terms a huge "*ghazzia*". (The more usual rendering of the Arabic word in English is, I think, "razzia" – in any case, a raid.) He also gives a political and ethnic analysis of the leading liberators, driven by the winner-takes-all approach of past *hukum* regimes, concluding: "Their view of legitimate entitlement was boundless."

As Prunier asserts, South Sudan needs a paradigm shift, but none is in sight. He finds the current peace process "a Pollyannaish pretence, unsupported by any reality." There speaks the sceptical historian. What is today's peace-promoting activist to make of all this?

Sudan's neighbours have thrown up more than one model of state reinvention but the most influential regionally has perhaps been the guerilla-liberator-turned-president – Messrs. Museveni, Zenawi and Kagame (or prime minister in the late Meles Zenawi's case). These men have rebuilt their countries (Uganda, Ethiopia and Rwanda respectively) with sufficient economic growth and social progress to allow them to get away with repression of any opposition and rigging of polls or constitutions to allow them to stay in power. Kenya, by contrast, has muddled through the introduction of a multi-party system, a near-collapse in 2007 and a major constitutional reform. It has permitted opposition up to a certain point but taken little notice of it, while both the political and the middle classes grow and prosper, the former by grand corruption and the latter more by business success.

In South Sudan, with some honourable exceptions, the generals, the politicians and the local businessmen seem to have joined together in unholy pursuit of revenue from oil, land, hardwoods, gold, ivory and economic rents acquired by position. There is no longer a nationally unifying leader available, let alone a sufficient cadre of national figures of probity and moral stature to replace or watch over the discredited political class.

So the political course to run will be long, strewn with obstacles and unlikely soon to produce a modern state on the bureaucratic Weberian model, as Prunier terms it. The flaw in the current process is surely that it works on the principle that those who caused the problem have to be the ones to solve it, which is by no means a logical deduction and may lead to implementation so contested as to be largely ineffective. On the other hand, there is no other option on the table for now. At the time of writing, former President Mogae of Botswana has just convened the first session of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission he chairs. One can only wish him well.

Juba, 29 November, 2015

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Figure 1: Map of the Sudan Archaeological Research Society's projects.

The Sudan Archaeological Research Society

Derek A. Welsby *

Abstract
The Sudan Archaeological Research Society was founded in 1991 to provide a focus for the study of the archaeology and history of Sudan and of Egypt south of the First Nile Cataract. It seeks to raise awareness of Sudan's rich and varied past, both in Sudan through surveys and excavations and in the UK through a programme of lectures, its annual colloquium and publications, most notably its bulletin Sudan & Nubia. This article details the history of archaeology in Sudan and the work of the Sudan Archaeological Research Society.

Early Travellers and Archaeologists in Sudan

The year 1820 was a traumatic one for Sudan. Led by Ismail Pasha, the armies of Mohamed Ali Pasha marched upstream from the First Cataract. He was the effective ruler of Egypt although nominally under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan. The rapid conquest of much of Sudan followed over the next few years, ushering in the *Turkiya*.

This conquest established a semblance of stability over a vast tract of the Nile Valley and beyond, and one unintended consequence was the opening up of the country to antiquarians and other travellers. There had been a trickle of such men earlier, among whom might be mentioned Frederic Norden, James Bruce, John Lewis Burkhardt, George Waddington and Barnard Hanbury. From 1820 onwards, the numbers greatly increased, individuals coming from many countries. The first of these was Frédéric Cailliaud, who travelled with the invading army, being employed by Egypt as a geologist, and penetrated as far south as Fazougli (Fazugli) on the Upper Blue Nile.

These 19th century antiquarians opened up a new archaeological world. Many of the monuments and objects noted in the Nile Valley, from the First Cataract as far upstream as Khartoum, were either familiar as Egyptian objects and monuments or at least showed some affiliation with the north.

The most systematic of these expeditions was the Royal Prussian Expedition, led by Karl Richard Lepsius. His team, as well as recording monuments in Egypt and Nubia, travelled the length of the Nile upstream to Wad ben Naqa and beyond, as well as into the Keraba to the east. The meticulous work, involving the drawing of highly detailed plans and elevations of upstanding buildings, and drawing antiquities scattered around on the sites, was published promptly

between 1849 and 1859 in twelve massive (790 millimetre x 320 mm) volumes, *Denkmäler aus Ägypten und Äthiopien, Nach den Zeichnungen der von Seiner Majestät dem Koenige v. Preußen Friedrich Wilhelm IV, Nach diesen Länderngesendeten und in den Jahren 1842-1845 ausgeführten wißenschaftlichen Expedition auf Befehl Seiner Majestät.*

Almost all archaeological activities came to an end with the rise of the Mahdi in Sudan, although very small-scale excavations were conducted by, amongst others, members of the (by then failed) Gordon Relief Expedition at Kawa in the summer of 1885. From the early 1880s until 1896, most of Sudan was inaccessible to Westerners and during this time, a number of major monuments disappeared. The most notable case is the Kushite temple at Amara East, which had many of its columns surviving several metres high when photographed in around 1859 by Francis Frith. It had vanished by the turn of the century.[1]

In 1885, as the Anglo-Egyptian army retreated north and the *de facto* frontier between Egypt and Sudan moved with it, until a halt was called at Wadi Halfa and the international border was fixed close by, following, for much of its line, the 22nd parallel. This is not, and never was, a cultural frontier. In the late 19th century, it cut right across the area occupied by the Nubians and lay far upstream of the southern frontier of Ancient Egypt on the First Cataract.

In 1896, the conquest of Sudan by the Anglo-Egyptian army under Horatio Herbert Kitchener began with a push towards Dongola and culminated in the Battle of Omdurman (Kerreri) in September 1898. As with the conquest by Ismail Pasha some 80 years before, this opened the way for archaeologists to follow and not a moment was lost. At the behest of the British Museum, the Keeper of the Department of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities, Wallis Budge, was dispatched in the wake of the invading army. Budge was excavating tombs and pyramids at Jebel Barkal (Karima) while the Khalifa Abdullahi was still residing in Omdurman. As peace and stability rapidly spread over large areas of Sudan, archaeologists flooded into north and central Sudan, almost exclusively along the Nile Valley, while ethnographers and anthropologists conducted extensive work in southern Sudan. Much stimulus to the archaeological activities came from the results of the First Archaeological Survey of Nubia directed, in its first season, by George Reisner and thereafter by C.M. Firth.

Amongst these early 20th century missions were a number from the UK led by Dr Wallis Budge, Professor Francis Llewellyn Griffith (University of Oxford), Sir Henry Wellcome and Prof. John Garstang (University of Liverpool). Thereafter, British involvement in Sudan's archaeology continued, albeit rather sporadically,

1. E.A. Wallis Budge, in his book *The Egyptian Sudan*, recounts how he saw the temple columns standing during his visit in 1903 (Budge 1907, 467), although at the time the Anglo-Egyptian army passed by in 1896, all upstanding remains of the temple appear to have vanished (Kirwan 1936).

for the next 80 years.

During the early 20th century, a number of organisations were founded in the UK which took a particular interest in archaeology and related disciplines in adjacent areas. The British School of Archaeology in Jerusalem was founded in 1919, the British Institute at Ankara in 1948, the British Institute in Eastern Africa (BIEA) in 1960, the Society for Libyan Studies in 1969 and the British Institute in Amman in 1975. The Egypt Exploration Society (EES) had been in existence since 1882 and was active in Sudan and Nubia, excavating at Sesebi and Amara West in the 1930s and 1940s, and it participated in the High Dam campaign by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). One of the sites excavated by the EES, at Qasr Ibrim perched high above the Nile, lay largely above the reservoir level and remained a substantial commitment until work ceased in 2009.

Sudan fell between two stools. The EES was focussed on Egypt while the BIEA was focussed on Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia. However, between 1977 and 1981, the BIEA did undertake work in south Sudan (see Mack and Robertshaw, 1982). It was also responsible for renewed British activity further north in the winter of 1981-82, when Sir Laurence Kirwan, at that time the BIEA President, was able to persuade it to fund a survey of the capital of the southernmost medieval Nubian kingdom, Alwa (Alodia) at Soba East on the Blue Nile, 22 kilometres upstream from Khartoum. Sir Laurence had a particular interest in Sudan going back to the mid-1930s, when he had directed excavations at Firka and Kawa. With his support, the single survey season was extended to allow three seasons of excavations. The results of these excavations, with the discovery of two cathedrals, an additional church and a massive palatial building, finally allowed Alwa to take its rightful place alongside the other two Nubian kingdoms which were much better known from excavation over many decades.

The results of the work at Soba were submitted for publication in 1988 and another campaign of excavation on the site was proposed to the BIEA by the writer that same year. This was a pivotal moment as, when financial support was being sought, the Department of Egyptian Antiquities at the British Museum was approached. The application was timely: the Department had just begun planning the Museum's first gallery to be devoted to the ancient and medieval cultures of Nubia and Sudan, which opened in July 1991. In this context, support was given to the proposed second campaign of excavation at Soba.

The Sudan Archaeological Research Society

At this time of renewed interest in Sudan's archaeology, a group of like-minded individuals, foremost among them Vivian Davies, Keeper of the Department

of Egyptian Antiquities, Dr John Alexander of Cambridge University and Sir Laurence Kirwan, conceived the idea of founding a society with a specific interest, as stated in its constitution '…in the archaeology, the ancient and medieval history and traditional cultures…' of the Sudan but also, in light of the ancient cultural boundaries, including that part of Nubia that currently lies within Egypt. Initial meetings were held in 1990 and that November, the Sudan Archaeological Research Society (SARS) came into being. With the assistance in particular of Martin Davies, a constitution was drawn up. The first event organised by the Society was a one-day colloquium on 20th July 1991, **Nubia and the Sudan**, at the British Museum. Papers were given by Prof. Anthony Marks (Southern Methodist University), Prof. Charles Bonnet (Geneva University), Dr Timothy Kendall (Boston, Museum of Fine Arts), Dr Derek Welsby (British Museum) and Dr John Mack (Museum of Mankind). This was followed by the first general meeting on 2nd October, which 32 people attended. The first newsletter was circulated in November.

The Society is a registered charity based in the Department of Ancient Egypt and Sudan, as the Department of Egyptian Antiquities was renamed in 2001, with the permission of the British Museum Trustees. They agreed that the curators responsible for the Museum's Sudanese and Nubian collections could undertake administrative and editorial roles for the Society as part of their core activities. This close association with the Museum is particularly beneficial, allowing the Society to run with very low overheads and thus to spend almost all the money it raises on its core activities.

Over many years, significant funding has been provided on an annual basis by the Bioanthropology Foundation (now the Institute for Bioarchaeology) and the British Museum, as well as from patrons of the Society. Specific grants for fieldwork projects have also come from many other sources.
Amongst the core aims of the Society are:

- To undertake and publish fieldwork in Sudan.
- To publicise Sudan's rich archaeological heritage through lectures, colloquia and publications.
- To support other deserving projects if funds allow.

SARS activities in Sudan

Over its 24 years of existence, the Society has become a major player in the archaeology of Sudan. Owing to the security situation in parts of the country, coupled with the interests of its field directors, all the Society's projects have to date been within the Nile Valley or in the adjacent deserts, between Meroe in the south and the Egyptian border in the north.

The first significant contribution made by the Society to archaeological ac-

tivities in Sudan was the purchase of a Land Rover County 110 vehicle with full desert specifications, which was made available in the winter of 1991 for use on the excavations at Soba East by the British Institute in Eastern Africa. Another Land Rover, a Defender 110, was obtained in 1998.

The Society's 1998 Landrover Defender 110 in its concession at the Fourth Nile Cataract

The Society's projects (Map Figure 1), some in collaboration with the British Museum and occasionally with other partners, have addressed a number of issues. Working closely with Sudan's National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums, priority has been given to work required as a result of significant external threats being posed to the archaeology. Two such projects have been along the line of new roads, the first between Begrawiya and Atbara in1993-94, beginning with a survey along the course of the Challenge Road immediately before its construction (Mallinson et al. 1994; Mallinson et al. 1996). Only one major site lay directly on the road line and this, a Meroitic, Post-Meroitic and Christian cemetery at Gabati, was totally excavated in 1994 (Edwards 1998; Judd 2012). The other project was between Omdurman and Gabolab in 1997, a survey along the road across the Bayuda Desert, the *Shiryan esh Shimaliya*, immediately prior to its construction (Mallinson 1998).

A much more extensive threat has come in recent years from a resurgence of dam building on the Nile and its tributaries. Although first proposed in the early 1940s, the dam at the Fourth Nile Cataract was not begun until 2002. The imminent threat had been apparent at least since the late 1980s and SARS dispatched

one of the first missions to begin work in the region in 1999, returning in 2002 as a component of the Merowe Dam Archaeological Salvage Project. Over the next five seasons, surveys and excavations (the AKS project) were conducted within the 40 km long concession on the left bank of the Nile and the adjacent islands. Several teams, working concurrently under the Society's project director, discovered and recorded well over 2,000 sites and excavated many. One component of this work focussed on cemeteries, which resulted in about 1,500 graves being excavated, dating mainly to the Neolithic, Kerma, Post-Meroitic and Christian periods. Several settlements were also extensively investigated along with the abundant rock art and rock gongs. Local agricultural practices and the organisation and structure of modern dwellings were additional foci.[2] The final season was in 2007; by the autumn of 2008, the whole concession was inundated.

As Sudan's oil boom continued before South Sudan's Independence in 2011, new dams were planned while the Roseires Dam was heightened. Following a new appeal to archaeologists to rise to the challenge of these renewed threats, the Society began work at the Fifth Cataract in 2012-13, a region to be inundated by the reservoir impounded by the Shereig Dam (Welsby 2013). Fortunately, at least from an archaeological perspective, Sudan's current financial situation has curtailed major infrastructure projects on the Nile, so the threat at Shereig and elsewhere has receded, at least for the moment.

Other SARS projects have been more research-based. The largest has been in the Northern Dongola Reach, where work began in 1993 on the right bank of the Nile. The concession measured 80 km north-south along the valley, which here extends to a maximum of 18 km to the east of the present-day course of the river (Welsby 2001). Three seasons of survey, with the discovery of 450 sites, was followed by a single season of excavation in 1996-97, at sites O16, P1, P4 and P37 (see photo below), dating to the Kerma period and the period around 1,000 BC (Welsby 2001). The most important site in the concession lay at Kawa and excavations have for many years been focussed there within the Pharaonic and Kushite town of Gematon and its associated Kushite cemetery and are still ongoing.[3] The results are summarised in a recent guidebook to the site in English and Arabic.[4] Another excavation in the concession was at site H29 in 2011-12, the total excavation of a Kerma Ancien cemetery discovered during the 1996 survey season (Welsby 2012).

2. For a summary of the work see Welsby 2010 while a number of draft reports can be found at http://www.sudarchrs.org.uk/fieldwork/fieldwork-merowe-dam-salvage/
3. The work within the SARS concession is on going but from 2013 has become part of the Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project and is totally financed by that project
4. This is available at http://www.sudarchrs.org.uk/fieldwork/fieldwork-kawa-excavation-project

Excavating a Kerma Moyen grave in the cemetery at Site 37 during the North Dongola Reach Survey

The Northern Dongola Reach survey was not conceived as a rescue project but, as with most archaeological projects in Sudan, there was a significant rescue component. In the Northern Dongola Reach this comes mainly from the expansion of agriculture, which has a devastating impact on ancient and more recent archaeological remains. Until very recently it was considered, at least in northern Sudan, that the main areas of threat were along the Nile Valley. The Korosko Road Survey in 2013 dramatically demonstrated the fallacy of this notion. Unrestricted gold mining is ranging over vast tracts of the Eastern Sahara on both sides of the Nile and is in particular impacting very negatively on those areas where ancient gold mining installations had remained extremely well preserved for over 3,500 years until just a few years ago. The project undertook the detailed recording of Ancient Egyptian inscriptions along the Korosko Road running through the Eastern Desert from Korosko to Abu Hamed (Davies 2014). In many areas, detailed study of the ancient gold mines has come too late.

Another major project is the ongoing epigraphic recording of Egyptian inscriptions, which began at Kurgus in 1997 at the Hagr el Merwa. Here, at the southern boundary of the Egyptian Empire during the New Kingdom, are imposing rock inscriptions of the pharaohs Thutmose I, Thutmose III, Ramesses II and members of their entourage, as well as pre-Egyptian rock art (Davies 2001; 2003; 2008a). To set the Hagr in its context, a regional low-level survey on both banks of the Nile and on the adjacent island, along with small-scale excavations in the cemetery a little to the north of it and within the fort were also undertaken (Davies and Welsby Sjöström 1998-2002; Welsby Sjöström 1998; 2001; 2008; 2014).

The project has also worked at Tombos near the Third Cataract, recording the royal inscriptions of Thutmose I (see photo below) and the minor inscriptions in the vicinity along with those on Gezirat Tombos (Davies 2008b; 2009; 2012). Work has now moved on to the inscriptions, reliefs and the rock-cut shrine of Thutmose III at Jebel Dosha (Davies 2004). Inscriptions in the vicinity of Akasha are also being re-examined, inscriptions which were first noted during the UNESCO High Dam Campaign and that still remain above the waters of Lake Nubia (Davies 2014).



The Society's Honorary Chairman, vivian Davies and El-Hassan Ahmed from NCAM recording the Egyptian inscriptions of Thutmose I, dating from around 1500 BC, at Tombos.

One survey was the result of a chance find when the author climbed the isolated mountain of Jebel Umm Rowag in 2000 to look at the superb view and discovered rock pictures and pottery. In 2001, a short survey was made of the ritual site on the summit of the *jebel,* which lies 19 km north-east of Abri. Fine Kushite rock art, hut circles and large quantities of early Christian ceramics were recorded and published (Welsby and Welsby Sjöström 2006).

Currently, the Society's main fieldwork project is at Kurgus where, building on the earlier work, large-scale excavations are ongoing within the mediaeval fort close by the river and in the extensive cemetery a little to the north of the Hagr el Merwa (Ginns 2015; Haddow 2014; Nicholas 2014).

Although the Society has tended to investigate ancient and medieval sites, it has also undertaken the only large-scale industrial archaeology project in Sudan, with a survey along the Wadi Halfa to Kerma railway in 2008 and 2010. This

was an archaeological survey along the line of the railway (see photo below), the construction of which began in 1875 and which was progressively abandoned between 1904 and 1910. Also surveyed were the adjacent military installations dating from the Gordon Relief Expedition (1884-85) and the Dongola Expedition of 1896, and the camps of the rail construction gangs (Welsby 2011).

The Society has also supported a number of other projects, particularly those of Sudanese colleagues, on sites in the Nile Valley, most notably at Akkad near Ed Damer, at Berber, on the White Nile and at Suakin on the Red Sea coast. Funds have also been made available for ethnographic work.

The arched railway bridge on the Wadi Halfa to Kerma railway a litte to the north-east of Delgo

Publications and Activities of the Society in the UK

The Society is committed wherever possible to the prompt publication of its research, which appears in its monograph series, for many years produced in conjunction with Archaeopress, volumes appearing both in the SARS series and that of British Archaeological Reports. Several of the Society's projects have been published in the series, along with a report by Prof. Irene Vincentelli of the University of Casino, Italy, on her excavations at Hillat el Arab near Karima, three volumes on surveys and excavations by Professors William Y. Adams and Hans-Åke Nordström on the Sudan Antiquities Service's West Bank Survey, and several on the excavations by Prof. Adams at Meinarti and Kulubnarti.

Each year, the Society organises a one-day international colloquium entitled **Recent Archaeological Fieldwork in Sudan** where its field directors report on its fieldwork. Speakers are invited from other projects to present on their own

work. Papers have included a wide range of subjects, areas and periods from archaeology to museology and anthropology, from the Nile Valley in Nubia to Darfur, the Red Sea littoral and what is now territory within the Republic of South Sudan, and from the Palaeolithic to the early 20th century. All papers are published towards the end of the same year in the SARS journal, *Sudan & Nubia*, which replaced the *Sudan Archaeological Research Society Newsletter* in 1997. *Sudan & Nubia*, a peer-reviewed journal, is distributed free to members and is also available for free download from the Society's website from two years after publication.

The other major Society event is an annual lecture in the autumn. The first, held on 2nd October 1991, was delivered by Dr Krzysztof Grzymski of the Royal Ontario Museum, Toronto, who spoke on his archaeological project in the Dongola Reach. Following the death of the Society's first Honorary President, Sir Laurence Kirwan, in 1999, this event was named the Kirwan Memorial Lecture. These lectures are also published in the following issue of *Sudan & Nubia*. Each event is followed by a reception, usually held in the British Museum's Sudan, Egypt and Nubia Gallery. Several eminent scholars have been Kirwan Memorial lecturers, among them Professors William Y. Adams, Charles Bonnet and Fred Wendorf, and Doctors Claude Rilly, Salah Mohammed Ahmed and Abdelrahman Ali Mohammed. The latter is now Director General of Sudan's National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums.

The Society has a vibrant membership of over 300 people, spread across the world from Australia to Canada and from Norway to Sudan. Members range from those with a general interest in Sudan to academics for whom Sudan and Nubia are the focus of their working lives.

The Society's archives are in its office at the British Museum. As well as the archives relating to its own surveys and excavations, others have been donated, of which the most important to date are those of Prof. William Adams, from his work in Nubia during the UNESCO High Dam Campaign, and that of Jean-Pierre Greenlaw, focussing on Suakin. The Society has a small library built around that of Laurence Kirwan. This facility is about to be significantly augmented by the very generous gift from our current Honorary President, Prof. Adams, of his superb library on the archaeology of Nubia. The library and archive are open to members and others by appointment.

Anyone seeking further information about the Society, its fieldwork projects, publications, events, library and archive are directed to the website at http://sudarchrs.org.uk. New members are most welcome.

** Derek Welsby began directing excavations at Soba East in 1982. Since then, he has undertaken many surveys and excavations in Northern Sudan, most notably the Northern Dongola Reach Survey (1993-97), excavations at Kawa (1997-present)*

and survey and excavations at the Fourth Cataract (1999, 2002-2007). He is an Assistant Keeper in the British Museum's Department of Ancient Egypt and Sudan, has been Honorary Secretary of SARS since it began and was President of the International Society for Nubian Studies in 2002-10.

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Darfuri singer Shurooq Abu el Nas sings at the 2016 Holocaust Memorial Day commemoration

Peter Verney

Wednesday 27th January is Holocaust Memorial Day. The day marks the liberation of the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz in Poland but it has in recent years been increasingly used to commemorate the victims of modern genocides around the world, including those suffering the ongoing human rights abuses in Darfur and the rest of Sudan. This year, the day's theme was 'Don't Stand By', in order to pay respect to those individuals who weren't bystanders to persecution but defended the human rights of members of their community in the face of unimaginable horror.

More than 200 Holocaust survivors attended a unique commemoration at the Guildhall in London to mark the Memorial Day. With powerful personal testimony, music and poetry, all those who were persecuted and murdered by the Nazis and those who have died in later genocides will be remembered. Several Holocaust survivors spoke on stage or on film clips. Survivors of the Holocaust and of genocide in Darfur, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and Rwanda lit candles to commemorate those lost.

Several well known British actors read testimony, including from an unnamed woman from Darfur. Among the actors were Robert Lindsay, Kristin Scott Thomas, Kevin Whately, Emilia and Freddie Fox, and Naomie Harris, who spoke a moving account by an unnamed woman from Darfur who had been raped and tortured. Music was performed by the internationally renowned choir of Clare College, Cambridge, and acclaimed violinist Jennifer Pike played the haunting theme from the film Schindler's List.

Shurooq Abu el Nas, whose family is from Darfur, sang *Um al Yatama* ('Mother of Orphans'). The lyrics of this song were written by Sudan's most famous poet, Mahjoub Sherif, who gave the song to Shurooq. He was a long-standing advocate of human rights and was imprisoned several times by the Sudanese regime after the 1989 Islamist coup. Hamza Suleiman, who wrote the music, was also persecuted as a member of the Sudanese band *Igd el Jilad*. Mahjoub Sherif mentored Shurooq, whom he regarded as a socially conscious singer who would carry the flame to the next generation. He died in 2015.

In 2007, during a brief spell of relative openness in Sudan, Shurooq and Mahjoub Sherif were able to launch the song in public but it was not allowed on the airwaves. The Sudanese government regarded it as too politically sensitive and

Mahjoub Sherif was one of their long-standing enemies, so they blocked it.

The song is about sympathy for a destitute widow's struggle to support her children, with imagery of her perspiring in the dusty heat, and weeping. This mother is suffering grief after her husband's death (implicitly in the war), and it is very hard for her to look after her children. She has no money, and has no alternative but to endure menial work and exhausting conditions to feed them and to get them to a place of safety. A loose and partial translation of the song follows.

Um al Yatama

Between her workplace and her home,
struggling on her way,
sweating in the heat,
the Mother of Orphans is weeping.

When she counts what she earns,
she feels overwhelmed,
drowning in a sea of troubles.

The money – for milk, oil,
gurassa, exercise books –
just isn't enough.

Signing in at her workplace,
sitting at the sewing machine.
Experience teaches her
this work can heal the injury:
the needle will stitch
a wounded life together.

Bereaved of feeling,
she will fend for herself
without support
if she must.

Mother of Orphans
sewing clothes for her children
with scraps from work,
from the tailoring factory.

Wishing her husband had not died
and was still with her, and her children.
There are no guarantees in this life.
Everything gets destroyed.

Weeping and remembering
as the needle pierces the cloth,
suffering pierces her heart
and her eyes feel the pulling threads.
There is pain in every stitch
but she must finish sewing.

Shurooq Abu el Nas sang at the SSSUK Symposium this year to the delight of the participants. A photograph of her with her accompanist at the event can be seen below.

Book Review

Katarzyna Grabska, **Gender, Home and Identity: The Nuer Repatriation to South Sudan,** 2014, James Currey, Woodbridge, ISBN 9781847010995 hardback, £45

Grabska's *Gender, Home and Identity* is a detailed and sensitive anthropological study of Nuer individuals and families resettling from Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya to Unity State in greater Upper Nile, part of a wave of new historical and anthropological work on return migration to South Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.

Grabska, an anthropologist with a specialism in migration studies, has published several other studies of contemporary South Sudanese social change and the renegotiation of gender roles and relations in return migration and settlement in South Sudan, particularly among Nuer people. She draws extensively on eastern African and international gender studies and migration literature, in a welcome gendered consideration of the details of generational and gendered social change in post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement southern Sudan.

Gender, Home and Identity is an ethnographic study of a group of Nuer men, women and their families resident in Kakuma refugee camp in 2006, their personal and familial histories, and their decisions and experiences of return migration to Leer, a small town in what was previously Unity State in Greater Upper Nile, in 2006-2007. Grabska calls this a 'microscope of return dilemmas' (page 7), particularly focusing on the lives and choices of several women. Still quite uniquely for migration studies, Grabska actively traces people and their recreation of personal lives from Kenya to South Sudan, and lived and contributed to female-run households in Leer during her research. She specifically aims to articulate the massive heterogeneity of South Sudanese wartime and postwar experience, exploring gender and generational differences in understandings of this period's intense social and political change.

Her research is focused on the work of making "home" and a sense of community during violent conflict, displacement and post-war reconstruction, as part of a discussion of the challenges in creating a horizontal national community out of a diverse population with multiple and disparate wartime experiences. Grabska's gendered ethnography of return migration is an excellent and long-needed lens on this process: national morality, rights, orders and futures are commonly projected onto women's bodies and lives, and her examination of the common popular panics over "nigga gangs", immoral miniskirts and alien social mores is a productive means of examining debates over changing gendered power. The strengths of this book lie in its detailed accounts of these personal conflicts and

power plays in 2006 and 2007. Chapter 3 focuses on Kakuma, and Chapter 4 moves to Leer, with detailed discussions of Leer's social and cultural heterogeneity making up Chapter Five; Chapter Six discusses social reconstruction, moral reconfiguration, and personal and community futures in Leer through exploring local debates over young relationships and marriage.

Grabska's key argument is that the general subordination of southern Sudanese women has been partly reversed as a result of the civil wars and displacement experience, and she demonstrates specific forms of female power gained in relocation to Kakuma, the options and forms of access in the refugee camp, and post-war attempts to maintain these potential freedoms. In contrast, Grabska also argues that these processes have 'diversified masculinities' (page 8), with the civil war's militarization of young men and the humanitarian "gender mainstreaming" of Kakuma refugee camp creating divergent – in summary, hyper-violent versus more global and feminist - claims to manhood. These two claims are not necessarily radical, and their evidence is maybe more conflicting than portrayed here – Grabska herself points out that her focus on Kakuma (and Nuer) residents likely means she is engaging with better-off and often politically well-connected families, who through their ability to reach the refugee camp have access to English language education and aid programmes - but her evidence from these specifically Kakuma-to-Leer residents for this argument is compelling.

Gender, Home and Identity builds heavily on the seminal work of Sharon Hutchinson and E. E. Evans Pritchard on Nuer social change, as a 'historical anchor' (page 9). Unfortunately the weakest aspect of the book is this historical contextualisation, with only a few pages dedicated to pre-1988 Sudanese civil war history: the book really begins 'during the wars' (page 31). This brevity is likely the result of the natural problem of focusing on an extremely detailed local and contemporary study, but this light historical touch results in some generalisations about the political details, affiliations and aims of the various parties in the civil wars around Leer. This makes it hard to know specifically what ideas underpin the 'nationalist movement' recruiting, educating and militarizing young boys in Chapter 2, and arguably makes Grabska's discussions of the creation of a specifically national community under-powered: it is hard to explicitly see how women's ideas of personal sacrifices for the 'new nation' fit with their discussions of the Nuer cieng, and their ideas of going 'home' to a specific and ethnic homeland. This broad-brush history also results in some factual incongruity, such as (likely accidentally) calling the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) (page 54).

Gender, Home and Identity is an extremely valuable part of an emerging patchwork of localised (and often ethnically-bounded) studies on post-war community reconstruction in South Sudan. It evidences the fertile intellectual ground of gen-

der studies in discussing social and political change in South Sudan, and suggests several avenues for research – for instance, on men's own discussions of this emergent toxic violent masculinity, and on inter-ethnic marriages and families.

Nicki Kindersley

Book Review

Gertel, J., Rottenburg, R. and Calkins, S. (Eds) **Disrupting Territories: Land, Commodification and Conflict in Sudan,** James Currey, 2014, ISBN 9781847010544 hardback, £45

This book is in James Currey's Eastern Africa Series. The dilemmas and conflicts discussed are common to many African countries but the creation of Sudan and South Sudan, out of pre-2011 referendum Sudan has brought many of these problems into a new focus, with resulting interest in these two countries.

The first chapter is a good overview by the editors of some of the general theories concerned with competition between different players and their attitudes over use of land and other resources in the global world of the 21st century, though in fact some of these dilemmas can be seen in an embryonic form in earlier times and these are discussed with special reference to the Sudans. The remaining nine chapters in the book cover a range of specific situations.

Many of the problems discussed relate to a clash between 'Tradition' and 'Modernity' when it comes to 'Development'. The skill in any situation is to link both together. In earlier days, things were rather simpler when the main players were only the Sudan Government, the communities affected by the changes and the country's moneyed classes. Today, the position is much more complicated. Firstly, there is the impact of outside investment by foreign governments and international companies, each with its own agenda. Secondly, the situation has been made much more complicated by the break-up of the 'old' Sudan into two independent countries, Sudan and South Sudan. For example, in the early days of the 1940s and 1950s, the mechanised agriculture programme on Sudan's clay plains around El Gedaref with the construction of *hafirs* and other water points opened up formerly unusable areas for farmers and pastoralists and suited all parties economically. From the Government point of view, it led to a secure food supply by safeguarding supplies of *dura* (sorghum). It brought in money from oil-seed exports and suited traditional farmers as well. Private enterprise was happy as it could invest in a potentially lucrative modern type of farming.

Almost everyone benefited economically but one serious question was omitted that has proved important in most other aspects of development. This was the question of land and resource ownership, and the effects upon people living in an area under 'development'. Once wide areas of rain-fed land were demarcated and fenced off for large farms to cultivate mechanically, the situation changed dramatically because traditional cultivators and pastoralists were denied access to what they believed were their ancestral lands, receiving little or no compensation.

For most rural people in the Sudans, land proclaims their group identity and 'development' that does not take this fact into consideration is going to be resented and resisted.

As the 20th century progressed the situation deteriorated for many of central Sudan's rural dwellers as the world demand to grow crops meant that foreign investors, particularly from the oil-rich Middle East states, were anxious to obtain a stake in Sudan's so-called 'breadbasket' savanna lands.

Competition for rain land resources is just a small part of the problem. As Sudan saw it, large sums would need to be invested if its various desired projects were to be become a reality. China has been investing heavily in various ventures, particularly relating to infrastructure as it pursues its general policy of increasing its influence in all parts of Africa. In Sudan, the discovery of oil with its relevant wellheads and associated pipelines, the construction of dams on the Nile and its tributaries for irrigation and hydro-electric generation, together with road building and shipping have all required foreign investment in money and personnel, with much of it coming from China.

All this development activity has meant that many communities have been forced to leave their traditional lands by flooding or for security reasons along oil pipelines. In a similar way, gold mining concessions to foreign companies have brought little benefit to local communities. Many Beja leaders complain that they receive little or no benefit from these foreign investments in their wealth extracted from their lands. On the other hand, there are groups of local people who do their own private prospecting.

Government ideology, religious dogma and the excessive power and influence of the northern Nile elites has led to the marginalisation of many peripheral areas and an apparent willingness to ignore the varied cultural landscapes of the Sudan. This is reflected in the failure to see or deal with problems as they arise. Many of the old arrangements whereby government officials, as impartial referees, would bring together parties in dispute to resolve difficulties, as for example, between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers, seem to have disappeared in many areas. Many clashes, as seen for example in Darfur and Kordofan, could conceivably have been avoided. Poor quality of governance in both Sudans is compounded by an apparent inability to deal effectively with foreign investors. In South Sudan, government leaders appear to have been more interested in personal power and self-aggrandisement than with the welfare of their people. This factor seems already to be putting off some prospective investors.

Some types of dispute over land result from other factors, of which population increase is of considerable importance. Current estimates suggest that Sudan's population is now about 39 million and South Sudan's, about 12 million,

compared with about 7 million in 1955 for the two countries combined. In 1955, 8% of people were said to be urban dwellers; today the figure is about 30%, which still leaves both countries largely rural societies. Increased population implies a large increase in the livestock population. If we add to this the evidence for desertification brought about by these increased numbers of people and livestock, and apparent climatic change with lower rainfall towards the desert margins, it is hardly surprising that disputes over land are prevalent. The rapid increase in the number of urban dwellers reflects difficulties faced by rural folk who drift into towns, the Three Towns in particular, producing a 'ruralisation of the city' whereby rural migrants to the city try to combine together old rural and new urban life styles.

To all these factors are added the difficulties created by the emergence of the new Sudan and South Sudan. Whereas in the past the internal state boundaries were porous affairs, allowing the relatively straightforward movement of people with their animals with the seasons, an example of which was the free migration of Arab nomads as far south as the Bahr el Ghazal. This now involves the ready cooperation of two sovereign states. It is hardly surprising that the new frontier zone between the two new nations should be a zone of particular conflict over land and other rights, as for example over the oil industry. This new boundary is a deep fissure which has somehow to be overcome. Its actual line on the ground is still in dispute.

The editors are to be congratulated for bringing together a group of contributors well versed in the topics they write about. This book is an excellent account of the problems referred to in this review. Each of the ten chapters is well researched by authors, who have a close research relationship with the topic or region referred to. There are excellent bibliographies for each chapter and nearly always a section of End Notes, giving further enlightenment to the material under discussion.

Jack Davies

Mansour Khalid, **The paradox of Two Sudans: The CPA and the road to partition,** Africa World Press, London, 2015, ISBN-10:1569024510; ISBN-13:978-1569024515 paperback, $39.95

The SSSSUK Annual Symposium 2015 was honoured to host the launch of Mansour Khalid's latest book. Mansour is uniquely qualified to write on the subject of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). As a government minister in the 1970s, he has a first-hand understanding of the issues of the country, as well as the intricacies of its government and politics, while his years as foreign minister gave him wide experience of international politics at all levels. Later he was to see Sudan from the side of the opposition, when he became 'councillor and advisor' to the leader of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA), the late Dr. John Garang. In addition, he has a string of earlier books chronicling Sudan's troubled history since independence.

While Mansour is generally an admirer of Garang's leadership, he is not unaware of criticisms of it. However he was particularly drawn to Garang for his leadership not of a separatist movement for the South but of a national movement for a New Sudan: an inclusive vision of a united country that Garang articulated in his writings and speeches. This book is the story of how that vision fared during the long CPA process, which involved at its centre the Islamist government of Sudan and the SPLA. It was to end not in a new framework for national unity as laid out in the CPA but with the decision of the overwhelming majority of South Sudanese to form a separate state in 2011: the paradox of two Sudans.

The first two chapters give an account of the roots of Sudan's civil wars and the failure to address these in the long term, before moving on to the decades of struggle from the founding of the SPLA in 1983 to the beginning of the peace process completed in the CPA over two decades later in 2005. The Agreement itself has come in for a great deal of discussion amongst critics of the Sudan government following South Sudan's secession, an outcome that many felt could have been avoided. While most South Sudanese rejoiced at secession, some in Sudan laid the blame for the division of their country on the international community and especially the USA. Mansour argues that this was not the case; as he makes clear, the right of self-determination for the South in the event of the Sudan government opposing a secular unitary state dated from the involvement of the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the 1990s. It was this position that was central to breaking the deadlock between the two armed movements in the Machakos Protocol of 2002. This core agree-

ment was accepted by the international community but it was not imposed and many hoped that later stages in the peace process and in its implementation would not result in separation. As negotiations proceeded beyond Machakos to the agreements on other matters – including security, wealth sharing and the power structure – Mansour insists that the international actors, especially the Triad (or 'Troika': USA, Norway and UK), acted as facilitators to the two parties. The facilitators' input was significant for the structure and organisation of the agreements that comprised the CPA but they did not impose the outcomes: at all stages, he insists, the final agreements were decided by the negotiators for the Sudan government and SPLM.

While the negotiations themselves had a successful outcome, it was the implementation of them that was to show woeful shortcomings. Mansour attributes that in part to the untimely death of John Garang shortly after the CPA was signed, as well as to the political decline of the principal government negotiator, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha. However, much was also down to the inability of the new 'Government of National Unity' to function in such a way as 'to make unity attractive' ahead of the referendum in the South. Mansour's main target for criticism is the leadership of the National Congress Party (NCP; the majority in the national institutions) which behaved in a way that prevented the achievement of a successful coalition with its SPLM colleagues. Furthermore, the SPLM was clearly in a complex position since Salva Kiir, Garang's successor as leader, was both First Vice-President of the national government and President of the new autonomous Government of South Sudan (GoSS). Given that the GoSS was being established virtually from scratch, it is probably unsurprising that Kiir appeared to focus primarily on his latter role. The upshot was that the implementation of just about all the agreements – including security, the sharing of public debt, Southerners in north Sudan and demarcation of the new South Sudan-Sudan border – had not been settled adequately by the end of the scheduled six-year period from the 2005 CPA to the referendum in the South. At the same time relations between the governments in Khartoum and Juba had steadily deteriorated, making South Sudan's vote for separation inevitable. There is also a chapter relating the CPA and the crisis in Darfur – another dimension of the failure, including its distraction of the international community from the implementation of the CPA.

It is a sorry tale of woe, distressing many inside and outside the two Sudans, including the author who had toiled so hard on behalf of John Garang's vision of the New Sudan. By 2015 both states had deteriorated to an extent that only the greatest pessimists would have foreseen when the CPA was signed ten years earlier. This book has a wealth of information to which one review cannot start

to do justice and as such it is an important resource for all students of the two Sudans. No wonder Mansour concludes by asking: "Is it unkind… to say that the recurrent tribulations in the two countries are not only a manifestation of addiction to failure by its political elite, but probably also evidence of its allergy to success?"

Peter Woodward

Muna Zaki and Edmund Wyatt, **Sudanese Proverbs. Translated, transliterated, explained.** Create Space independent publishing platform, 2015, ISBN 10: 1511687185 paperback £6.11, E-book £2.00

Muna Zaki and Edmund Wyatt have compiled a useful collection of Sudanese sayings and proverbs, which provide a source of learning and a reference point for those who are interested in Sudanese culture and folklore. Although the title indicates that this collection represents the whole of Sudan, it is mainly drawn from the culture and folklore of those who dwell in or around the Nile Valley, with some examples from Western parts of Sudan e.g. Kordofan and Darfur, and a few from the Beja people of eastern Sudan. This being the case, the collection could better have been entitled, '*Proverbs from Sudan*'.

In their preface, the authors mention that there are some proverbs in the collection that are not specifically Sudanese, pointing to the reality of the nature of Sudan's population in a vast land with diverse ethics and cultural components. In particular, the influence of the Egyptian and Levantine dialect is clear in some of the proverbs, for example, طني اناج طقلا ةريس انبج which means, 'we talked of the cat and it came jumping on.' The cat in colloquial Sudanese is never called *gutt* or *utt,* these terms belong to colloquial Egyptian. Another example is, ةصوبلا سبل ةسورع ىقبت which means, 'Dress a reed and it will become a beautiful bride'; both the words reed and beautiful bride are not used in colloquial Sudanese, or at least not with the meaning intended in the proverb, indicating an Egyptian form of expression.

We should not be surprised to find that some expressions and sayings that have their origins in Egypt and the Levant have seeped into Sudanese culture and language. The long history of cultural and social interaction between Sudan and Egypt is well known; there were large numbers of Egyptians and other groups from Turkey and the Levant living in the Sudan during the periods of Turkish rule and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, mostly in the urban areas, which is where their cultural and linguistic legacy is particularly evident today.

I do not doubt the motivation of Muna Zaki in her endeavour to collect and explain these proverbs but there are some points that are worth mentioning. The first is that there are some proverbs in this collection that are alien to Sudanese culture and that portray a picture that contradicts reality e.g. لجار ادخايلا ةوشرلا لجار اهيديلاو which is translated as, 'A bribe is only taken by a man and given by a man.' This proverb appears to be new or recently composed, as the taking or giving of bribes has never been something to gloat about or to be proud of in Sudanese culture; on the contrary, the implication of bribery casts a shameful taint on both parties involved. This being the case, it is questionable whether this text should be defined as a proverb as it doesn't have a universally agreed rationale or message.

Secondly, the misinterpretation of a proverb changes its whole meaning and message e.g. الشمام كتل الحمام is translated here as, 'Curiosity killed the donkey', however, *alshamar* which means 'Dill' (a green plant that is used as a herb), is not used to feed donkeys. Furthermore, the translation of the word *shamar* as gossip is erroneous, as *shamar* only acquired this meaning very recently and the term is used only in urban areas.

Finally, the pronunciation of colloquial Sudanese Arabic is vital to understanding a proverb and a slight change in the pronunciation of the written text can drastically change the meaning. This is illustrated by proverb 369, دلو قربك ام which is translated as, 'not every blessing (labour) is a boy.' However, the word *baraka* means blessing and *barka* means to crouch on your knees, so the proverb means, 'not every time a woman takes the position of crouching to give birth is she granted a boy.' It is important to highlight these anomalies as this transliteration of Sudanese proverbs is likely to act as a reference point in future research and where there are errors these will give the wrong impression of Sudanese cultural and ethical structures.

I salute *Ustaza* Muna Zaki and Mr. Edmund Wyatt for their effort in compiling this collection and I look forward to a revised second edition that places more emphasis on the origin of the proverbs and includes more material from other areas of Sudan. This is necessary for the sake of future generations and researchers of our intangible cultural heritage that is currently under pressure and in danger of decline. I would like to congratulate Muna Zaki's and Edmund Wyatt's son David (to whom the book is dedicated) for having parents with the insight to avail him of some of his cultural heritage.

Rashid Sid Ahmed Elsheikh

M.W. Daly, **The Last of the Great Proconsuls: Sir William Luce and the British Empire in the Middle East**, Sussex Academic Press, 2015, ISBN-13: 978-1845195953 hardcover, £50

This review deals with the first section of Martin Daly's sympathetic and highly readable biography: 124 pages that cover in detail Luce's experiences in the Sudan Political Service (SPS). This opening episode of what was to be an illustrious career began with his first posting in September 1930, a month after his 23rd birthday, as Assistant District Commissioner (ADC) at El Damer in Berber Province and concluded with his departure, shortly after Independence in January 1956, as Sir William Luce, KBE (Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire).

The quarter century in between included appointments as ADC at Nyala in Darfur and Hassaheissa in Blue Nile; promotion to District Commissioner (DC) in Blue Nile in 1940, after a decade of service; administrative roles of increasing importance in Khartoum from November 1941 through to the summer of 1950; an absurdly brief assignment as Deputy Governor of Equatoria, curtailed by further promotion to Governor of Blue Nile in June 1951, in what Daly calls an example of the 'SPS game of musical chairs'; and his final, defining role back in Khartoum as Advisor to the Governor-General on Constitutional and External Affairs. It was this last experience that prepared him for further end-of-empire service in Aden and the Gulf, which account for the remainder of Daly's book and transformed Luce into the 'great proconsul' of its subtitle.

No reader familiar with Daly's work on the Condominium era will be surprised to find another authoritative, meticulously sourced and well argued account, indeed one that is perhaps all the more tightly focused for its central personality. In its attempts to understand motivation, analyse personal flaws and get beyond the mere sequencing of promotion and day-to-day decision-making, this biography is more of a kind with Daly's compelling 1997 life of Sir Reginald Wingate, *The Sirdar*. Nor does he pull any punches. One is repeatedly struck by how little Luce actually liked Sudan. In his early correspondence, he rarely mentions the Sudanese, in whom he professed himself 'not genuinely in the least interested'. After four years of service, he had concluded that Sudan was simply 'a horrid place'. By August 1934, he writes from Shendi: 'The country is itself, to me, grim… I'm not sure that I'm sufficiently keen about these people to want to do a tremendous lot for them.'

By October 1939, he muses in a diary entry that, 'I find it very difficult to take any interest in my work here,' adding that his colleagues feel the same, even if

they do not 'dislike the country as I do'. This chronic dissatisfaction, summed up by Daly as 'gloom, captiousness, and even anger', was prompted in part by the boredom of provincial life at the very margins of authority – although even as a relative junior, Luce exercised the power of life and death, having 'no qualms about awarding the death penalty'. Greater than this prevailing resentment, however, were simple, human problems: Luce badly missed his wife, Margaret, who remained in Britain during most of his provincial postings and even while he was resident in Khartoum; he also worried constantly about the salary required to maintain his family back at home and at boarding school, as well as his own colonial household, where costs rose with seniority. Daly astutely places the relationship with Margaret at the heart of Luce's Sudan experience: not only has it provided the best source of epistolary evidence, it explains many decisions that had a decisive impact on Luce's career, in Sudan and beyond. Marital problems, including Luce's admitted infidelity, are acknowledged but handled discreetly and with respect for the family.

For the enthusiastic student of Sudanese politics, however, all this is build-up to Luce's central, if frequently unacknowledged, role in the transition from British rule to Independence. The bland title of Advisor certainly underplayed the complexity of the three central power relationships that he was required to negotiate: dissolving the Britain-Egypt-Sudan triangle established by the Condominium agreement of 1899; satisfying (or at least minimising the sense of betrayal among) the various governmental, administrative and military British interest groups; and picking allies from among the increasing variety of nascent Sudanese political forces, in an environment that was more multifaceted than the conventional description of a simple sectarian divide between *Ansar* and *Khatmiya*. It was true that many *Khatmiya* adherents feared Abdel Rahman al Mahdi's quasi-monarchic aspirations and pursued firm ties with Egypt. Yet so, too, did some politicians who neither followed the *Khatmiya* nor opposed the *Ansar*: some, like the *Ashiqqa*, actively sought subordination to the Egyptian monarchy. With the various strands evolving into two coalitions, the Independence Front and the pro-unity National Front, Daly observes with acuity how British officialdom dithered, belatedly looking to the Socialist Republican Party as a vehicle to build rural as well as urban backing for Sudanese self-rule without sectarian labels. In this, Luce was not guilt-free in his 'wishful thinking'.

It is certainly remarkable that Luce, as Daly notes, played a central role in the resolution of these multiple problems with diplomatic skill and a rare sympathy for the losers – yet remained, in most accounts of transition politics, the invisible man. It is in this area that one regrets the absence of some useful Sudanese sources. Many of these are, inevitably, partisan, but such a perspective can provide bite. In analysing the aftermath of the November 1953 elections, in

which the *Umma* and its pro-Independence allies took a fearful bashing – entirely against the predictions of Luce and his colleagues – it might have been constructive to leaven Daly's dry observation that Luce 'dusted himself off and set about subtly to "disengage" from the flailing *Umma'* with the sheer anger of the Mahdists at this perceived betrayal. Some of this has long been available in, for example, the accounts of Hassan Ahmad Ibrahim and Graham Thomas but more recent studies focused on the Ansar movement may provide additional insights, among them El Tayyib Muhammad Adam el Zaki's *The Throne and the Pulpit* (2005), El Sadiq Dhaw el Beit's *History of Jazira Aba and Life of Imam Abdel Rahman* (2000) and the 2002 collection of biographical essays on Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, edited by Yusuf Fadl Hassan, Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Salim and El Tayyib Mirghani Shukkak.

The memoir of the Sudanese journalist Muhammad Kheir el Badawi (father of the broadcaster Zeinab Badawi) is full of praise for Luce, whom he calls 'one of the outstanding British administrators' and 'a veritable dove of peace in each crisis that blew up'. In *Trains of My Life*, El Badawi relates amusing incidents from Luce's junior career in Berber, describes pivotal campaign meetings at Luce's house on rain-swept Khartoum nights, before concluding with a hearty endorsement of the sentiments expressed by the man effectively installed by Luce as the ruler of the United Arab Emirates, Zayyid bin Sultan al Nahyan: 'Luce served us with sincerity and enthusiasm, as if our country had become his own'.

Such quibbles aside, this is an enjoyable and valuable addition to the body of work on the run-up to Independence. In taking the story forward to cover Luce's important work in Aden and the Gulf, Daly continues to demonstrate a deft balance between the personal and the political. In his services to Empire, albeit in its final stages, Luce brought balance, sensitivity to competing interests and an ability to negotiate with royalty, the military and his masters in London with equal *sang-froid* – ensuring that, as Malcolm didn't quite say, nothing in Britain's activity in these colonial territories became her like the leaving of them.

Fergus Nicoll

SSSUK NOTICES

Sudan Studies Society of the UK
28th Annual General Meeting, 13 September 2014
Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS

MINUTES

1. *Welcome*

The Chairperson welcomed everyone to the 28th annual general meeting of the SSSUK.

2. *Apologies*

Apologies were received from committee members Jacob Akol, Philip Bowcock, Jack Davies, Cherry Leonardi, David Lindley, Michael Medley; and members Hashim Mohamed Ahmed, Peter Everington, Lesley Forbes, Peter Kemp, Nicki Kindersley and John Udal.

3. *Minutes*

The minutes of the 27th AGM of 5 October 2013 were accepted as a true record.

4. *Elections to the committee*

The Chairperson reported that:

- Andy Wheeler has stepped down as Deputy Chairperson due to other commitments. Fergus Nicoll had volunteered to replace him. He was nominated by Jane Hogan, seconded by Gill Lusk and duly elected
- Jack Davies, who was unable to attend due to an accident, had decided to retire after Sudan Studies 50 was completed and Charlotte Martin had volunteered to take on the editorship. She was proposed by Gill Lusk, seconded by Rosie Squires and duly elected.
- Thomas Mawan Muortat and Zoë Cormack had agreed to be co-opted to the committee.

5. *Chairperson's report*

Gill Lusk was delighted to see so many people at the annual symposium and asked those attending to encourage others to join the Society. She thanked the Centre of African Studies at SOAS for their help in organising the symposium, especially Angelica Baschiera. We would like to arrange occasional seminars on Sudanese topics, with the help of organisations like the CAS, and would welcome suggestions. Gill also thanked the Media in Cooperation & Transition (MICT)

in Germany for sending copies of their publication, The Niles, and encouraged members to take them.

6. *Treasurer's report*

Adrian Thomas circulated copies of the accounts. He reported that the finances were in a healthy state, with an income of almost £3500 for 2013, resulting in a small surplus. The two main items of expenditure are the symposium and the printing and postal costs of Sudan Studies. The symposium charges had been held at the previous rate for this year, but may have to go up in future years. Postal charges in particular have risen this year with the abolition of the printed paper rate. Members who would prefer to receive Sudan Studies in electronic form, were encouraged to let the Treasurer know via treasurer@sssuk.org. The membership of the Society had remained fairly static, so Adrian encouraged everyone to promote the Society to potential members. He thanked his colleagues on the committee for their support, especially David Lindley, who checked the accounts.

7. *Editor's report*

Jack Davies, who was unable to attend, sent a written report. He had enjoyed editing Sudan Studies for the last 15 issues but felt that he should hand over to someone younger. He thanked those who had contributed to Sudan Studies under his editorship, Jane Hogan for her help in getting each issue out, and Douglas Johnson for his advice and his rescue of issue 50.

8. *Website Editor's report*

Michael Medley was unable to attend so sent a written report. He reported that the website continues to function as a source of basic information about the SSSUK. No major areas of new content had been added in the last year but he was interested in publishing notices from members on relevant topics and in discussing ideas for developing the website. He encouraged anyone with ideas, or content to contribute, to get in touch with him via website@sssuk.org.

9. *SSA conference*

Douglas Johnson reported on the SSA annual conference in San Francisco which had been well financed and well supported. Jacob Akol, Wendy James and Douglas himself had presented papers. Our President, Ibrahim al-Salahi, had given the keynote speech at the conference dinner. There was no news to report about the next international conference as no host institution has come forward yet. He hoped that it would be possible to arrange one for 2015 or 2016.

10. *Any other business*

- Fergus Nicoll suggested Qatar as a venue for the next international conference and also pointed out that there were many non-members at the symposium and they should all be encouraged to join the SSSUK.
- Charlotte Martin urged the SSSUK to accept help from other institutions to organise additional seminars. She also encouraged members to write for Sudan Studies, particularly those who had presented at the Symposium
- Nahla Abbas thanked Jane Hogan for a visit by a Sudanese group to the Sudan Archive at Durham and encouraged other members to visit.

Jane Hogan, Honorary Secretary
16 September 2014

Sudan Studies Society of the UK (Charity no. 328272): Accounts for 2014

INCOME	2014	2013
Membership dues (chq & SO)	1,672.59	1,936.44
Membership dues (PayPal)	485.00	
Sale of Publications and CDs	42.00	36.00
Interest on Bank Accounts	1.84	1.80
Donations & Misc. Revenue	71.00	117.00
Gift Aid Refund		525.33
AGM/Symposium	1,403.80	820.00
Grand Total	**3,676.23**	**3,436.57**

EXPENDITURE	2014	2013
Printing & Editorial	1,513.89	1,366.47
Secretarial Expenses		
Committee Room Hire	100.00	200.00
Website	100.00	108.00
PayPal Fees	40.04	
Other - Sponsorship for Confnce		
AGM/Symposium	1,552.92	1,691.30
Total	**3,306.85**	**3,365.77**
Surplus/Deficit for the Year	369.38	70.80
Grand Total	3,676.23	**3,436.57**

ASSETS	2014	2013
Bank Balance on 1st January	8,136.83	8,066.03
Bank Balance at 31st December	8,506.21	8,136.83
Surplus/Deficit	369.38	70.80

Adrian P. Thomas

Prepared by Adrian Thomas
Honorary Treasurer, SSSUK

SK Lindley

Checked on behalf of members by
Dr David Lindley, SSSUK Committee

Sudan Studies

Sudan Studies is published twice a year by the Society for the Study of the Sudans (UK). Views expressed in notes, articles and reviews published in Sudan Studies are not necessarily those held by the SSSUK, the Editor or the Editorial Board. Articles are published to promote discussion and further scholarship in Sudan and South Sudan studies.

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Notes for Contributors

SSSUK welcomes notes and articles intended for publication, to be assessed by the Editorial Board. The maximum length is 5,000 words including footnotes; longer articles may be accepted for publication in two or more parts. Short pieces are also welcome. Notes and articles should be typed in Times New Roman and single spaced and should normally be submitted as Microsoft Word files and sent to the editor as an e-mail attachment. Maps, diagrams and photographs should be of high definition and sent as separate files, with a file name corresponding directly to the figure or plate number in the text. Any bibliographies should be in Harvard style. SSSUK retains the right to edit articles for reasons of space or clarity, and consistency of style and spelling.

It is helpful to have some relevant details about the author (2-3 lines), e.g. any post held or time spent in the Sudan and interest in the topic being discussed.

Single copies and back numbers may be obtained from the Secretary at (secretary@sssuk.org) at a cost of £8 per copy plus postage.